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ABSTRACT 
 
Death At Elmira: 
George W. Jernigan, William Hoffman, and 
The Union Prison System 
by 
T. Watson Jernigan 
 
This thesis examines the interaction between the Union Prison System led by William Hoffman 
and the Confederate prisoners-of-war, specifically those held at Elmira, New York.  By focusing 
on Hoffman’s actions and decisions in the last year of the war, the Confederate death toll can be 
better understood. 
 
The treatise relies heavily on The War Of The Rebellion:  A Compilation Of The Official Records 
Of The Union And Confederate Armies.  Two studies were indispensable for this study:  
Hesseltine’s Civil War Prisons:  A Study in War Psychology, and Leslie Hunter’s Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Warden for the Union:  William Hoffman (1807-1884). 
 
The conclusions of my research are:  (A) William Hoffman developed a change in actions in 
1864, and (B) these actions continued in the last year of the war.  As a result of his actions and 
other factors, Elmira had the highest percentage of death of any Union prison camp.  Hoffman’s 
actions led to a higher death rate of Confederate prisoners than has been previously recognized. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Andersonville.  Even today, the name resounds as a prime example of man’s inhumanity 
to man.  The records showed that over 13,000 Union prisoners-of-war (POWs) died in the small 
stockade in Georgia.  The camp had a reputation for some of the worst conditions ever endured 
by any POW.  Inadequate shelter (make-shift tents), poor water supply (a single stream 
supplying over 30,000 men), and horrific rations were among the conditions that caused the 
death of so many men.  The images of the returning Union survivors were among the most 
striking photographs ever taken and compare to those of Holocaust victims of World War II.  As 
a result of Andersonville, the people of the North demanded retaliation and accountability.  The 
commandant of Andersonville, Henry Wirz, became the object of their scorn.  There was no 
doubt that the conditions at Andersonville were horrific and the death toll was high.  It was not, 
however, the only Civil War prison camp to have that reputation.  The Union prison camp at 
Elmira, New York had the reputation of “Hellmira.”  During its twelve-month existence, one in 
every four of the prisoners who entered the camp was buried in Woodlawn Cemetery.  That was 
a death rate comparable to Andersonville.  Many of the survivors of Elmira wrote of inadequate 
shelter (housed in tents until December in New York State), the poisonous drinking water, and 
the poor rations.  Yet, no Union commander had the accountability of Wirz.  It is the thesis of 
this treatise that William Hoffman, Commissary-General of the Union Prison System, was in part 
responsible for the reputation of Elmira. 
8 
 Following the Civil War, POWs, both Union and Confederate, wrote books about their 
experiences in prison camps.  As most survivors passed away, the literature on the prison camps 
declined.  In 1912, Clay W. Holmes wrote The Elmira Prison Camp:  A History of the Military 
Prison at Elmira, N.Y. July 6, 1864, to July 10, 1865.1  It was not until 1930 that another author 
tackled the subject of Civil War prisons and prisoners.  William Best Hesseltine’s Civil War 
Prisons:  A Study In War Psychology2was the classic study on the subject and stood alone until 
the end of the century.  In the 1990s, there was a resurgence of interest in this subject.  Lonnie R. 
Speer’s Portals To Hell:  Military Prisons of the Civil War3 was the first of an increasing 
number of books on Civil War prisoners and their prison experience.  The difference was that 
Northern prison camps have come under as much scrutiny as Andersonville. George Levy’s To 
Die in Chicago:  Confederate Prisoners at Camp Douglas 1862-18654 discussed the prison 
facilities in Chicago, Illinois.  By the turn of the century, Elmira and its reputation was the 
subject of several books.  Michael Horigan’s Elmira:  Death Camp of the North5, Michael P. 
Gray’s The Business of Captivity:  Elmira And Its Civil War Prison6, and Philip Burnham’s So 
Far From Dixie:  Confederates in Yankee Prisons7 were new additions to literature scrutinizing 
the Union prison system, specifically Elmira.  The increased interest in this subject served as the 
basis for James McPherson’s comments.  Writing in a new afterword to his classic, Battle Cry Of 
                                                 
1
 Clay W. Holmes, The Elmira Prison Camp:  A History of the Military Prison at Elmira, N.Y. July 6, 1864, to July  
 10, 1865 (New York:  G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1912). 
2
 William B. Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons:  A Study In War Psychology (Columbus:  The Ohio State University  
 Press, 1930).  Hereafter Civil War Prisons. 
3
 Lonnie R. Speer, Portals To Hell:  Military Prisons of the Civil War (Mechanicsburg:  Stackpole Books, 1997. 
4
 George Levy, To Die in Chicago:  Confederate Prisoners at Camp Douglas 1862-1865 (Gretna, Louisiana:   
 Pelican Publishing Company, 1999). 
5
 Michael Horigan, Elmira:  Death Camp of the North (Mechanicsburg:  Stackpole Books, 2002). 
6
 Michael P. Gray, The Business of Captivity:  Elmira And Its Civil War Prison (Kent:  The Kent State University 
 Press, 2001).  Hereafter listed as:  The Business of Captivity. 
7
 Philip Burnham, So Far From Dixie:  Confederates in Yankee Prisons (Lanham, Maryland:  Taylor Trade  
Publishing, 2003). 
9 
Freedom:  The Civil War Era, he stated, “Civil War Prisons and Prisoners have finally begun to 
get the attention they have so long needed.”8 
 Along with this renewed interest in POW issues, new information became available to 
modern scholars.  Some of this information led to a critical analysis of William Hoffman’s 
actions during the last year of the war.  In his study, Hesseltine described a phenomenon of the 
North that he labeled, “war psychosis.”  He wrote, “Apparently an inevitable concomitant of 
armed warfare is the hatred engendered in the minds of the contestants by the conflict.  The spirit 
of patriotism which inspires men to answer the call of their country in its hour of need breeds 
within those men the fiercest antagonism toward that country’s enemies…Seemingly, it becomes 
for the supporters of one cause to identify their entire personality with that cause, to identify 
their opponents with the opposing cause, and to hate the supporters of the enemy cause with a 
venom which counterbalances their devotion to their own.”9  This condition of “war psychosis” 
created changes in the actions of individuals.  Confederate prisoners endured hardship and 
suffering during the time frame of this condition.  While not using the term “war psychosis,” 
McPherson wrote of this time frame, “Nevertheless, the reduction of prisoner rations was 
indicative of a hardening northern attitude.  Combined with the huge increase in number of 
prisoners during 1864, this produced a deterioration of conditions in northern prisons until the 
suffering, sickness, and death in some of them rivaled that in southern prisons…10 
 Leslie Gene Hunter wrote Warden Of The North:  William Hoffman (1807-1884) as his 
Ph.D. dissertation in 1971.  Using this “war psychosis” as a basis for his thesis, Hunter admitted 
Hoffman developed “war psychosis” during the last year of the war.  He pointed to several 
                                                 
8
 James M. McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom:  The Civil War Era (New York:  Ballentine Books, 1988), 864. 
 An afterword written April 23, 2003. 
10 
decisions made by Hoffman that caused conditions for Confederate POWs to deteriorate.  Hunter 
indicated that the time frame of Hoffman’s “war psychosis” was limited, and quantitatively it 
had no appreciable impact upon prisoner outcomes.  By the use of monthly mortality rates, he 
calculated the percentage of deaths for the prisoners.  It was Hunter’s thesis that other factors 
and conditions, not Hoffman’s actions, caused the increase in Confederate death toll in the last 
year of the war. 
 The thesis of this treatise is that William Hoffman changed in his actions toward the 
Confederate prisoners during the last year of the war.  It is the effect of these actions that caused 
significant problems for the Confederate captives, especially those located at Elmira.  It will be 
shown that Hoffman’s actions did affect the death toll at Elmira and that its reputation as 
“Hellmira” is at least in part due to Hoffman.  Using The War Of The Rebellion:  A Compilation 
Of The Official Records Of The Union And Confederate Armies, this thesis will show that certain 
decisions regarding Elmira were Hoffman’s alone and that those decisions contributed to nearly 
3,000 deaths in twelve months. 
 Whether being used to estimate casualties after battle or to denote the number of deaths 
in a prison camp, statistics are the cold reality of history.  Yet, history is made up of individuals 
who become those statistics.  During the last year of the war, more Confederate POWs including 
George W. Jernigan lost their lives in those prison camps than in the previous years.  Jernigan’s 
records showed he enlisted in the Confederate service in 1861 and served with the 20th NC 
Volunteer Infantry Regiment.  He was captured after the battle of Harris Farm on May 20th, 
1864, and entered Elmira’s prison camp on July 6th of that year.  He was number 275 through the 
                                                                                                                                                             
9
 Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, 172. 
10
 McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom:  The Civil War Era, 798. 
11 
gates of the camp on its first day of operation.  This thesis describes the conditions of Elmira 
Prison Camp and the death of George W. Jernigan. 
12 
CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR  
TO THE EXCHANGE CARTEL OF 1862 
   A prisoner of war is a public enemy armed or attached to the  
   hostile army for active aid, who has fallen into the hands of the 
   captor, either fighting or wounded, on the field or in the hospital, 
   by individual surrender, or by capitulation. 
 
       Francis Lieber11 
 
 Since the development of Homo Sapiens on the plains of East Africa, the history of 
Mankind has been marked by conflict between individuals, tribes of individuals, and ultimately, 
nation-states.  As the complexity of the communities in conflict grew, unwritten and written laws 
arose that governed these conflicts.  These laws addressed the behavior of combatants toward 
one another.  As warfare changed, these laws were revised and expanded to include the treatment 
of non-combatants and captives.  As the armies grew in size numerically, the care of large 
numbers of captives became an issue.  Special rules and procedures were developed to deal with 
the number of prisoners held by each belligerent.  On the eve of the Civil War, there was no 
codified written document for participants to follow in the treatment of captives.  Even with 
codified rules and regulations, the ethical and moral treatment of captives plagued humanity 
even into the Twenty-First Century. 
 The first chapter of this thesis describes the development of behavior by captors toward 
captives from biblical times until the Nineteenth Century.  As warfare changed, the chapter 
shows how the treatment of captives also changed.  It explores the emergence of special 
procedures dealing with captives and the rationale behind their development.  It reviews how the 
13 
enemies of the fledging United States of America treated captured American soldiers.  It 
discusses the events leading to the first POWs during the Civil War and the subsequent attempts 
by newspapers and individuals to bring about the general release of those POWs.  The chapter 
ends with the development of the Exchange Cartel of 1862 for the release of those captured 
soldiers.  Finally, this chapter details the rise of the individual who had a tremendous impact on 
Confederate POWs…William Hoffman. 
 For the legal scholar, a cursory look at ancient civilizations revealed no POW issues.  
The maxim “to the victor go the spoils of war” meant no prisoners to care for or to exchange.  In 
Deuteronomy Chapter 20 Verse 16-18, the Ancient Israelites were instructed as to their behavior 
against their neighbors: 
  “However, in the cities of the nations the Lord your God is giving to you 
  as an inheritance, do not leave alive anything that breathes.  Completely  
  destroy them—the Hittites, Amorites, Canannites, Perizzites, Hivites, and  
  Jebusites—As the Lord your God has commanded you.  Otherwise, they will  
  teach you to follow all the detestable things they do in worshipping their  
  gods, and you will sin against the Lord your God.”12 
 
The Ancient Middle East had military powers such as Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Egyptians who 
were more brutal than their predecessors.  It was a region of retribution, slaughter, and 
enslavement of the vanquished.13  It was a region where numerous societies were vulnerable to 
threatening neighbors.  Consequently, their warring behavior was more ruthless towards their 
foes.14  The numerically fewer their foes, the greater the chance for long-term survival. 
 Not all ancient societies treated their captives with marked distain.  Ancient Indians of 
North America had laws that forbade the killing of any enemy who had asked for quarter or 
                                                                                                                                                             
11
 Leon Friedman, Editor, The Law of War Vol. I (New York:  Random House, Inc., 1972), 168. 
12
 The Holy Bible New International Version Containing The Old Testament and The New Testament.  (Grand 
 Rapids:  Zondervan Publishing House, 1984), 304.  
13
 Peter Karsten, Law, Soldiers, and Combat (Westport:  Greenwood Press, 1976), 5. 
14 
surrender.15  Over the centuries, the Middle East evolved in its treatment of captives.  With the 
fall of Jerusalem in 690 B.C.E. to the Babylonians, the treatment of the local Jewish populace 
was prescribed by specific guidelines.  According to the Babylonian commander, Sennacherib, 
the conquered Jews were treated according to their involvement.  The officials and patricians 
who had committed crimes were executed and their bodies placed on poles.  Those citizens 
guilty of minor crimes were taken as POWs.  The remainder of the citizenry was released.  The 
conquered King of the Jews was required to pay personal tribute to Sennacherib.16  Over time, 
the treatment of POWs and non-combatants changed as they acquired a precious commodity—
worth. 
 As ancient civilizations developed greater complexity and sophistication, their 
philosophies and goals changed.  The need for slaves and unskilled labor increased as the 
economies of the ruling government became more sophisticated.17  For the Greek civilization, 
they were rarely free from attack either from outsiders (Greeks versus Persians) or among 
themselves (Athenians versus Syracusians).  Yet, warring armies generally respected temples, 
priests, and sacred places.  Prisoners were seldom mistreated as they could be exchanged, 
ransomed, or used as slaves to increase the value of the victorious city-state.18  In the Greek era 
only one in four battles ended with the total annihilation of prisoners.19  There was no 
                                                                                                                                                             
14
 Ibid., 4. 
15
 Major Pat Reid MBE MC and Maurice Michael, Prisoner Of War (New York:  Beaufort Book Publishers, 1978),  
 17. 
16
 Friedman, The Law Of War, 4. 
17
 Karsten, Law, Soldiers, and Combat, 4. 
18
 Ibid., 5. 
19
 Reid and Michael, Prisoner Of War, 28. 
15 
requirement for the battle to end in a slaughter of the prisoners and enslavement of the populace.  
However, it was still perfectly legal for the victorious army to treat its captives in this manner.20 
 The Roman Empire was built on military might and political power.  The Romans saw 
the same merit in prisoners, as did other civilizations.  After the Punic War, with the rise of 
organized agriculture and mining, there was an increased need for able-bodies laborers, not 
slaughtered captives.21  Aiding the slave-traders in meeting this increased demand for skilled 
laborers was a change in the customary law of warfare or ius belli.  Under the Romans, the ius 
belli included protection for ambassadors, temples, and persons who had been guaranteed 
quarter.  It provided for the exchange of POWs.  While the behavior of the Roman legions 
remained occasionally brutal, the need for economic labor advanced the treatment of POWs 
closer toward the modern laws of warfare.22 
 With the fall of the Roman Empire and the rise of Christianity, brutal warfare that 
characterized earlier civilizations returned to the European lands.  Tribal warfare (Visigoths, 
Franks, Saxons) led to a return of plundering and killing of non-combatants, especially prisoners.  
During the early Middle Ages, the Christian Church leaders tried to legislate restraint in battle.  
A constant them for these early leaders was the use of penance for Christian soldiers in the 
constant warfare of the time.23  In addition to penance requirements, the churches used 
penitential codes to standardize sanctions for transgressions committed by the populace 
including soldiers.  These sanctions included penance for the killing of pagans and Jews.  In 
1008 C.E., the Corrector of Burchard of Worms included the following sanction:  “Have you 
                                                 
20
 Karsten, Law, Soldiers, and Combat, 8. 
21
 Michael Rostovtzeff, The Social & Economic History Of The Hellenistic World Two Volumes (London,  
 England:  Oxford University Press, 1941), Vol. II, 1259-1261. 
22
 Karsten, Law, Soldiers, and Combat, 8-9. 
23
 Friedman, The Law Of War, 7. 
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committed homicide in a war by the command of the lawful prince who had ordered this done 
for the sake of peace…then you shall do a penance for three forty-days periods on the appointed 
days.”24 
 In addition to sanctions of penance, the early church leaders issued public decrees in an 
effort to restrain the cruelty of warfare.  These decrees, called “Peace of God,” attempted to 
outlaw any fighting on the days Thursday through Sunday.  The first “Peace of God” decree was 
issued in Charroux in 989 C.E.  The Archbishop of Arles in 1035 C.E. issued another decree, 
entitled “Truce of God.”  This decree beseeched all Christians to observe no fighting from 
Wednesday evening to Monday sunrise.25  Despite the attempts at restraint, the brutality of 
warfare continued, as seen by the treatment of prisoners in the Crusades and in the Eastern 
Empire.  A classic incident of this brutality was from Eastern Europe.  In 1014 C.E., the Eastern 
Emperor, Basil II, defeated the Bulgarian army at the Battle of Balathisia.  He blinded all of the 
captured prisoners.  A relatively few prisoners were blinded in only one eye so they could lead 
their fellow countrymen home. 
 For those prisoners who were neither slaughtered nor enslaved, there was a way to regain 
their freedom.  As early as the Code of Hammurabi, there were rules governing the paying of 
ransoms.26  As Christian knights fought other Christian knights in the early Middle Ages, it was 
not unusual to be fighting friends and relatives.  In these combative encounters, the captive 
prisoner was the personal property of his captor.  Depending upon the status of his captive, the 
captor expected to collect more than the standard 80-100 drachmae, which was the average 
ransom of a captive in ancient times.  By the early Middle Ages, the standard levy was the 
                                                 
24
 Ibid., 8. 
25
 Ibid. 9. 
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equivalent of the captive’s gross income for one year.  If the prisoners were unable to pay the 
ransom, they were either hanged or set free without means to fend for themselves far from 
home.27 
 As the early Middle Ages dissolved into the late Middle Ages, the treatment of POWs 
changed little.  The outcome of their lives remained in the hands of their captors.  The policy of 
ransoming continued as wealthy captives bought their freedom.  The poorer prisoners were sent 
into enslavement while a select few captives were exchanged.28  Europe between 1520 and 1650 
C.E. was at war constantly with hardly a year of peace.  Armies were raised by military 
contractors and were paid by their commanders in the field.  Poor transportation limited the 
ability to feed these troops as they marched throughout the land.  Consequently, the troops were 
forced to live off the surrounding countryside and towns.  The anticipated result of sieges was 
plundering and sacking of the besieged town.  With no means to care for prisoners and difficulty 
in maintaining discipline, the fate of captive soldiers and non-combatants alike was precarious.  
The brutality of the age extended to the soldiers as well.  In 1642, the Articles of War for the 
English parliamentary army had forty-five offenses that were punishable by death.29 
 The intensity of the warfare provoked a re-examination of the laws of war by scholars, 
theologians, and jurists, and included Francisco de Vitoria, Balthazar Ayala, Francisco Suarez, 
and Alberto Gentili, who reviewed the classical Greek and Roman writings on the laws of 
warfare.  These authors combined classical writings with Christian dogma to produce 
manuscripts on the ius belli regarding the treatment of POWs.  According to Gentili, in a just 
                                                                                                                                                             
26
 Reid and Michael, Prisoner Of War, 16. 
27
 Ibid., 19. 
28
 Richard Garrett, P.O.W. (Newton Abbot, England:  David & Charles Limited, 1981), 28. 
29
 Geoffrey Parker, Success Is Never Final:  Empire, War, and Faith in Early Modern Europe (New York:  Basic 
 Books, 2002), 154. 
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war the advent of professional armies allowed for the honorable surrender of soldiers.  
Therefore, captives were not to be subjected to abuse.30 
 The start of the modern law of war began with the publishing of De Jure Belli et Pacis 
(On the Law of War and Peace) by Hugo Grotius in 1625.  Born in the Netherlands in 1583, 
Grotius was a lawyer and wrote briefs for the Dutch East India Company.  He served the Dutch 
government in several high official positions.  In 1619, he was forced to flee to France after he 
was sentenced to life-imprisonment for backing the losing party in a political quarrel.  While 
there, he wrote his three-volume study that formed the basis for parts of The Hague and Geneva 
Conventions on the laws of war.  The first volume examined the lawfulness of any war and the 
second volume the causes of war.  Grotius created rules of international law by answering 
questions on the nature of war.  To support his answers, he quoted the teachings of Ancient 
Israelites, Greeks, Romans and church founders such as St. Augustine.31   
 Grotius discussed the conduct of war including the treatment of POWs and civilians in 
his third volume.  He advocated moderation of war and restraint of the use of poisons, but he was 
harsh in the treatment permitted towards prisoners.  In Chapter IV, Section X entitled, “The right 
to inflict injury extends even over captives, and without limitation of time,” he wrote, “So far as 
the law of nations is concerned, the right of killing such slaves, that is, captives taken in war, is 
not precluded at any time, although it is restricted, now more, now less, by the laws of states.”32  
By Chapter XIV, entitled, “Moderation in regard to prisoners of war,” the author argued that 
innocent prisoners, those who had not committed crimes, should not be killed; they should not be 
punished severely; and they should not be given excessively severe work.  Grotius answered the 
                                                 
30
 Karsten, Law, Soldiers, and Combat, 13. 
31
 Friedman, Law Of War, 15. 
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question about captives in countries that did not have slavery.  First, he recommended the 
exchange of POWs.  If that was unavailable, he proposed the art of ransoming at a price that was 
not unfair.  He quoted the ancient Greek sum of mina or the equivalent of one month’s pay for 
the captive.33 
The treatise of Grotius contained a written code of conduct for combatants.  In addition to 
this code, evolution in warfare created more restraint toward POWs.  The rise of the nation-states 
removed the burden of sustaining forces in the field from military contractors to the nation-state 
itself.  Combatants reached agreements that the wounded and sick POWs would be protected and 
exchanged as quickly as possible.34  Formalized exchanges of POWs were tied to the traditional 
art of ransoming.  By 1599, Spain and the Dutch Republic entered into a formal cartel for the 
exchange of prisoners—the cuartel general.  This agreement stated that all POWs were to be 
exchanged within twenty-five days of capture.  The exchanges were by equal rank of the 
prisoners until all possible POWs were exchanged.  Any remaining captives were ransomed at 
the equivalent of one month’s pay.  There was an additional daily “entertainment” fee to be paid 
by the prisoner’s country.35  In addition to the law of war by Grotius, the precedents of exchange 
and ransom of POWs were in place by the 1700s. 
 Over the next 100 years, the dynastic wars of Europe were fought between the 
professional armies of the nation-states.  During this time, two developments occurred in the 
treatment of POWs.  As the exchange system for captives continued to improve, the art of 
ransoming died.  Rather than buying their freedom, non-officer POWs simply waited their turn 
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 Ibid., 35. 
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 Ibid., 111. 
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 Parker, Success Is Never Final:  Empire, War and Faith In Early Modern Europe, 167. 
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 Ibid., 160. 
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for exchange rather than burden their families financially.36  The second development concerned 
those officers who were held prisoner.  In the wars between England and France, officers were 
allowed to give their parole d’honneur.  This agreement was between the captured officer and 
his host captors.  In exchange for his word of honor, the officer was granted the freedom to live 
outside any prison facility and to travel within a certain distance of his housing.  By giving his 
word of honor, the officer promised not to escape or to perform acts that were detrimental to his 
host country’s situation.  He was required to report to the local authorities regularly.  The 
paroled officers lived on monies sent from their governments and families, and from the sale of 
homemade crafts.37 
This system of paroles continued into the Napoleonic Wars of the early 1800s. The 
fortunes of non-commissioned officers who were held captive declined when the French 
Revolution created an environment of distrust.  During the Conventions of 1793 and 1794, the 
French delegates banned the ransoming of prisoners.  Consequently, the number of POWs held 
in England and France escalated.  By 1799, there were 26,000 French POWs held in England.  
This number of POWs exceeded the total capacity of England’s available space including 
prisons, fortresses, castles, and hulks of ships anchored in harbors.  The British government 
addressed the problem by building the first POW camps.  In 1797, construction began with the 
building of a POW camp at Norman Cross near Shelton.  To alleviate the conditions caused by 
this overcrowded condition, attempts were made to exchange POWs between the two 
combatants.  Unfortunately, extensive exchanges failed because the English and the French 
could not agree on conditions.  The failure of large-scale exchanges left exchanges to older 
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POWs, the sickly, and young boys.38  The policy of prisoner exchange was to continue in the 
War of 1812 between the United States of America and Great Britain. 
By 1861, there was no written unified code of conduct with regard to warfare and to the 
treatment of prisoners for the United States of America and its military forces.  Without such a 
written code of warfare, any military action was open to unforeseen legal ramifications.  For the 
Civil War, these ramifications began even before the firing on Fort Sumter on April 12th, 1861.   
On February 1st, the state secession convention of Texas passed the ordinance of secession 
severing the ties between Texas and the United States of America and the Federal government.  
At the time of the vote, the United States army had 2,649 regular army officers and enlisted men 
stationed in Texas.39  The military personnel were under the leadership of Brevet Major General 
(Maj. Gen.) David E. Twiggs.  These troops controlled the Federal governmental property 
including camps and forts within Texas.  The state secession convention desired this property 
including the military equipment contained within the forts. 
General (Gen.) Twiggs, who was born in 1790, had served in the regular army since the 
War of 1812.  He fought with distinction in both the Black Hawk War and the Seminole Wars.40  
He accompanied Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott in the Mexican War where he was 
brevetted twice to the rank of Brevet Maj. Gen.  By 1857, he was named commander of the 
Department of Texas.  Twiggs was aware of the growing sectional conflict and its potential 
impact on his command.  Before the Texas secession convention’s vote, Twiggs had written to 
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the War Department in Washington requesting instructions as to his course of action.  When no 
response was forthcoming, Twiggs proceeded to place his headquarters in San Antonio on alert, 
consolidated his forces from outlying posts, and ordered the protection of governmental 
property.41  For his efforts, the War Department relieved Gen. Twiggs of command and ordered 
Colonel (Col.) Carlos Waite to report to San Antonio to replace him. 
Events in Texas moved faster that the War Department in Washington.  Shortly after the 
ordinance of secession passed, the state convention appointed a Committee of Public Safety to 
negotiate with Gen. Twiggs for the transfer of Federal property from the United States 
government to the State of Texas.  This committee named several commissions to request 
deliverance of all governmental property and military posts under Twiggs’ command.42  At the 
time of their requests, these representatives of the State of Texas were in rebellion from the 
government of the United States of America.  When Twiggs did not immediately meet their 
requests, the State of Texas reacted with a show of force.  At 0400 hours on February 16th, 1861, 
a Texas militia force commanded by Col. Ben McCulloch entered the garrison of San Antonio.  
McCulloch commanded a force of 1000 volunteers and militia.43  In the face of an overwhelming 
force, Twiggs and his command of 160 men surrendered the governmental property and military 
post under his control.  He relinquished neither his troops nor their ordinance of light batteries. 
Twiggs agreed to turn over the property on February 18th provided his troops retained 
theirs arms and clothing.  He requested that transportation be obtained to move his troops from 
Texas.44  The commissioners consented to his requests, but stipulated that the troops be sent by 
the way of the coast of Texas.  They agreed the infantry and cavalry troops would retain their 
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arms and their two batteries of light artillery.  In a circular printed on February 18th, the state 
commissioners ordered that every facility be afforded to the troops, as “they are our friends.”45  
With the negotiations completed, the men of the San Antonio garrison (Company A, 8th Infantry 
and Company I, 1st Infantry) marched out of the garrison with the band playing “Red, White, and 
Blue.”  The Sergeant Major of the regiment saved the regimental flag by wrapping it around his 
person, under his uniform.46  The enlisted men and non-commissioned officers made camp about 
three miles from the city.  The headquarters staff remained in town and was confined to the San 
Antonio barracks.  By the next morning, Col. Waits arrived in the city to assume command of 
the forces in Texas.  Maj. Gen. Twiggs was relieved of his command and retired to his home in 
New Orleans. 
Col. Waite was left with an agreement with the Committee of Public Safety for the State 
of Texas.  He did not have any binding contract with the government of the fledgling 
Confederate States of America.  Per his agreement, Waite began concentrating his troops near 
Indianola in an effort to remove them from Texas soil.  This concentration of armed troops 
created a stir in the newly formed Confederate Texas government.  Responding to their concerns, 
higher Confederate governmental officials ordered Col. Earl Van Dorn to assume command of 
all Southern troops in Texas.  The Adjutant and Inspector General’s Office instructed Van Dorn 
“to intercept and prevent the movement of the U.S. troops from the State of Texas.”  Though 
some of the Union officers and enlisted men joined the Confederate States of America army, the 
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remainder of the Union troops was regarded as POWs.47  This change of status for Union troops 
occurred on April 11th, 1861, before the firing on Fort Sumter. 
Once the hostilities commenced, the Federal troops in Texas were without any agreement 
with regard to their safety.  The Confederate government declared that the authority of the state’s 
Committee of Public Safety had ended when Van Dorn assumed military control of Texas.  As a 
state of war was not in effect when Twiggs made his agreement with the commissioners, the 
subsequent state of war negated the agreement.48  Thus, all remaining Federal troops were to be 
captured and disarmed.  Van Dorn coordinated the capture and surrender of the Federal troops.  
Some troops were captured en route to the coast and others were taken prisoner while on troop 
ships leaving Indianola.  One of these troop steamers was the ill-fated Star of the West that had 
tried to reinforce Fort Sumter earlier in the year.  As the Star of the West prepared to leave 
Indianola, Confederate volunteers boarded the ship and took the homebound troops captive.  
Between April 23rd and May 13th, all 2,649 officers and enlisted men of the United States army 
surrendered to Confederate authorities.  The legal question was now, “What to do with these 
POWs?” 
For several years, the European system of parole and exchange of POWs had existed.  
Captured prisoners were paroled to their homes to await exchange for another captured POW.  
The exchange occurred on paper and the soldier returned to his military unit and to the fighting.  
Legally speaking, this system existed between two separate, but equal, nation-states who were 
the belligerents.  The difficulty faced by Waite and his troops was the questionable legal 
standing of the Confederate States of America.  On April 23rd, a Captain (Capt.) Wilcox entered 
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the headquarters of Col. Waite in San Antonio.  Wilcox informed Waite of his status as a POW.  
Waite questioned Wilcox by what authority he was a POW.  The answer was by the power of the 
President of the Confederate States of America.  Waite protested and denounced his status as “an 
act of unwarranted usurpation, and against the custom of war, and in violation of his personal 
rights.”49  Despite strict legal standing, Waite and his troops were offered either acceptance as 
detained POWs or parole and safe passage to the North.  Waite requested and was granted an 
additional twenty-four hours to consider their options.  He reassembled with his officers and men 
at noon on April 24th.  The majority overwhelmingly chose parole as the only method that would 
secure escape from Texas and place them within the authority of the Federal government.50  A 
few of the commissioned officers and about fifteen percent of the regular troops were persuaded 
to join the Confederate army.51 
Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) William Hoffman of the 8th Infantry was one of the officers 
under the command of Waite who opted for parole.  Prior to accepting that parole, he requested, 
in writing, a note allowing him the privilege of reporting the facts of his arrest as a POW and of 
his command to the War Department.52  Upon receipt of that note, he accepted the following 
parole: 
“I do hereby declare upon my honor and pledge myself as a gentleman and a soldier 
that I will not take arms or serve in the field against the Government of the Confederate 
States of America under my present or any other commission that I may hold during 
the existence of the present war between the United States and the Government of the  
Confederate States of America; that I will not correspond with the authorities of the  
United States either military or civil, giving information against the interest of the  
Confederate States of America until regularly exchanged.”53 
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Once they had signed the above noted parole, the officers and enlisted men of the Texas 
command were permitted to sail for New York City.  Not all of the remaining Federal troops 
were as lucky. 
 On May 10th, Van Dorn notified the Adjutant and Inspector General’s Office that he had 
captured ten officers and 337 men under the command of Col. Reeke.  Unlike Waite and the 
other 2,350 men of his command, Van Dorn indicated he was determined to hold these troops as 
POWs indefinitely.54  Though the officers were to be considered for parole, Van Dorn insisted 
that the enlisted troops were to be held without opportunity for parole.  What had transpired 
between April 24th and May 10th to create this environment for captured troops?  The change in 
environment began shortly after the bombardment of Fort Sumter.  On April 17th, President 
Jefferson Finis Davis issued a proclamation offering letter of marquee and reprisal for 
individuals desiring to engage the Federal government.  Though the Conference of Paris of 1856 
had outlawed privateering, Davis’ proclamation was still legal and valid.  The United States of 
America had failed to accede to the proposal and had never signed the agreement.  Thus, private 
individuals were able to seize Union ships for the Confederacy without legal ramifications by 
Davis’ offer.  President Abraham Lincoln countered with a proclamation on April 19th.  He 
ordered that all vessels and crews taken in such actions would be considered pirates and dealt 
with in accordance to municipal law.55  Lincoln’s order meant that those captured in the act of 
privateering could be hanged.  In was in response to Lincoln’s order that Van Dorn declared his 
intentions. 
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 During the late spring of 1861, forces of the United States navy captured naval personnel 
operating under the letters of marquee issued by Davis.  These naval officers and crewmen were 
placed in jails to await trials for piracy.  The Lincoln administration initially received support for 
this hard-line policy from Republican newspapers such as the New York Times.  The Times urged 
Lincoln to proceed with his policy despite a threat to retaliate against Confederate-held POWs if 
any naval personnel were executed.  In the words of an editorial published July 13th, the editors 
encouraged the President to proceed with haste.  “If t’were done, ‘twere well ‘twere done 
quickly.”56 
 Support for the administration’s policy changed following the disastrous defeat at the 
battle of First Bull Run.  The Confederate government now held a significant number of POWs 
including a member of the House of Representatives, the Honorable Alfred Ely, who was 
captured following the battle on July 21st.  He was held in Richmond in a converted tobacco 
warehouse known as Libby’s Prison.  Retaliation for Union treatment of Confederate naval 
personnel was now possible and likely.  The quandary of the POW issue was a difficult one for 
the Lincoln administration.  In Lincoln’s view, the Confederate government had not left the 
Union, but represented a rebellion against the legal government.  Lincoln did not recognize the 
Confederate States of America as a legitimate belligerent.  Consequently, under the laws of war, 
the Confederate government had no legal standing and was not able to exchange POWs.  The 
administration’s policy dictated that no exchange of POWs be done for fear of inadvertently 
recognizing the Confederate government as a legitimate belligerent.  The consequence of this 
policy was that POWs would be held until the end of the rebellion.  
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 In response to the administration’s policy, the Union officers and enlisted men who were 
held with Representative Ely petitioned Lincoln to effect their parole and release.57  While there 
was no response from the administration, newspapers and individuals championed a change of 
policy by the government.  The editors of the New York Times published a letter to the editor 
entitled, “The Disposal Of Prisoners.”  Printed on August 19th, the author forcibly argued the 
question, “Does an exchange of prisoners in a civil war imply a partial acknowledgement of the 
insurgents?”  He cited the historical exchange of prisoners by combatants in previous civil wars 
without either side recognizing the other.  In the author’s opinion, “The exchange of prisoners 
involves no question of acknowledgement of right, but is a simple recognition of fact and 
reality.”  The letter was signed F.L.58  The author was Francis Lieber, Chair of History and 
Political Economy at Columbia College in New York City.  This college professor was much 
more that an interested observer of the ongoing conflict. 
  Francis Lieber had been born in Berlin, Prussia in March of 1798.  He was the son of a 
Prussian iron maker and was influenced by the Napoleonic conquest of his native land.  By 1815, 
he had joined the Prussian army serving in the Waterloo Campaign.  Seriously wounded at the 
battle of Namur, he returned home for recovery and his education.  During his formative years, 
he was classified a liberal thinker and imprisoned by the Prussian government.  Upon completion 
of his doctorate, he was ordered to leave his residence and ultimately, entered the Greek War of 
independence with other German liberals.  When disillusionment led him to flee to Italy, he 
made an income by tutoring the son of the German ambassador.  He returned to Berlin in 1823 
only to be arrested again by the government for his role in a “liberal” conspiracy.  Aided by 
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friends, Lieber was first released from prison and then escaped to England.  He made his way to 
America, arriving in New York City in 1827.59 
 To support himself, Lieber edited the Encyclopedia Americana from 1827 to 1835.  
Written by prominent authors, these thirteen volumes contained articles on history, politics, and 
science.  By the end of 1835, he had accepted an offer to be Chair of History and Political 
Economy at South Carolina College.  While teaching there, he wrote the first systematic works 
on political science examining the philosophy of the state.  By the 1850s, Francis Lieber was 
considered the first political scientist in the United States.  His time in the South was troubling 
for this liberal political scientist.60 
 Despite having owned slaves and taught at a southern college, Lieber was one of the 
earliest critics of secession.  His views on the state of the Union led to his resignation from South 
Carolina College in 1857.  He returned to the North to find an offer from Columbia College.  
While teaching and writing at Columbia, Lieber discussed the breakdown of the Union.  He 
wrote in 1860, “When nations go on recklessly as we do, dancing, drinking, laughing, defying 
right, morality, justice, (engaging in) money-making and murdering, God in his mercy has 
sometimes condescended to smite them and to smite them hard, in order to bring them to their 
senses and make them recover themselves.”61  During his time in America, he had cultivated 
many friends, including Republican politicians.  Among these politicians was Senator Charles 
Sumner.  Through his friendship with Sumner, Lieber had a conduit for his ideas to a wider 
audience. 
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 By 1861, Lieber cultivated a variety of lines of communication with high officials in 
Washington, including several generals in the Union army.  He met with the President as the 
official representative of Columbia when the institution conferred an honorary degree upon 
Lincoln.  Through other contacts, he made close friends with the Attorney General, Edward 
Bates.  The Missourian was at that moment trying to defend Lincoln’s suspension of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus in April.  With the help of noted Philadelphia lawyer, Horace Binney, Lieber 
published several pamphlets supporting the suspension and refuting the arguments of the Chief 
Justice, Roger Taney.  These pamphlets were well received by the population as well as the 
Attorney General.62 
 With his contacts and friends in Washington, Lieber was no casual observer of the 
ongoing conflict.  The editors of the New York Times readily agreed.  On the day, August 19th, 
that Lieber’s letter was published, they noted, “we publish a communication from a gentleman 
whose initials sufficiently accredit his opinions as entitled to weight upon this subject.”63  Lieber 
concluded his letter of that date with the statement “nothing remains to be decided except the 
expediency or advantage, which we leave to the proper authorities.  They must decide, in each 
case, whether it is advisable or not.”64  Others were not so gracious in their patience awaiting a 
decision from the Lincoln administration.  As the voice of the POWs held in Richmond, Ely 
cried out for the attention of the government.  He argued that POWs must be exchanged 
whatever may be the direct or implied consequences.65  Another letter to the editors of the Times 
questioned, “Is it right that the prisoners receive nothing from a Government whose peculiar 
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policy prevents the prisoner from supporting his family?”66  By October, the editors themselves 
had joined in the clamor for exchange of prisoners.  In an editorial published on October 8th, they 
noted that sufficient Confederate prisoners had been retained at the capture of the Hatteras forts 
to exchange for those held in Richmond.  The editorial concluded there was “not only no reason 
why an exchange should not be negotiated, but every reason why it should; and if the 
Government will be at the trouble to revise its decisions upon the point, we feel an assurance that 
its previous judgment will be reversed.  The question is one not only of urgent expediency, but 
of the merest humanity.”67  Despite the pressure from Congress and newspapers, the Lincoln 
administration did not change its policy, but the issue of POWs was becoming a significant 
logistical problem for the government. 
 The outbreak of hostilities created chaos on both sides of the Potomac.  The creation of 
military commands overnight overwhelmed even the best of planners.  The low priority of POWs 
meant little if anything was done to prepare for the influx of human beings held captive for 
extended periods of time.  Where would they be held?  How would they be cared for?  Who 
would be responsible for their conditions?  These important questions were not addressed in the 
first months of the war.  Thus, a converted tobacco warehouse was used for Union POWs, while 
standard city jails housed captured Confederate privateers. 
 The Quartermaster-General of the Union Army, Montgomery C. Meigs, recognized the 
need for some planning.  It was under his command that the Confederate POWs would be placed.  
He wrote Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, on July 11th inquiring into the inevitable increase in 
POWs.  He noted the difference in status between disloyal citizens and POWs, and depicted the 
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traditional conditions for the care of POWs, including their needs from shelter, medical care, and 
food.  Meigs reminded Cameron of the office of Commissary of Prisoners, a historical title used 
in the War of 1812 with Great Britain.  During that conflict, Gen. John Mason served, as the 
Commissary of Prisoners for the United States, while Mr. Thomas Barclay, the British Consul at 
New York, was his English counterpart.68 
 Meigs described the duties of the job and the necessary qualifications of the individual 
named to this office.  He specifically made a distinction between the position of Commissary of 
Prisoners and the Provost-Marshall, who was the chief superintendent of prisoners.  As the job 
required a complete knowledge of military law and custom, the Commissary of Prisoners was 
considered a much higher position.  In addition to a sound military background, the officer 
needed to be skilled in negotiating the exchange of prisoners as well as sound financial 
understanding due to the large sums of money that passed through his hands.69  Until October 
1861, the Secretary of War ignored the request by Meigs.  By that time, the captured privateers 
and officers captured by McClellan in western Virginia were joined by troops who surrendered 
after the fall of the Hatteras Inlet forts.  In the Western Theater, the POW camp near Columbus, 
Ohio, held both military captives and political prisoners.  In Missouri, there was no system of 
order for the detainees.  Citizens accused of disloyalty, guerillas, and Confederate soldiers were 
held in a confiscated medical college and a deserted slave pen in St. Louis.70  The Union military 
prison system needed someone to create order out of this chaotic system. 
 On October 3rd, Meigs again wrote to Cameron about the need for establishing a depot 
for POWs on one of the islands in Lake Erie.  Meigs recommended Lt. Col. William Hoffman of 
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the 8th Infantry regiment to the position of Commissary of Prisoners.  In his correspondence, 
Meigs noted Hoffman was still on parole from the Texas surrender in April and was unable to 
take a field command.71  By Special Orders No. 284 and by order of the Secretary of War, Lt. 
Col. William Hoffman was detailed for duty as Commissary-General of Prisoners on October 
23rd.72  
He was instructed to report for duty and to report to the Quarter-Master General for orders.  
Meigs instructed Hoffman to evaluate the islands of Lake Erie for the purpose of creating a depot 
for Confederate POWs. 
 William Hoffman was a career military officer from a military family.  His father was Lt. 
Col. William Hoffman.  The older Hoffman was a First Lieutenant (Lt.) with the 41st Infantry 
during the War of 1812.  Two of his brothers saw combat action with the regular army.  One 
brother, Satterlee, was a Second Lieutenant in the First Artillery at the time of his death.  On 
August 20, 1847, Satterlee was killed in action at the battle of Churubusco, Mexico.  The other 
brother was a Second Lieutenant in the 6th Infantry.  Alexander T. Hoffman was serving in the 
regular army in Florida at the time of his death in 1844.  As for the younger William, he was 
born in New York City on December 2, 1807.  Under the tutelage of the younger officers in his 
father’s command, William’s early education came on garrison duty.73  Growing up in a large 
family dependent on meager military pay, Hoffman learned to be as close with a dollar as a 
necessity.74 
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 By age seventeen, Hoffman was appointed to the United States Military Academy 
(USMA) at West Point, New York and entered the Class of 1829 on July 1st, 1825.  There were 
ninety-nine cadets admitted to that class.  Upon graduation in 1829, Hoffman ranked 18th out of 
the 46 (18/46) surviving cadets.  Fellow members of the Class of ’29 included Seth Eastman 
(22/46), who was to be the first commandant at Elmira prison camp, Joseph Eggleston Johnston 
(13/46), and Robert Edward Lee, who ranked 2nd in the class. 
 Following graduation from the USMA, Hoffman was assigned garrison duty on the 
frontier like his father.  He participated in the Seminole War and fought in the Indian Wars 
between 1837 and 1842.  During the Mexican War, he was brevetted twice for gallantry and was 
wounded at the same battle that took his brother’s life.75  After the cessation of hostilities, 
Hoffman remained in the army and received promotion to Lt. Col. of the 8th Infantry just prior to 
the previously mentioned Texas surrender and subsequent parole.  In appointing Hoffman as 
Commissary-General of Prisoners, Meigs named a career military man with organizational skills 
to match the enormity of the POW system.  He also named an individual accustomed to military 
posts where expenditures were kept to a minimum.76 
 Meigs notified Hoffman as of October 7th, 1861, of his appointment to the office of 
Commissary-General of Prisoners.  He then instructed Hoffman to proceed to the area of Lake 
Erie near Sandusky, Ohio to explore the possibility of constructing a POW depot on one of the 
islands of Put-In-Bay.77  His instructions to Hoffman included the specific requirements of the 
site chosen.  He indicated the need for haste so that preparations for the camp could commence 
before winter.  By October 22nd, Hoffman had completed his assignment and submitted his 
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report.  The well-written and comprehensive report spoke to the thoroughness of its author.  It 
also spoke to his manner of economy.  He rejected one site because the rent was too high.  
Hoffman outlined the options on all islands including rental costs, transportation costs, ability to 
supply, and what it would require to create the site.  He included an itemized estimated cost of 
creation of the camp with the additional costs of guards.  The cost of housing approximately 
1000 Confederate POWs was estimated at $26,266 for total construction.  The site chosen was 
Johnson’s Island in Sandusky Bay.78  
 By return correspondence dated October 26th, Meigs ordered Hoffman to proceed with 
the construction.  He outlined the first of several regulations for the prisoners.  Meigs 
recommended that “as far as practicable” the prisoners were required to furnish their own 
clothing.  They were allowed to engage in any occupation that was profitable and did not 
interfere with their confinement.  Meigs concluded with a fateful sentence for all future 
Confederate POWs.  He wrote, “in all that is done the strictest economy consistent with security 
and proper welfare of the prisoners must be observed.”79  Hoffman was to follow Meigs’ advice 
compulsively. 
 While Meigs and Hoffman prepared for the inevitable influx of POWs, the popular 
demand for the general exchange of prisoners continued both outside and inside Washington.  
Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, who was commander of the Department of Missouri, expressed his 
opinion on the exchange of prisoners with his superior, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, 
Commander-In-Chief of the Federal army.  Halleck saw the exchange as a mere military 
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convention and only a part of the ordinary commercia belli.80  Halleck’s opinion was more than 
just a military officer’s point of view.  Prior to the war, he had published Elements of Military 
Art and Science as well as the first English-language edition of Henri Jomini’s Vie Politique et 
Militaire de Napoleon.  Earlier in 1861, he had produced a treatise entitled International Law.81  
He was a world-respected scholar and writer of military law.  Inside Washington, Congress 
adopted a Joint Resolution “that the President of the United States be requested to inaugurate 
systematic measures for the exchange of prisoners in the present rebellion.”  The Joint 
Resolution noted that the exchange of prisoners had already been practiced indirectly by special 
exchanges.82 
 These special exchanges began as an informal exchange of individuals between the two 
governments.  When Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough, the commander of the squadron 
blockading Norfolk, had contacted Gen. Benjamin Huger, commander of the Confederate forces 
around Richmond, concerning the exchange of two lieutenants, the special exchanges began and 
flourished.  Ultimately, Goldsborough relinquished his role in the exchanges in favor of Gen. 
Wool, field commander of Union troops at Norfolk.  This system of exchanges was supported by 
the Lincoln administration.  It allowed the Federal government to release prisoners without the 
dangerous practice of negotiations, which might accidentally recognize the status of the 
Confederate States of America.83 
 The Lincoln administration began to weaken on its exchange of prisoners’ policy in early 
1862.  As of January 7th, Halleck was instructed to obtain the release of the remainder of the 8th 
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Infantry still held in Texas.84  While further correspondence clarified that he was not to 
recognize the Confederate government, the administration was now in the business of prisoner 
exchange.85  After twenty-two months of captivity, the remaining Texas troops were released on 
exchange as of February 25th, 1862.86  Later in January of 1862, Edwin Masters Stanton was 
confirmed as the new Secretary of War.  One of his first official statements declared that the duty 
of his department was to care for the prisoners in the South.  The editors of the New York Times 
pressed for more than just care for the POWs.  An editorial on January 25th stated, “the release 
can best be brought about by the informal process of exchange now inaugurated.”87  Another 
editorial pushed the humanitarian aspect even further commenting, “The prolonged 
imprisonment of more than a thousand brave men, who did not run away from Bull Run had 
brought grief to numberless firesides and through months of suspense families and friends have 
awaited impatiently some action on the part of Government affording a hope that the prisoners 
should be restored to their duty and not to their households.”88  Invoking the cause of 
humanitarianism, the editors of the New York Times pushed for a more general exchange of 
prisoners.  On July 9th, the editors decried, “our captives pine, our wounded men die of grief, 
loneliness, and neglect, while the hearts of family and friends are breaking in the distant North to 
have them at home to nurse and tend.”89 
 As it flourished, the business of special exchanges began to bend under the extensive 
clerical work.  Wool offered Huger a proposal that would dispose of all captive prisoners held in 
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the North and the South.90  On the same day that Wool transmitted his proposal to Huger, Gen. 
Ulysses S. Grant captured Fort Henry and 15,000 new Confederate POWs.  The Union assault on 
Roanoke Island resulted in an additional 2,500 prisoners.  The reality of confining, feeding, and 
guarding significant numbers of POWs exploded on the scene.  Negotiations for a formal cartel 
for the exchange of prisoners commenced between the intermediaries of the two governments.  
Aided by the favorable exchange of wounded soldiers from the fighting around Richmond, 
Lincoln approved the plan of a formal cartel.  He gave Gen. John Dix, who had replaced Gen. 
Wool, permission to enter into a formal agreement as long as he avoided any recognition of the 
Confederacy.91  Dix conferred with his Confederate counterpart, Gen. David Harvey Hill, on 
July 18th.  The two intermediaries agreed to a rough draft in principle.  Commissions of both 
governments ratified the formal cartel four days later. 
 On July 24th, 1862, Hoffman submitted to Stanton that the several prisons stations held 
approximately 20,500 Confederate POWs, the largest number held in the camp just outside 
Chicago named Camp Douglas.  There were 7,800 prisoners interned in that camp.92  Earlier in 
July, Hoffman published a circular requiring the individual camps to keep track of the number of 
prisoners present, the number admitted each month, the number transferred out to other camps, 
as well as the number of captives who died, escaped, or were released.  Hoffman required the 
number of prisoners who were sick to be included in those statistics.  While some camps did not 
send reports in July, August, or September of 1862, the number of deaths among those held 
captive was small.  Of those interned at Camp Douglas, there were 146 deaths in July and 117 
deaths in August.  With the exchange of prisoners occurring, the number of deaths at Camp 
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Douglas dropped to 26 in September.93  The Exchange Cartel had the desired humanitarian effect 
on the POW issue.  The New York Times saw another benefit from the implementation of the 
Cartel.  On the same day that Hoffman corresponded to Stanton, the editors of the New York 
Times commented “that the return of these eight or ten thousand men would be the means of 
inducing twice or thrice that number to join the ranks of the army at once.”94 
 During the first year of the war, the Lincoln administration insisted that the Confederate 
States of America had no legal standing.  When this policy faced reality, there was a change in 
the adherence to the policy.  The Federal government behaved as if the Confederacy was a 
legitimate belligerent.  Union field commanders arranged battlefield truces with their 
Confederate counterparts and granted POW status to captives.  By July of 1862, the 
administration even negotiated the regular exchange of military captives.95  This conciliatory 
policy extended to the handling of the slavery issue in the Border States and the treatment of 
individual citizens near the fields of military operations.  For the majority of the year, this 
conciliatory policy worked.  The Border States remained in the Union and the Southern populace 
was treated with respect and mildness.  When Maj. Gen. McClellan led the Army of The 
Potomac into Virginia’s peninsula, military troops guarded the doorways of the local inhabitants.  
With McClellan and his great army engaged in combat not more that ten miles from the capital 
of Richmond, the conciliatory policy of the Lincoln administration appeared to have won the war 
and reunited the Republic.  All that remained was for McClellan to capture Richmond, end the 
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hostilities, free the remaining POWs, and negotiate the return of the Southern states to the bosom 
of the Union. 
41 
CHAPTER 3 
TREATMENT OF CONFEDERATE POWs DURING THE EXCHANGE 
CARTEL UNTIL THE SPRING OF 1864 
  The exchange of prisoners of war is an act of convenience to both 
  belligerents.  If no general cartel has been concluded, it cannot be 
  demanded by either of them.  No belligerent is obliged to exchange  
  prisoners of war.  A cartel is voidable as soon as either party has 
  violated it. 
 
       Francis Lieber96 
 
 It never happened.  The Peninsula Campaign of McClellan did not capture the capitol of 
Richmond.  The war did not end in the spring of 1862 with the status quo intact concerning the 
issue of slavery.  Instead, Gen. Robert E. Lee’s new army, the Army of Northern Virginia, forced 
the Union troops away from the capitol of the Confederate States of America until they left the 
peninsula for the safety of the Potomac River.  The war continued and resulted in revolutionary 
social change.  The war and the revolution it created changed the fabric of the American scene, 
including the elimination of the South’s peculiar institution, slavery.  It also changed how 
Northerners and Southerners viewed each other, how their armies fought the war, and how 
governments treated the captives of their enemies.  It was this last change that created significant 
hardship and even death for the Confederate POWs held in Northern prison camps, especially in 
the last full year of the war. 
 As the war continued, William Best Hesseltine noted the development in the North of a 
new phenomenon.  He labeled this change “war psychosis.”  The definition of “war psychosis,” 
according to Hesseltine, is the “hatred engendered in the minds of the contestants by the 
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conflict.”  It led to a hatred of the supporters of the enemy cause with a venomous spirit.97  While 
other historians did not use the same term, they noted a change in actions toward the prisoners 
after the collapse of the Exchange Cartel.  The establishment of a standardized code for the 
prosecution of the war and the Emancipation Proclamation were two factors that help create the 
collapse of the Exchange Cartel.  Other factors included the paroles at Vicksburg, the 
acrimonious behavior between the agents of exchange, and the role of Gen. U. S. Grant.  
Regardless of the cause of the end of the Exchange Cartel, the collapse was the event that 
propelled Hoffman into a more prominent role with regard to the Confederate POWs.  The thesis 
of this chapter is that Hoffman developed a change in action in the spring of 1864.  Whether or 
not this change reflected a developing “war psychosis,” Hoffman’s actions affected the care of 
the Confederate prisoners.  His greater role allowed Hoffman to influence the welfare of the 
POWs substantially, especially those captives sent to the prison camp at Elmira. 
 For Francis Lieber, the events of 1862 brought both tragedy and triumph.  Lieber had 
three sons of military age and all joined the army.  Two sons, Hamilton and Norman, chose to 
fight for the preservation of the Union.  A third son, Oscar, followed his path from Charleston, 
South Carolina to the Confederate forces defending Richmond against McClellan’s Army of The 
Potomac.  As in many cases in this brutal war, Union regiments that included his brother, 
Norman, opposed Oscar Lieber and his Confederate comrades.  Oscar was mortally wounded at 
the battle of Williamsburg though his father did not learn of his death until December 16, 1862.  
In a letter to his wife, Lieber expressed his mixed feelings over the loss of his son.  “I can lay my 
hand on my heart,” he wrote, “ and say that unconditionally as I desire the South to be subdued 
                                                 
97
 Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, 172. 
43 
and most wicked as I hold her cause to be, I know at the same time that God alone can weigh and 
judge each individual.”98 
 Hamilton Lieber, who had enlisted in the Union Army, was sent to the Western Theater 
during the spring of 1862.  He participated in the victory at Fort Donaldson, but was wounded 
and required the amputation of his arm.  Upon learning of his son’s injury, Lieber made his way 
to the hospital where Hamilton was convalescing.  While visiting his son, he made fast friends 
with a fellow expert on international law, Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck.  Together, these two learned 
gentlemen embarked on a friendship that culminated in the rewriting of the laws of warfare. 
 While Halleck enjoyed the military success of his command, there were other issues that 
created difficulties—both militarily and legally.  In the Western Theater, guerillas and marauders 
roamed the countryside causing destruction and mayhem, while demanding treatment as 
legitimate belligerents.  Failure to comply with these demands created a vicious war of 
retaliation between these irregular forces where no prisoners expected to live after capture.  The 
question before Halleck was the legal status of these irregular troops.  Before reaching an answer 
to this question, he was summoned to Washington to replace McClellan as general-in-chief of all 
Union armies.  Assuming command on July 11, 1862, Halleck researched the legal status of 
irregular troops and all guerilla forces and turned to his new friend, Francis Lieber, for another 
opinion. 
 In a letter addressed “My Dear Doctor” and dated August 6, 1862, Halleck placed the 
issue of guerilla warfare before Lieber.  He wrote, “The rebel authorities claim the right to send 
men, in the garb of peaceful citizens, to waylay and attack our troops, to burn bridges and 
houses, and to destroy property and persons within our lines.  They demand that such persons be 
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treated as ordinary belligerents, and that when captured they have extended to them the same 
rights as other prisoners of war; they also threaten that if such persons be punished as marauders 
and spies they will retaliate by executing our prisoners of war in their possession.”99  Within the 
month, Lieber had a sixteen-page answer for Halleck.  In summary, Lieber divided the irregular 
troops into two classes.  He depicted one class as partisans who were described as authorized 
troops engaged in guerilla tactics.  These troops wore uniforms or some identification and 
conducted their operations properly.  In Lieber’s opinion, partisans deserved treatment as 
belligerents, including prisoner-of-war status.  For other troops, denoted by terms like self-
contained guerillas or brigands, he was of another opinion.  These individuals operated without 
authorization and were subject to summary execution if caught.100  Halleck approved of the brief 
dissertation and ordered 5000 copies printed.  These copies were sent to all field commanders for 
their use and guidance.  On August 20, 1862, in a letter to Lieber, Halleck gave the dissertation 
high approval.101  
 Buoyed by his success on the guerilla treatise and requests for other legal opinions by 
new Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, Lieber pushed for the formalization of a code of military 
law.  On November 13, 1862, in a letter to Halleck, he proposed the development of a set of rules 
and definitions regarding the law and usages of war.  He recommended that the President appoint 
a committee to create a code to define such terms as “prisoner-of-war” and “paroling,” with 
Halleck as its chairman.  Lieber stated that if the President did not possess the authority for such 
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a code on the rules of war, then Congress could enact it.102  When Halleck did not respond, 
Lieber sent several more letters during the months of November and December. 
 Lieber’s persistence was rewarded, when he was invited to Washington by Halleck to 
create this code in early December.   On December 17, 1862, by order of the Secretary of War, a 
committee of five individuals was impaneled as a board “to propose amendments or changes in 
the Rules and Articles of War, and a code of regulations for the government of armies in the 
field, as authorized by the laws and usages of war.”103  Joining Lieber on the committee were 
four generals:  Maj. Gen. Ethan Allen Hitchcock, Maj. Gen. George Cadwalader, Maj. Gen. 
George L. Hartstuff, and Brig. Gen. John H. Martindale.  Cadwalader and Martindale were 
lawyers with military backgrounds, Cadwalader having served in the Mexican War.  Hartstuff 
was a former West Point instructor with field command experience.104  Hitchcock was appointed 
President of the Board, which began its work immediately. 
 While Lieber desired a comprehensive reform of the entire military system, including 
revision of the curriculum at West Point, the Board members maintained a goal of revising the 
outdated articles of war and asked Lieber to draw up a code for the rules of land warfare.105 
Using classic treaties including the works of Hugo Grotius as well as Halleck’s International 
Law, Lieber undertook the development of the draft.  Conferring with esteemed colleagues as 
well as using newspaper clippings, he labored with the time-consuming task and finished the 
first draft in February of 1863.106  The first draft was printed and sent to all officers for their 
comments and criticisms.  While few responses were obtained, Lieber used the insight of 
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Halleck and others to prepare a revised draft for consideration by the Board.  By March of 1863, 
the Board and Lieber reviewed and revised this second draft before a final presentation. 
 Before the final presentation was delivered, Halleck authorized the distribution of the 
sections on parole and exchange of prisoners because of their importance.  This distribution was 
made as General Orders No. 49 on February 28, 1863.  Of the twelve regulations of this order, 
Numbers 3 and 10 had impact on the treatment of prisoner exchanges later in 1863.  Number 3 
stated:  “No paroling on the battle-field.  No paroling of entire bodies of troops after a battle and 
no dismissal of large numbers of prisoners with a general declaration that they are paroled is 
permitted or of any value.”  Number 10 declared:  “While the pledging of the military parole is a 
voluntary act of the individual the capturing power is not obliged to grant it, nor is the 
Government of the individual paroled bound to approve or ratify it.”107  General Orders No. 49 
gave all field commanders strict guidelines with regard to paroles, including battlefield paroles 
and exchanges.  In conjunction with the Articles of the Exchange Cartel, the process of paroles, 
particularly following the surrender of large number of troops, was now more restricted and 
subject to more scrutiny. 
 Just prior to the final presentation Lieber was asked to add sections on civil war, 
rebellion, and insurrection.  Lieber responded with a six-page treatise on which he commented, 
“ticklish work, that.”108  Halleck condensed Lieber’s work from six pages to a few paragraphs 
and included them in the final draft.  The final form was published April 24, 1863, as General 
Orders No. 100.  It was entitled, “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States 
in the Field” and was approved by the President of the United States who “commands that they 
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be published for the information of all concerned.”109  While the document had a lengthy title 
and came as a general order, it was referred to as “Lieber’s Code” for the man whose ideas it 
embodied. 
 The code has sound international law at its core.  It was the western world’s first written 
code for the conduct of war.  On subsequent military codes of conduct in warfare, its long-term 
impact was immeasurable.  Lieber’s Code served as the basis for the codes of many European 
governments, including the Prussian Army Code of 1870.  The code was used during the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870.  According to the German Army staff, not a single case arose to which its 
principles did not apply.110  In a letter to Halleck, Lieber wrote that General Orders No. 100 
“will do honor to our country.  The English, French and Germans will adopt it as a basis for 
similar works.  It is a contribution by the U.S. to the stock of common civilization.”111  Indeed, 
Lieber’s Code was accepted by the European powers and was a model for conventions regarding 
war in the late Nineteenth Century.  The United States Army was still using parts of Lieber’s 
Code in 1940. 
 In the short term, the effectiveness of the code was due to its writing style and its writer.  
It was an admixture of military sternness and basic humanitarianism.  To make it usable for 
battle-hardened Union officers in the field, the code was less a rigid legal document than a well-
written essay on the ethics of conducting war.112  The code contained strong prohibitions against 
wanton destruction and violence by Union forces but kept the barriers framed to allow latitude in 
individual actions.  It prohibited destruction of the enemy’s property, churches, hospitals, and 
educational establishments in particular, but it allowed by “military necessity, the destruction or 
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capture of the enemy, armed and unarmed, and of his property.  Thus, the code contained 
sufficient latitude to allow Sherman’s wide path of destruction through Georgia.113 
----------------------   ------------------------------   --------------------------   -------------------------------
 
 The code’s impact on the POW issue was immediate and far-reaching.  Both General 
Orders No. 49 and No. 100 brought attention to the parole of captured enemy troops, as first 
discussed in Article 7 of the Dix-Hill Exchange Cartel of July of 1862.  The cartel agreement had 
designated A. M. Aiken’s Landing below Dutch Gap on the James River and Vicksburg on the 
Mississippi River as the exchange sites for captured enemy troops.  Article 7 stated, “in the case 
the vicissitudes of war shall change the military relations of the places designated in this article 
to the contending parties so as to render the same inconvenient for the delivery and exchange of 
prisoners, other places bearing as nearly as may be the present local relations of said places to 
the lines of said parties shall be by mutual agreement substituted.”114  These “other places” led to 
a lax system of paroles and exchanges, which General Orders No. 100 ended immediately.  All 
prisoners were to be exchanged after actual possession of them and paroled only at official 
designated sites.  Lieber’s Code was one more blow to the Dix-Hill Exchange Cartel, which by 
April of 1863 was on the brink of collapse. 
 Upon signing the cartel, both sides began to the exchange of prisoners.  By September 
1862, most of the Confederate POWs in the West had been freed.  The overall number of 
Confederate POWs held in the Northern prison system dropped dramatically.  From a high of 18, 
347 prisoners retained on July 31st, 1862, the Exchange Cartel depleted this number to 5,012 by 
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the end of September.  The decline in the number of POWs held continued throughout the 
remainder of the year.  On January 1, 1863, only 1,286 Confederate POWs were held in 
Northern prison camps.115  The effectiveness of the cartel, however, was damaged severely by 
events in September 1862.  These events began the collapse of the cartel that continued until the 
closing days of the war. 
 As with any system dependent on multiple individuals and accurate accounting, the 
Exchange Cartel developed a number of problems.  In addition to the enormity of keeping track 
of all the transactions, the cartel suffered from suspected injustices perceived by one side or the 
other.  By October of 1862, the Confederate agent of exchange, the Honorable Judge Robert 
Ould, wrote to his Union counterpart about alleged abuses of the exchange policy.  Lt. Col. W. 
H. Ludlow was the recipient of that communication dated October 5th.  Ould complained of the 
treatment of Missouri citizens and non-combatants; retention of captains of blockade running 
ships when captured; and other acts that violated the articles of the cartel.116  Ould wrote many 
letters similar to this one during his tenure as the Confederate agent of exchange, but these 
matters were minor compared to those introduced in September of 1862.  Following McClellan’s 
victory at the battle of Antietam, Lincoln announced his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation 
on September 21st.  In addition to freeing certain African-American slaves after January 1, 1863, 
he indicated the willingness of the United States government to enlist and train African-
American soldiers into the United States army.  These troops were to be led by white officers.   
 Following the Confederate victory at Fredericksburg, Jefferson Davis issued a 
proclamation addressing the September proclamation of Lincoln.  On December 24th, 1862, 
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General Orders No. 111 for the Confederate army announced, “the African slaves have not only 
been excited to insurrection by every license and encouragement but numbers of them have been 
armed for a servile war—a war in its nature far exceeding in horrors the most merciless atrocities 
of the savages.”  The Commander-In-Chief of the Armies of the Confederate States then ordered 
“that all Negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered over to the executive authorities of 
the respective States to which they belong to be dealt with according to the laws of said States 
[and] that the like orders be executed in all cases with respect to all commissioned officers of the 
United State when found serving in company with armed slaves in insurrection against the 
authorities of the different States of this Confederacy.”117  The existing punishment for 
insurrection by armed African-American slaves was death. 
 The Lincoln administration’s response was quick and decisive.  On December 28th, 
Secretary of War Stanton ordered Ludlow to cease all exchanges of commissioned officers.  
Halleck extended this prohibition to the exchange of commissioned officers on the battlefield to 
all field commanders the next day.  On January 12, 1863, Davis went further in his response to 
Lincoln’s now implemented Emancipation Proclamation.  He ordered that all commissioned 
officers captured be turned over to state authorities for punishment unless the Confederate 
Congress supported his December proclamation.  He did not include enlisted men who Davis felt 
were “unwilling instruments in the commission of these crimes.”118  Ludlow and Ould continued 
to exchange non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel unabated in accordance with the 
articles of the Exchange Cartel.  They were able to reach an agreement on those officers captured 
and ready for exchange before the January 12th date.  It was not until May 1st, 1863, that the 
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Confederate Congress passed a joint resolution with regard to the proclamations of Lincoln and 
Davis.  The joint resolution stated the following: 
  (1) The commissioned officers of the enemy should not be delivered to state 
  authorities, but ought to be dealt with and disposed of by the Confederate  
  government. 
  (2) The proclamations of the President of the United States dated September  
  22, 1862, and January 1, 1863, incite a servile war and if successful produce 
  “atrocious consequences.”  These proclamations may be met with  
  retaliation. 
  (3) The President of the Confederate States is authorized to “cause full and 
  ample retaliation” for each violation of the laws of war. 
  (4) All white officers of Negro troops were found to be inciting servile  
  insurrection and if captured, should be put to death. 
  (5) All Negro troops captured in Confederate States are to be delivered to  
  state authorities and “dealt with according to the present or future laws 
  of such states.”119 
 
 At a time when the concept of the Exchange Cartel was in serious question, General 
Orders No. 49 and No. 100 were issued.  Ludlow was ordered to transmit the new orders to Ould 
with the announcement that all paroles given after their publication would be considered null and 
void.120  While Ludlow, Ould, and even Hoffman corresponded and debated the exact timing of 
the enforcement of these orders, the exchange of officers ceased entirely after May 25th, 1863.  
Exchanges of non-commissioned officers and enlisted men did continue, but the role of paroles 
in the Exchange Cartel changed after the publication of additional general orders.  On July 3, 
1863, the office of the Secretary of War issued General Orders No. 207.  These orders reiterated 
Article 7 of the Exchange Cartel and specifically stated, “According to the terms of this cartel all 
captures must be reduced to actual possession and all prisoners of war delivered at the places 
designated, there to be exchanged or paroled until exchange can be effected.”  The new orders 
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pointed out cases where paroles occurred on the battlefield by officers other than the 
commanders, and cases where sick and wounded soldiers had been paroled and released in an 
effort to avoid guarding them.  General Orders No. 207 stated flatly, “Such paroles are in 
violation of general orders and stipulations of the cartel and are null and void.”121 
 Among the three new general orders issued, the only legal paroles were those that 
conformed to the articles of the cartel.  On July 6th, Halleck informed Ludlow to send General 
Orders No. 207 to Ould.  He was to notify Ould that while officers of both armies had paroled 
and released prisoners in a manner not conforming to the cartel in the past, the government of the 
United States no longer recognized these paroles as legal.  Halleck expected the Confederate 
States to do the same.  Specifically, captives released without proper paroles were not considered 
POWs and therefore did not count in the exchange numbers.122  Ludlow’s letter to Ould was very 
direct.  Any release of prisoners regarded as unauthorized was considered illegal and such 
prisoners were to be released as if they had never been captured.123  While these events of late 
June and early July transpired, the city of Vicksburg and its defenders surrendered to Grant on 
July 4, 1863. 
 Ulysses S. Grant was no stranger to the POW issue.  In 1861, when faced with a request 
for exchange of prisoners by Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, he argued the existing governmental 
position.  His communication of October 14, 1861, read, “In regard to the exchange of prisoners 
proposed I can of my own accord make no move.  I recognize no Southern confederacy.”124  
Later, it was his capture of Fort Donaldson along with its 15,000 prisoners that created the initial 
large demand for prison camps.  Indirectly, this large number of prisoners led to the creation of 
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the Exchange Cartel and their subsequent release.  During the initial phase of the Vicksburg 
Campaign, Grant objected to sending prisoners to Vicksburg for proper exchange, as Vicksburg 
was the western designation exchange site.  His military logic was appropriate.  He was opposed 
to sending troops to re-enforce the place that he wished to reduce.125  Ultimately, these 
Confederate prisoners were diverted to the penitentiary at Alton, Illinois before being sent to the 
exchange site in the East, City Point.  With his forces poised to accept the surrender of the city of 
Vicksburg in July of 1863, Grant debated the fate of the 30,000 Confederate defenders. 
 The climax of the Vicksburg Campaign began on July 1st when Lt. Gen. John C. 
Pemberton, commander of the embattled Confederate forces, polled his four division 
commanders regarding the feasibility of evacuation of Vicksburg.  Two of the officers 
recommended surrender, while the other two indicated that an attempt to escape would not 
succeed.126  Pemberton requested a face-to-face meeting with Grant on July 3rd, with a view of 
arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg.127  Pemberton and Grant met for an hour on 
that date without any successful decision being reached regarding the surrender of Vicksburg 
and its troops.  It was agreed that Grant would sent another letter before ten o’clock that evening 
giving his terms.  At dusk, Grant met with his corps and division commanders to determine the 
fate of the Confederate troops.  With the exception of Gen. Steele, the assembled officers 
favored paroling Pemberton’s forces.  While he wrote later that he had favored paroling, Grant 
was initially opposed to the plan proposed by Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson and “reluctantly 
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gave way” to their plan.128  His return letter to Pemberton on the evening of July 3rd read in part, 
“as soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to 
march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, 
staff, and cavalry officers one horse each.  The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing but 
no other property…The paroles for [all sick and wounded] must be signed, however, whilst 
officers are present authorized to sign the roll of prisoners.”129  At ten o’clock on Saturday, July 
4th, 1863, the defenders of Vicksburg marched out of their positions, stacked their weapons, and 
returned to their breast works as POWs. 
 The decision to parole nearly 32,000 men and officers did not come easily.130  Pemberton 
had a hand in forcing Grant’s decision.  By rejecting terms of unconditional surrender, 
Pemberton place the burden of paroling his troops onto Grant.  He knew that burden of sending 
that many troops North would place on Grant’s transportation system.  It was discovered that the 
rebel intelligence service was intercepting and decoding messages between Grant and Rear 
Admiral (Adm.) David D. Porter.  Pemberton was aware of the enormous strain shipping 30,000 
POWs North would place on the river transportation.131  By forcing Grant to parole his troops, 
Pemberton opted to keep those troops in the South available for further duty at some time.  For 
Grant, paroling this number of men came at a high cost of trust, not only in the Confederate 
authorities, but the Exchange Cartel as well. 
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 Paroled soldiers were different from POWs sent to the enemy’s prison camps.  They 
belonged to their army and were to remain in a camp designated by their respective army 
commanders.  They were subject to military discipline until properly exchanged, which then 
allowed them to return to active duty on the front lines.  In reality, paroled soldiers sat around 
camp with other paroled soldiers doing nothing (as the Articles of the Cartel did not allow any 
military activity on parole), simply waiting to be allowed back into active duty.  In theoretical 
terms, the troops paroled at Vicksburg were just like those men languishing in Northern POW 
camps; but these men were left in the vicinity of Vicksburg with their promises on paper not to 
fight for the South until the proper time.  These promises came at a time when the intensity of 
the war effort by both sides was reaching new heights.  If the Union experience with paroled 
soldiers was typical, then the recent Confederate captives were not likely to be effective soldiers 
for the foreseeable future.  When Union troops had been paroled earlier in the war, they assumed 
they were out of the war and not subject to military discipline.132  Numerous complaints had 
been expressed regarding their behavior of Union troops on parole.  Upon observing their 
behavior, a citizen of Columbus, Ohio wrote Stanton to complain, “unless the paroling system is 
abandoned we will be beaten by the number of paroled prisoners we shall have.”133  It was not a 
guarantee that these newly paroled Confederate prisoners would remain under military rule or 
discipline. 
 Grant’s decision, whether his own or by the force of his commanders, made military 
sense.  The transportation of this number to POWs to Northern prison camps placed the burden 
on Grant’s troops isolated in Mississippi.  These forces included those under Maj. Gen. William 
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T. Sherman who were at that time chasing the rebel forces of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston near 
Jackson, Mississippi.  Grant calculated the cost to include loss of river transportation as steamers 
took the POWs North, troops to act as guards to accompany the POWs to their destinations in the 
North, and the expense of feeding and caring for those POWs once they reached the Northern 
camps.  Many of Pemberton’s forces were from Texas and the Southwest.  Judging from the 
Union experience, these paroled troops were expected to fade away to their homes as quickly as 
possible.  If they did not go home, then they became the Confederate government’s problem, not 
the Federal government.  In the short term, their presence disrupted the military command 
around Vicksburg; but in the long term, their presence demonstrated to the South that their 
government could not manage its own people.134  Grant’s anticipation of this action was voiced 
when he wrote, “I knew many of them were tired of the war and would get home just as soon as 
they could.”135 
 While Grant’s decision was correct militarily, it did have serious consequences in light of 
the turmoil raging over General Orders No. 49 and No. 207.  Though it took until July 11th to 
complete the paroling process for the Vicksburg troops, Halleck’s response to Grant’s news was 
much quicker.  On July 8th, he wrote Grant a terse note bordering on a rebuke.  The note read, “I 
fear your paroling of the garrison at Vicksburg without actual delivery to a proper agent, as 
required by the seventh article of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that 
these men will be immediately placed in the ranks of the enemy.  Such has been the case 
elsewhere.”136  He recommended retaining the paroled prisoners if they had not departed.  
Halleck’s next communication indicated he had time to more thoroughly review Grant’s actions.  
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He simply stated, “On a full examination of the question it is decided that you, as the commander 
of the army, were authorized to agree upon the parole and release of the garrison of Vicksburg 
with the general commanding the place.”137   
Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks followed the precedent set by Grant and paroled the 
garrison at Port Hudson, Louisiana when it surrendered upon hearing of the fall of Vicksburg.  
Once again Halleck was troubled by the conduct of the commanding officer, in this case, Banks.  
On July 25th, he noted, “It is very much to be regretted that the prisoners taken at Port Hudson 
were paroled.  It is feared that the enemy will not regard such paroles on the ground that they 
were not in accordance with the cartel…I take it that the release and paroling of the soldiers was 
a voluntary act on your part and therefore not covered by the cartel.”138  Banks responded that 
the arrangements were made with the Confederate commander of Port Hudson, Maj. Gen. Frank 
Gardner upon surrender of the garrison.  He further declared that he did not have sufficient 
troops to guard the POWs.139  The focus of Halleck’s concern was the sheer number of captured 
and paroled Confederate troops whose paroles were legally questioned.  In addition to the 32,000 
troops who surrendered at Vicksburg, Grant’s forces captured 3,000 troops at the battle of 
Champion’s Hill, 2,000 troops at the battle of Big Black Bridge, and 2,000 more troops at the 
battle of Port Gibson.140  With the additional 5,500 enlisted men captured by Banks at Port 
Hudson, the July 1863 paroling process created nearly 45,000 paroles of questionable legality.  It 
was not surprising that the anticipated response by the Confederate government became a point 
of discussion for Union officials. 
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 Unsure of the Confederate response, Stanton, Hoffman, and Ludlow began to decelerate 
the exchange process.  By July 13th, Hoffman indicated to Ludlow that no more Confederate 
POWs were to be shipped to the exchange site at City Point.141  Ludlow’s answer revealed his 
concern that if no Southern POWs were sent South, then there would be no more deliveries of 
Union captives returning to the North.  If the United States government did not continue to send 
men to the Confederacy, the Davis’ administration would stop all returning Union prisoners.142  
While the Union officials debated, the Confederate response to the July paroling process was 
received.  Ould notified Ludlow on July 14th that he was declaring Lt. Gen. Pemberton, three 
major generals, nine brigadier generals, and three colonels unilaterally exchanged.  He instructed 
Ludlow to take the equivalents of these officers out of those Union troops captured and paroled 
after the battle of Chancellorsville.143  By return mail, Ludlow declined to accept Ould’s 
unilateral declaration because of Confederate failure to exchange Union officers held by the 
Confederacy despite the offer to exchange equivalents for them in the past.  He further rejected 
any attempts at special arrangements and requested Ould to notify the officers so named that 
their exchange was pending Federal approval.  In addition, Ludlow invited Ould to a face-to-face 
meeting once Ludlow had the rolls of the paroles from Vicksburg.  He encouraged Ould to return 
to the articles of the cartel and rhetorically asked, if Ould refused, what was the basis of his 
refusal.144 
 The official correspondence between Ludlow and Ould deteriorated after this exchange.  
With each new communication, the distance between the two agents of exchange increased and 
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their personal acrimony increased.145  The planned meeting between the two agents never 
transpired.  Whether it was because of his staunch support of the articles of the cartel or his 
apparent loss of communication with Ould, General Orders No. 227 relieved Ludlow of his 
duties as agent of exchange for prisoners on July 23rd.  Brig. Gen. Sullivan Amory Meredith was 
named as his replacement and assumed control of the exchange process.146  The change of 
personnel did little to settle Ould’s acrimony.  His letters to Meredith differed little in their tone 
from the previous ones to Ludlow.  The planned meeting between Ould and Ludlow did go forth, 
but now it was Ould and Meredith who met. 
 Meredith was unfamiliar with the duties of his new role, so he requested input for the 
upcoming meeting from his immediate superior, Maj. Gen. Ethan Allen Hitchcock, who had 
served as President of the Board on Lieber’s Code.  Meredith set an agenda for the meeting that 
included the requirement “that all officers commanding negro troops, and negro troops 
themselves, shall be treated as other prisoners of war, and exchanged in the same way.”147  
Hitchcock forwarded Meredith’s request up the chain of command to Halleck who responded to 
Meredith.  He agreed in principle with the agenda items set by Meredith, including the question 
of African-American troops and their officers.  In addition, Halleck gave the Union’s view of the 
paroling process of July 1863 focusing on Lee’s paroles of captives after the battle of 
Gettysburg.  He flatly denied Ould’s contention that Lee’s paroles of wounded and captured 
Union troops were legal paroles.  Meade had refused Lee’s offer of special paroles following the 
battle of Gettysburg.  This refusal meant the paroles were illegal even though Lee and his 
officers proceeded with them.  Halleck instructed Meredith that he was authorized “to agree with 
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Mr. Ould that all paroles given by officers and men on either side between 23rd of May and 3rd of 
July not in conformity with the stipulations of the cartel be regarded as null and void, a 
declaration to that effect being published to the armies of both sides.”148  This statement 
sidestepped the fact that both Gettysburg and Vicksburg ended after July 3rd.  To Halleck and the 
Union command, Lee’s paroles at Gettysburg were illegal and Grant’s paroles at Vicksburg were 
legal and binding on the troops whose commanding officer agreed to them.  By not including 
July 4th in the negotiations, Halleck preserved the large number of legal paroles at Vicksburg and 
theoretically, prevented those troops from reentering the Confederate army quickly. 
 Meredith made his report to Hitchcock following his meeting with Ould on August 25th, 
1863.  With the increasing acrimony between Ould and the Union exchange command, it was 
unlikely any headway could be obtained in regards to the paroles and exchange of prisoners.  
None was.  Meredith noted that Ould rejected Halleck’s proposal on the parole issue.  He had a 
counter proposal.  He proposed that the paroles be established by the general orders of the 
United States, including General Orders No. 49, No. 100, and No. 207, according to the dates 
issued.  If this proposal was rejected, then the paroles and exchanges reverted to older practices 
such as Ould’s unilateral declaration.  Ould offered to exchange officers for officers of the same 
grade, except those who were in command of African-American troops.  Meredith declined this 
proposal.  As for African-American troops, according to Meredith, Ould stated, “that they (the 
rebels) would ‘die in the last ditch’ before giving up the right to send slaves back to slavery as 
property recaptured.”  Though Meredith stated that the Confederate government wished to 
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continue exchanging non-commissioned officers and privates as usual, he concluded his report, 
“No agreement as to exchanges was arrived at.”149 
 Before any decision was reached regarding Ould’s statements, Meredith received a series 
of letters from Ould demanding action on the matters discussed at their most recent meeting.  In 
his letters, Ould charged that the United States government had no intention of answering his 
proposals and informed Meredith that the Confederate authorities were now at liberty to choose 
any course of action they deemed proper.150  Apparently, this threat was aimed at the paroles 
obtained at Vicksburg.  Ould informed Meredith that by virtue of the articles of the cartel, he 
declared the prisoners captured by Grant at Vicksburg exchanged before the week was out.151  In 
essence, Ould and the Confederate authorities had on paper “exchanged” Pemberton’s troops and 
made them eligible for immediate active duty in the Confederate army. 
 Ould, who faced questions on the legality of his declarations, had significant reasons for 
making such a decision.  Following the surrender of Vicksburg and the paroling process of July, 
the Confederate authorities faced the same difficulties with paroled soldiers that the Union 
authorities had faced previously.  During the initial phases of the Exchange Cartel, the South 
maintained more prisoners that the North.  When a Confederate POW was released, he was able 
to get back to his regiment as soon as he reached the front.  While furloughs were not granted, as 
was the practice in the Union army, the returning Confederate soldiers received backpay and 
new clothing.  The problems of discipline experienced throughout the Northern parole camps did 
not develop in the South until after the fall of Vicksburg.152  Pemberton had granted furloughs to 
the paroled men who had already left for their homes, much as Grant had anticipated.  The 
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Confederate authorities recalled the paroled men and assigned them to a parole camp at 
Demopolis, Alabama.  By August 24th, Pemberton informed James A. Seddon, Confederate 
Secretary of War, that the paroled prisoners believed they could not be held for military service 
until exchanged.  He pointed out that prominent citizens of the area were encouraging the 
soldiers.153  Rather than dealing with the problem of paroled prisoners as the North had been 
forced to do, Ould and the Confederate government opted to forego formalities and simply 
“exchanged” these troops and placed them back into active service.  A camp for returning 
paroled prisoners was created at Enterprise, Mississippi, under the command of Lt. Gen. William 
J. Hardee.  There were preparations made for returning these troops to the battlefield.154   
 The real question was whether Ould’s unilateral decision was legal.  Halleck 
emphatically did not think so.  When Grant requested clarification as to the status of paroled 
Confederates, Halleck sent him a copy of Ould ‘s declaration for the exchange of rebel prisoners.  
Grant was informed that 16,000 of the prisoners he paroled at Vicksburg were now released from 
their paroles and returned to active duty.  All of the captives paroled by Grant and Banks were to 
be put in the ranks confronting Gen. Rosecrans near Chattanooga.  Halleck’s bitter report was, 
“After violating the cartel in every possible way, they (Ould and the Confederates) now violate 
the plainest law of war and principles of humanity.”155  As for the paroles at Port Hudson, he 
wrote to Banks that the fact that Maj. Gen. Gardner was a captive at the time the agreement was 
signed negated the paroles.  Halleck concluded that had the agreement been reached before 
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Gardner’s surrender, the paroles would have been within the articles of the cartel.156  The 
conclusion was that there was little to be done other than declare Ould’s actions illegal and not 
send any more Confederate prisoners to the exchange point.  Otherwise, there was nothing 
Halleck, Hitchcock, Meredith, or Grant could do. 
 Hoffman, who kept the parole and exchange rolls, was assigned the task of determining 
the number of paroled Union troops available for exchange.  After calculating that number to be 
about 19,000 enlisted men, he forwarded dispatch concerning Ould’s declaration of exchanges to 
Meredith.157  Hoffman deduced that Ould had declared approximately 29,000 equivalent enlisted 
men exchanged.  This figure left a balance of roughly 10,000 equivalent troops owed to the 
Union army.  Hoffman recommended to Stanton that Meredith declare all Union officers and 
enlisted personnel captured and paroled before September 1st exchanged.158  Meredith and Ould 
met for a second time on September 22nd during which meeting Ould agreed that his actions 
were not in accordance with the terms of the articles of the cartel.  He argued that they were in 
line with earlier dealings with Ludlow.  Ould went further and asked for acknowledgement of 
4,800 paroles from Gettysburg.  This request was made despite his previous statement that all 
paroles not given at the exchange point after May 22nd were null and void.159  Given the requests 
of Ould and the response of Meredith, no agreement on the parole issue was reached in 
September or during the remainder of the year.  Over the new two months, Meredith and Ould 
disputed the validity of the paroles of 1863 including the actual number of paroles, their legality, 
and the discrepancy between their figures.  As with Ludlow, Ould’s remarks became more 
acrimonious; and once again, alienation of the Union agent of exchange occurred.  For his part, 
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Meredith became equally involved with this personal debate.  In a reply to Ould’s 
communication of October 31st, Meredith stated, “I would have been surprised at its contents had 
I not been previously acquainted with your habit of special pleading and of perverting the 
truth.”160 
 Hitchcock was caught up in the acrimonious nature of this diatribe. When Ould produced 
a list of 18,867 paroles from his own investigations, Hitchcock was immediately suspicious.  He 
accused Ould of leaving out vital information on the captives and failing to again meet the 
articles of the cartel.  He implied that many of the paroles were non-combatant citizens of the 
states of Kentucky and Tennessee.161  In a letter to Meredith dated November 21st, Ould rebutted 
Hitchcock’s allegations in a stepwise fashion.  He explained and defended his declarations of 
paroles starting in September of 1863.  He stated, “As to all paroles given after the 3rd of July 
1863, I will allow General Orders No. 207 to have full force.  No paroles from and after that date 
are to be valid, unless the paroling is in pursuance of the agreement of the commanders of two 
opposing armies.”162  The paroles between Grant and Pemberton at Vicksburg were somehow 
ignored.  Ould’s defense did elicit an apology from Hitchcock who indicated that he had 
misunderstood the purpose of Ould’s communication regarding paroles.  However, Hitchcock 
reiterated that the present parole controversy had its origin in the January 12th declaration 
regarding treatment of African-American troops and their commanders.163  In response to the 
growing public awareness of the lack of prisoner exchanges, Hitchcock redirected the focus of 
the prisoner issue to the treatment of African-American troops. 
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 On November 10th, the New York Times reported that Union POWs were starving 
because of the parole controversy.164  To respond to the reports of the newspapers, both Halleck 
and Hitchcock prepared statements supporting the Union position on the prisoner exchange 
issue.  Both documents were designed to elicit public support for the administration’s policies.  
In his annual report to Stanton on November 15th, Halleck illuminated the difference in treatment 
between the rebel prisoners and Union POWs held in the South.  Halleck pronounced, “Rebel 
prisoners held by the United States have been uniformly treated with consideration and 
kindness.”  The Southern POWs were supported with all clothing and food as Union soldiers in 
the field as compared to Union POWs who were stripped of their blankets, clothing, and shoes 
even in winter weather.  They were fed damaged rations or actually starved.  Halleck compared 
their treatment to that of the Christian captives at the hands of the pirates of Tripoli, the hulks of 
the British ships during the Revolutionary War, and the fate of prisoners at the “Black Hole of 
Calcutta.”165  Hitchcock, who received permission from Stanton, wrote an open letter to the 
Editors of the New York Times.  In that letter published December 2nd, Hitchcock outlined for the 
public the events of 1863 starting with the effect of the Emancipation Proclamation on the issue 
of prisoners.  By using individual cases, Hitchcock described for the public the South’s contempt 
for African-American troops and African-American non-combatants.  He placed the blame for 
the parole controversy directly on Ould and the Confederate authorities.  He assured the 
populace that the Government was doing everything in its power to held the Union POWs.  In a 
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dramatic finish, he concluded that with the help of the African-American troops, the Government 
was capable of defeating the South and ending slavery.166 
 The public response to Halleck and Hitchcock’s statements was not uniformly favorable.  
As stated in the National Intelligencer, it was believed that if the agents of exchange were 
removed and new commissioners appointed, the prisoners would be exchanged in a matter of 
weeks.167  Other newspapers, including ones in Ohio where Copperhead sentiment was high, 
decried the administration’s attempt to use the African-American prisoner issue to terminate the 
exchanges.  In reviewing published correspondence of the agents of exchange, the general public 
had concluded that the African-American prisoner issue was not the most important issue.168  To 
maintain the public’s focus on the African-American issue, Hitchcock issued a postscript to his 
initial letter.  He emphatically wrote, “The simple truth is that the recent correspondence grew 
out of…the proclamation of Mr. Davis and the proceedings of the rebel Congress on that 
subject.”169  Amid the swirling controversy, Hitchcock offered to resign his position as 
Commissioner of Exchange.170  
 Though Hitchcock’s resignation was refused, the Lincoln administration, under attack to 
do something to help the Union POWs, named a Special Agent of Exchange.  The nominee came 
as a surprise to Davis, Ould, and the entire Confederacy.  On December 17th, Hitchcock notified 
Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler that he was to take charge of the exchange of prisoners at City 
Point.  Butler, who was to be assisted by Meredith, was to make exchanges man for man and 
officer for officer of equal rank.  African-American troops were to be exchanged in the same 
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manner as white troops.  Their white officers were to be treated equally as well.  Matters 
concerning the legality of paroles and the excess of prisoners were to be tabled at present.171  
Butler was the same officer denounced for his behavior as Commander of New Orleans by 
President Davis on December 24th, 1862.  In the same proclamation outlining the treatment of 
African-American troops and their officers, Davis had condemned Butler as an “outlaw and a 
common enemy of mankind.”  He ordered that in the event of Butler’s capture, the commanding 
officer should execute him immediately by hanging.172  Ould protested Butler’s appointment and 
indicated he was not to be recognized by the Confederate authorities as an agent of exchange.173  
Because of events that occurred earlier in the month, the people of Richmond were divided on 
the issue of Butler’s appointment.  Upon learning of an outbreak of smallpox among the Union 
POWs held in Richmond, Butler, without orders, dispatched six thousand smallpox vaccinations 
to the Richmond area.174 
 The appointment of Butler had the effect of hardening the positions of the two sides and 
slowing the exchange process even further.  For the South, it was a matter of pride in supporting 
Davis against the “Beast Of New Orleans.”  The New York Times noted a statement from the 
Richmond Whig concerning Butler.  In a January 19th statement the Richmond Whig urged its 
readers, “Determined as the enemy are to interpose the obnoxious Beast in the way of a solution 
of this vexed problem, it is now reduced to a question of endurance, each side hoping the other 
will back down.  Whatever may have been the course of our Government heretofore in 
retaliation matters, it is applauded and sustained by the country in adhering to its proclamation 
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outlawing Butler”175  On the Union side, it became a matter of “national honor” to support 
whomever the administration appointed to the position.176  Between December of 1863 and 
March of 1864, Butler did achieve token success in exchanging sick and wounded prisoners, but 
there was no resumption of wholesale exchanges.  He did this without official recognition from 
the Confederate government.   
On March 29th, 1864, Butler received a communication fro Ould addressed to “U. S. 
Agent of Exchange.”  In that note, Ould invited Butler to meet with him to discuss matters 
regarding the exchange of prisoners.177  Butler related the salient points of their March 31st 
meeting in a memorandum to Stanton.  In summary, Butler recommended settling on all points 
of contention, including the parole issue, except for the treatment of African-American troops.  
He reasoned, “So that this point may be left standing out sharply alone, and in regard to it, to 
insist that the cartel applies…to those colored prisoners of war and that no further exchange can 
on by the delivery of prisoners captured, until this point is yielded”178 Hitchcock, who was still 
concerned about the parole issue, registered his disagreement with Butler’s assessment.  Again, 
he argued against the legality of Ould’s unilateral declarations and now included the argument 
that General Order No. 207 was intended solely for the use by Union troops and was not to be 
considered as a substitute for the Articles of the Cartel.179 
 As Butler and Hitchcock were staunch defenders of their positions, the matter was 
referred to the new General-In-Chief for all the Armies of the Union, Ulysses S. Grant.  Upon his 
promotion to Lt. Gen., Grant was elevated to that position on March 3rd, 1864.  With his 
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acceptance of that post, he inherited from Halleck not only Butler and Hitchcock, but also the 
parole and exchange issue as well.  In a private interview with Butler on April 1st, Grant 
discussed his view of the prisoner exchange policy.  Reflecting on his experience with returned 
POWs, Grant stated that every rebel soldier returned by Union authorities went straight into the 
rebel battle lines.  In his opinion, those Union troops returned were mostly disabled men.  Grant 
pointed out that exchanged Union soldiers were granted an immediate three-month furlough as 
per rules and regulations.  These men were allowed to go home, and very few ever returned to 
the army.  It was Grant’s view that newer troops, who had not volunteered for service, would be 
less likely to surrender quickly in order to avoid campaigning and fighting if there was no parole 
and exchange policy.180   
 Butler’s memorandum to Stanton was dated April 9th, while Hitchcock’s response, also to 
Stanton, was sent April 14th.  Upon receipt of their correspondence, Grant ordered Butler to 
decline all further negotiations with Ould until he reviewed the situation.  On the evening of 
April 14th, Stanton met with Grant and Hitchcock regarding the parole controversy.  Stanton 
instructed Hitchcock to have Hoffman prepare a statement of Union and Confederate POWs 
received and delivered since the beginning of 1864 for Grant’s review.181  The next day 
Hoffman’s report was enclosed with a note from Hitchcock to Grant.  Hoffman’s calculations 
showed an indebtedness of 11,591 prisoners owed to the Union army.  His report finished by 
pointing out that Ould had recently declared all rebel prisoners delivered to City Point before 
January 1st, 1864 and all Vicksburg prisoners assembled at Enterprise, Mississippi prior to 
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November 14, 1863 as exchanged.182  Grant’s decision on the parole and exchange policy was 
published on April 17th, 1864 and addressed the validity of the paroles of the prisoners at 
Vicksburg and Port Hudson and the status of African-American soldiers.  He ordered that “until 
there is released to us a sufficient number of officers and men as were captured and paroles at 
Vicksburg and Port Hudson not another Confederate prisoner of war will be paroles or 
exchanged.”  As to African-American troops, Grant indicated that no distinction would be made 
in the exchange of white and colored prisoners.183  Grant’s decision terminated the parole and 
exchange policy for the upcoming Spring Offensive of 1864.  Any Confederate soldier captured 
during that time would be transported North to a POW camp. 
---------------------  -------------------------  -------------------  ---------------------  ----------------------- 
 Of the individuals, aside from the prisoners, involved with the decline and final collapse 
of the Exchange Cartel, few individuals were as directly affected as William Hoffman.  During 
his tenure as Commissary-General of the Prisoners, he had dealt with the ever-changing 
environment of the Union prison system.  From the capture of Fort Donaldson and its 15,000 
Confederate troops by Grant in February 1862 through the Exchange Cartel to Grant’s decision 
in April of 1864 ending all prisoner exchanges, Hoffman adapted to the changes as 
professionally as possible.  By the spring of 1864, he had withstood the day-to-day work of 
maintaining the Union prison system for nearly two and a half years.  Dealing with government 
and state officials, camp commanders, and paroled Union troops impacted Hoffman.  The degree 
of this impact was seen in his actions toward his Confederate charges, starting in late spring of 
1864. 
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 Hoffman had barely begun his organization of the Union prison system when Fort 
Donaldson fell.  He was preparing Johnson’s Island for the initial 500 to 600 prisoners, when the 
15,000 Confederate POWs landed in Union possession.  As high-ranking military officials, 
specifically Halleck and McClellan, gave different and contradictory orders regarding the 
dispersal of the POWs, chaos commenced.  Despite difficulties with communications, Halleck 
dispersed the captives to various cities in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio.  From this group of sites, 
permanent camps were established at Chicago (Camp Douglas), Springfield (Camp Butler), 
Indianapolis (Camp Morton), and Columbus (Camp Chase).  Halleck continued to give 
instructions to the officers in command of these camps until Hoffman took charge.  To 
understand the situation better, Hoffman toured the prisons, which were created out of necessity 
by Halleck, and ordered improvements.184   
 Administration of prisoner-of-war camps required a great deal more than prisoners and a 
location.  To start, the prisoners had to be guarded by someone.  When nearly seven thousand 
Confederate POWs from Fort Donaldson entered Chicago, there was no organized force to guard 
them.  After communication with Halleck, the Mayor of Chicago assigned the city police force to 
guard them until Union troops arrived.185  Rules and regulations for the governance of the camps 
were needed for such items as visitation by relatives, prisoner purchases of supplies and 
sundries, and prisoner correspondence.  By February 28th, 1862, Hoffman began setting up the 
regulations of the camps.  He wrote the Governor of Ohio, Honorable David Tod, that no visitors 
except near relatives should be admitted to the camp and only by written permission.  Prisoners 
were allowed to purchase items such as books and newspapers through an authorized agent 
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known as a sutler, but other items such as liquor and sidearms were strictly prohibited.  The 
prisoners were able to send and receive letters as long as they were of one page, were opened for 
inspection by prison officials, and contained no objectionable material.186  
 Besides guarding the prisoners and establishing guidelines for their captivity, the United 
States government was required to feed the prisoners.  According to international law and the 
regulations of the U. S. army, the POWs were entitled to the same ration as the enlisted men in 
the United States Army.  In 1862, a single ration, or what a soldier received in one day, consisted 
of:  twelve ounces of pork or bacon or one pound four ounces of salt or fresh beef; one pound six 
ounces of soft bread or flour or one pound four ounces of hard bread or one pound four ounces of 
corn meal.  For every 100 rations (or the size of a company of troops), there was to be 
distributed:  one peck of beans or pease; ten pounds of rice or hominy; ten pounds of green 
coffee or eight pounds of roasted and ground coffee, or one pound eight ounces of tea; fifteen 
pounds of sugar; one pound four ounces of candles; four pounds of soap; two quarts of salt; four 
quarts of vinegar; four ounces of pepper; a half bushel or potatoes, and one quart of molasses.187  
A regiment, which was comprised of approximately 1000 men, received 750 pounds of pork or 
bacon or 1250 pounds of salt or fresh beef.  15,000 Confederate POWs were to receive daily 
fifteen times that amount.  Contracts were made with local merchants for these rations.  The 
average daily cost per prisoner was ten to fifteen cents.188  
 The United States government had not planned for such an infusion of prisoners and was 
not prepared for the great cost of care and feeding of the prisoners.  Reviving an old frontier post 
method for saving money, Hoffman created a “general fund for the benefit of the prisoners” or a 
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prison fund.189  On March 7th, Hoffman informed Col. James A. Mulligan, Commander at Camp 
Douglas that, “The regular ration is larger than is necessary for men living quietly in camp, and 
by judiciously withholding some part of it to be sold to the commissary a fund may be created 
with which many articles needful to the prisoners may be purchased and thus save expenses to 
the government.190  The traditional method of creating such a fund was to have a bakery make 
the daily bread for the troops.  The bakery was either on the site or contracted to a local baker.  
The troops were then issued twenty-two ounces (one pound, six ounces) of bread, not flour, 
daily.  As twenty-two ounces of bread required less than twenty-two ounces of flour to produce, 
there was a surplus amount of flour saved.  This surplus was sold back to the commissary or to 
the local baker.  The money generated became the prison fund for needed prisoner 
improvements.191  The prison fund became a source of consternation by the end of the war. 
 Another requirement of the government was the clothing of the POWs.  At the start of the 
war, Hoffman allowed prisoners to receive clothing from friends and family and even allowed 
money from the citizenry of the North to purchase clothes for the POWs.192  Meigs ordered 
Hoffman to furnish to the prisoners, “what is absolutely necessary to prevent their suffering…the 
United States will supply such blankets, cooking utensils, and clothing as are necessary to 
prevent real suffering.”193  Some of this clothing included defective clothing that had been 
rejected as unfit for the army’s use.  There were two exceptions to the clothing rules.  Hoffman 
decided against issuing drawers and socks to prisoners except those POWs who were sick.  The 
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second exception occurred just before the cartel took force.  He rejected issuing any clothing to a 
prisoner about to be exchanged.  As the prisoner would take the clothing into the front lines, it 
was almost a direct issue to the Southern army.194 
 To bring all prison camps into line with the various recommendations, Hoffman issued a 
circular on July 7th, 1862.  There were eleven items contained within the circular.  Among these 
items were the duties of the commanding officer at the camp including the creation of proper 
rolls for accounting of prisoners.  These rolls were to be sent as monthly reports and were to 
include figures on prisoners held, transferred, sick, or expired.  Prior to July 1st, there had been 
no reports concerning the number or condition of the prisoners including the number of deaths 
that occurred.  Hereafter, there were accurate reports regarding the status of POWs at the various 
Union prison camps.  All of these reports were sent directly to Hoffman.  The circular spelled out 
the regulations for the privileges of the POWs and placed the sutler and his merchandise under 
the control of the commanding officer.  Finally, the parole or release of prisoners by anyone 
other than the War Department or the Commissary-General was forbidden.195  
 With further Union victories in the Western Theater, the number of Confederate POWs 
increased, causing overcrowding in the existing camps.  With the July 7th circular, Hoffman 
learned that there were 19,413 POWs held as of June 30th.196  In an effort to alleviate the 
overcrowded conditions, Hoffman sent Capt. H. M. Lazelle to New York State.  Lazelle was to 
evaluate possible sites for future prison camps.  One of the sites evaluated by Lazelle was Camp 
Revedezvous located at Elmira, New York.197 
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 Just prior to the Exchange Cartel in July of 1862, the status of the imprisoned 
Confederate POWs was established.  The prisoner was entitled to clothing and blankets provided 
by the U. S. government.  If he was ill, he was allowed visits from close family if they proved to 
be loyal.  He received packages and letters from family and friends.  These packages contained 
additional clothing and food supplies.  The prisoner was allotted the same daily ration as the 
enlisted men in the U. S. army received including meat and vegetables.  If these items were 
insufficient or unfit, the prisoner had access to the camp sutler and his merchandise including 
food.  There were no restrictions on the money sent by family and friends to the prisoners except 
the camp authorities held it in a personal account for the prisoner.  As Hoffman’s actions 
changed, these rights and privileges were restricted and diminished the prisoner’s chance of 
survival. 
 When the Exchange Cartel was signed July 22nd, 1862, Hoffman’s role in the Union 
prison system changed.  His responsibility shifted to the delivery of prisoners to the exchange 
sites, while the agents of exchange conducted the actual exchange of prisoners.  Within the first 
two months of the program, the number of Confederate POWs dropped precipitously.  From the 
19,413 captives held in June, the Union prison camps enrolled only 13,241 POWs as of August 
31st.  The decline continued through the fall of 1862 until January 1st, 1863 when Hoffman 
oversaw only 1,286 prisoners.198  As there was no longer a need to create more camps, Hoffman 
inspected several existing camps.  Those found to have deficiencies were closed.  By the end of 
December, the remaining POWs were housed in three camps—Camp Chase (Ohio), Johnson’s 
Island (Ohio), and Alton Prison (Illinois).199  Besides decreasing the number of remaining 
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POWs, the Exchange Cartel impacted the mortality among the prisoners.  There were only forty-
seven deaths recorded in December 1862 in the Union prison system.200  The coming of 1863 
brought not only resurgence in the number of prisoners but also the number of deaths. 
 Hoffman’s duties altered with the decrease in Confederate POWs and the increase in 
paroled Union officers and enlisted personnel.  The behavior of these Union troops was 
unmilitary and undisciplined.  According to Gen. Lew Wallace, the men refused to perform any 
military duties or to be disciplined while on parole.  He indicated that many simply deserted.201  
There did not appear to be much difference in managing these men as opposed to caring fro the 
Confederate POWs.  Former prison camps were reactivated to house these troops.  As for the 
number of Confederates held, even with the suspension of the exchange of officers in December, 
1862, the number of POWs remained low through the first six months of 1863.  On May 31st, the 
camp commanders reported a total of 3,708 POWs for the entire Union prison system, while one 
month later the figure had reached 6,062 Confederate captives.202 
 As the events of July 1st-4th at Gettysburg and Vicksburg unfolded, Hoffman’s focus 
returned to caring for an increasing number of prisoners.  By the end of July, the Union prison 
system counted 17,457 POWs or nearly three times as many men as detained a month earlier.203 
Hoffman ordered the reopening of several abandoned camps such as Camp Douglas and Camp 
Morton.  The reopening of these camps occurred before the deficiencies noted earlier had been 
repaired.  As in early 1862, the system seemed overwhelmed by the rapid rise of incoming 
prisoners.  As the second half of 1863 progressed, the rapidly increasing number of detained 
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captives was associated with an increasing number of deaths among the prisoners.204  While the 
increasing number of deaths was not entirely Hoffman’s fault, his actions during this timeframe 
were a source of examination. 
 In his classic study of Civil War prisons, published in 1930, William B. Hesseltine wrote, 
“Apparently an inevitable concomitant of armed warfare is the hatred engendered in the minds of 
the contestants by the conflict.  The spirit of patriotism which inspires men to answer the call of 
their country in its hour of need breeds within those men the fiercest antagonism toward that 
country’s enemies.”205  Hesseltine labeled this philosophy “war psychosis.”  He expanded his 
reasoning in Chapter IX, which he entitled, “War Psychosis And The Northern Prisons.”  The 
thesis of this chapter was that as a result of this “war psychosis,” the Union officials imposed 
restrictions on the prisoners it held.  Hesseltine argued these restrictions were in retaliation to the 
public perception that Confederate prison officials were intentionally mistreating Union captives.  
At the same time, it was a perception that the rebel prisoners were receiving luxurious treatment 
in the Union prison camps.206  Hesseltine’s thesis was that every deficiency in the Union prison 
system from 1862 was the result of this “war psychosis.”  The biographer of William Hoffman 
took a different stance.  While Hunter agreed with Hesseltine that Hoffman was eventually 
caught up with the condition labeled “war psychosis,” he argued that it did not manifest in 
Hoffman’s actions until the end of 1863.207  A review of Hoffman’s correspondence in 1863 
supported Hunter’s thesis. 
 In looking that the treatment of POWs, there were consistently two areas of concern—
clothing and food.  With regard to the former concern, Hoffman’s correspondence remained 
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fairly consistent throughout much of 1863.  In 1862, Meigs had urged Hoffman to make use of 
defective clothing for the prisoners, including blankets.208  Following the deterioration of the 
cartel, Hoffman’s restrictions concerning clothing were consistent with previous circulars.  He 
notified the camp surgeon in New York that it was not the intention to issue more clothing than 
was absolutely necessary.  While Hoffman reduced the amount of clothing requisitioned by the 
surgeon, he indicated that he would accept explanations for the original requisition.  In 
correspondence with Maj. W. S. Pierson, camp commander at Johnson’s Island, he was specific 
in the privileges of the rebel officers and their clothing.  He restricted their purchasing of 
clothing to a single suit of outer clothes and a change of underclothes.  While Hoffman 
prohibited the purchase of boots, he allowed the purchase of shoes, if of poor quality, and coats 
and pants, if of gray cloth, plain buttons, and no trimmings.  Pierson responded and requested 
clarification on packages received by the officers from friends containing clothing and boots.  
Hoffman replied that Pierson was not permitted to allow the prisoners to add to their clothing.  
They were to remain in the clothes they brought with them.  The prisoners were neither to 
request nor to receive packages containing clothing and, especially, boots.  These packages were 
to be returned to the individuals who sent them.209  Hoffman stood firm that prisoners were 
allowed one set of outer garments and a change of underclothes. 
 The clothing issue continued to manifest itself as the summer of 1863 concluded.  Pierson 
addressed the difficulty of the color of clothing.  He stated that some boxes contained cheap and 
second-hand clothing which was not always gray in color.  His interest was in outfitting some 
prisoners who were nearly naked and others who did not have a change of underclothes.  
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Hoffman referred Pierson to his July 7th, 1862 circular, specifically paragraph No. 4, regarding 
the distribution of clothing as necessary.  The intention, he wrote, was to prevent the facilitation 
of a prisoner trying to escape in a crowd.  He left the deviation from the prescribed color to the 
discretion of Pierson.210  Well-meaning friends of the captives were not the only ones interested 
in supplying the POWs with clothing. 
 On August 19th, Hoffman inquired of Surgeon J. Simons, camp surgeon in New York, 
with regard to an article published in the New York Herald.  He asked about a certain Reverend 
(Rev.) Mr. Goss who was reported to be acting in concert with the authorities to supply the 
prisoners with what the Government refused to furnish.  He reminded the surgeon that no 
contributions of clothing were to be received without authorization from his office and any 
clothing was to be limited to the amounts already stated.  Simons responded that only the 
clothing sent by Hoffman had been issued and in accordance with the standing regulations.  
While he knew nothing of the New York Herald article, the aforementioned Rev. Goss had 
visited the camp to inquire about the needs of the prisoners.  Nothing further had been heard 
from him.  Simons mentioned that he had distributed hats, shoes, and a few undershirts received 
from Rev. Mr. Dillon, but upon receipt of orders, this practice was stopped immediately.  Of note 
was his statement, “I regret that the issue of these articles has caused the most extravagant 
reports to be made by mischievous, untruthful, and designing parties.”211 To the Northern public, 
the perception of the treatment of the Confederate POWs was the reality. 
This problem with perception of the treatment of Confederate POWs vexed Hoffman in 
his dealing with camp commanders.  A communication, written September 11th, to Brig. Gen. 
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E.R.S. Canby by Hoffman reiterated his stance on the clothing situation.  The prisoners were to 
receive only clothing necessary to have the standard issue—an outer garment suit and a change 
of underclothes.  He acknowledged complaints by the rebel authorities that the Confederate 
POWs were refused such favors as clothing and money allowed to Union prisoners.  Hoffman 
concluded, “Though it is well known that the Union prisoners in Richmond are badly abused it is 
well to avoid giving [Confederate officials] any opportunity to refer to anything we do as an 
example or excuse.”  This concern dominated a letter sent at the end of September to the 
commanding officer of the Department of the Monongahela.  Hoffman indicated he had been 
informed of comments, made in Pittsburgh, about the many indulgences afforded the POWs held 
at the Allegheny Penitentiary.  These indulgences were attributed to Hoffman’s orders.  
Hoffman’s firm retort reminded the commanding officer that no instructions regarding the 
treatment of POWs other than the standard regulations had been sent.  These instructions “do not 
authorize anything but what is necessary and proper, neither excessive clothing nor luxuries of 
any kind.”212   
 If Hoffman was affected by “war psychosis,” the coming of the winter 1863-1864 was a 
time his actions could affect the prisoners.  At the present time, his response to the clothing issue 
remained consistent.  On September 30th, he informed Pierson that the prisoners would be in 
need of warmer clothing when winter came.  Hoffman recommended to Pierson to allow 
prisoners to purchase overcoats or undergarments “when, in your judgment, it is absolutely 
necessary.”  Pierson gave permission to the sutler to sell coarse gray overcoats, but replied to 
Hoffman, it was impossible to return the overcoats of other colors because the express company 
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demanded prepayment.  To the commanders of Camp Morton and Camp Douglas, the message 
was clear, concise, and similar.  Clothing was to be received from immediate family only—
neither friends nor sympathizers.  The prisoner was not to be given any more than was absolutely 
necessary.  Hoffman even appealed to Meigs to prepare for the coming winter.  He requested that 
extra quantities of clothing be reserved for an expected increase in POWs.  This request was 
needed because “it has been found necessary, out of humane considerations, to issue 
considerable quantities to rebel prisoners who are generally found in a destitute condition.213 
 While Hoffman did not seem to be affected by the “war psychosis,” the deterioration of 
the cartel and the acrimony between the governmental officials of both sides began to exert 
itself.  By mid-October, Hoffman wrote to the camp commanders of Camp Chase and Point 
Lookout that their requests for improvements in their camps were denied by Stanton.  In the case 
of Point Lookout, Stanton refused to approve the construction of barracks forcing Hoffman to 
recommend placing POWs in tents.  No barracks for housing prisoners were ever built at Point 
Lookout.  November of 1863 brought the annual report of Halleck to Stanton.  Halleck 
exonerated the treatment of rebel prisoners, while stating, “the horrors of ‘Belle Isle’ and ‘Libby 
Prison’ exceed even those of the ‘British Hulks’ or the ‘Black Hole of Calcutta’.”214  Hitchcock’s 
late November letter to the New York Times only increased the public’s perception of the 
dichotomy between official statements and reality in the treatment of the POWs. 
 Given the positions of Stanton, Halleck, and Hitchcock, the Union response to the 
deteriorating circumstances was one of increasing rigidity.  Other officials in the Union prison 
system had already started to affect the soldiers.  In the creation of the prison fund, Hoffman 
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desired its use “to make the prisoners as comfortable as circumstances will admit and at the same 
time to relieve the Government as far as possible of the expense of their keeping.”215  The 
standard ration lacked a significant amount of fresh vegetables and the prison fund was intended 
to purchase them.  By November, scurvy began to appear among the Confederate POWs because 
camp commanders did not use the prison fund as it was intended.216  Despite attempts by well-
meaning citizens at Fort Delaware, between November 1863 and February 1864, one in every 
eight Confederate prisoners had scurvy.217  Even Hoffman added to the plight of the prisoners 
when he eliminated the boxes of foodstuffs received by the prisoners from family and friends.  
On November 9th, he informed the camp commander at Point Lookout, “As the prisoners are 
bountifully supplied with provisions, I do not think it well to permit them to receive boxes of 
eatables from their friends, and I suggest you have them informed that such articles will not 
hereafter be delivered.”218  As the year of 1863 closed, the restrictions on the Confederate 
captives tightened. 
 Throughout the fall of 1863, there were reports of the shocking physical condition of the 
Union POWs held near Richmond.  As more news was reported to the War Department, 
Hoffman notified certain camp commanders to prepare for prisoner unrest in the coming weeks.  
On November 11th, he requested three companies of men to be sent to Johnson’s Island “in view 
of the closer restrictions which may have to be placed on the prisoners of war in a short time.”  
While Hoffman prepared for greater changes, more information reached him regarding the plight 
of Union captives.  In a note from the Chaplain of the Tenth Connecticut Volunteers, he learned 
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of the poor conditions that abounded in Richmond.  Hoffman was told that upwards of ten Union 
prisoners died daily and that they received little or no ration of food.  The chaplain even noted a 
conversation with a Confederate official who confirmed that men held at Belle Isle were starving 
to death.  The next day, more information reached Hoffman confirming the truth about the status 
of the Union POWs.  Dr. A. M. Clark, Surgeon and Acting Medical Inspector, viewed the 
paroled Union troops returning to Annapolis.  He found men “suffering from scurvy, hospital 
gangrene, pneumonia, and some, though laboring under no disease, were actually dying of 
starvation.”219  While Hoffman made arrangements for provisions for the returning troops, the 
perception of the ill treatment of Union captives now seemed to be reality. 
 As tension over treatment of POWs escalated between the two sides, the focus of 
discussion became Northern retaliation.  In a letter to Stanton, the Judge Advocate of the United 
States Army commented on the intolerable treatment afforded the Union captives.  His 
recommendation was to treat the Confederate POWs exactly how the Union troops were being 
treated.  “Retaliation for outrages…is…an inadequate mode of redress,” he stated, “but it is the 
only one within the reach of the Government.”  The judge believed if such retaliatory measures 
were promptly adopted, it would go far in repressing such barbaric practices.  Even the Union 
POWs recommended retaliation by the government.  They recommended retaliation against the 
officers, not against the private soldier in captivity.  On December 1st, Hoffman notified the 
camp commanders that all trade by camp sutlers was prohibited from that date.  In a letter to the 
camp commander at Fort Delaware the next day, he confirmed the December 1st restriction.  
Hoffman noted that the prisoners would not be allowed to receive provisions from any person 
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such as a sutler.  He indicated that the prisoners’ rations, with the vegetables purchased by the 
prison fund, were ample and nothing more was to be allowed.220   
 Initially, it appeared that this retaliation policy was short-lived.  By December 14th, 
Hoffman was writing to Stanton about the prohibition of the trade with sutlers.  Camp 
commanders had requested clarification on the prohibition of the sale of tobacco, pipes, letter 
paper, and stamps.  As for tobacco, Hoffman made the argument that its absence was a greater 
inducement to escape for the deprived POWs.  He stated that if the POWs were not allowed to 
purchase tobacco, it should be purchased by the prison fund.  When Stanton decided the 
treatment of Union prisoners had improved, he ordered Hitchcock to notify Hoffman of a policy 
change.  On December 29th, Hoffman was informed that the prisoners were allowed to purchase 
such items that may be necessary for their comfort.  These “few other things’ included 
tobacco.221 
 In reality, the retaliation policy continued into the next year.  With regard to rations and 
extra provisions, the retaliation lasted until the end of February 1864.  From his negotiations 
with Ould, Butler reported to Hoffman that packages from Union families were not being 
received by their loved ones held captive in the South.  Butler argued while he knew the 
Confederate POWs were well supplied with clothing and food, their Union counterparts relied 
almost exclusively on those packages from family and friends.  He desired to have the packages 
delivered.  He was not able to ask Ould to deliver the packages to Union prisoners if Hoffman 
refused to allow similar packages to the Confederate POWs.  Hoffman responded by requesting 
Stanton to approve the reciprocal agreement proposed by Butler.  Hoffman maintained the stance 
                                                 
220
 Ibid., 459-460, 482-483, 625, 628. 
221
 Ibid., 702, 774. 
85 
preventing Confederate POWs from purchasing clothing and other items that enabled prisoners 
to fit themselves for transfer to the South.  On March 9th, Hoffman notified Butler that the 
delivery of supplies and provisions to prisoners by family and friends could resume.  Two days 
later, he wrote the camp commanders of the change in policy.  There was a list of contraband 
items, which included uniform clothing, weapons of any kind, intoxicating liquors and any 
excess clothing over what was required.222  Home packages were acceptable to Hoffman, but the 
privilege of open access by prisoners was not.  Between December 1st, 1863, and March 1st, 
1864, Hoffman’s monthly reports showed 2,205 Confederate POWs died.223  While there was a 
relaxation in the regulations, the over-all retaliation policy continued by the Union officials 
including Hoffman. 
 Retaliation gained momentum with each new transport of returning paroled prisoners.  
The New York Times lamented, “We’ve not heard as much lately as formerly of the maltreatment 
of prisoners in Richmond, but it has not abated.  Nay, their diabolism will never abate as long as 
it is in their power to exercise it.  The slaveholder is born to tyranny and reared to cruelty.”224  
Once Grant announced there would be no further prisoner exchanges, Hoffman’s retaliatory 
response was instigated.  Knowing this new policy meant a dramatic increase in the number of 
prisoners in Union camps, Hoffman issued a circular on April 20th, 1864.  Similar to the July 7th, 
1862 circular, this document listed the regulations controlling the stations where POWs and 
political or state prisoners were held.  While this circular had eighteen paragraphs compared to 
eleven for the 1862 circular, many paragraphs were very similar regarding the functioning of the 
camps.  Other paragraphs were expanded versions of previous ones, giving more specific 
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instructions.  Paragraph V denoted “the prison fund” and described its operation.  In the same 
paragraph, Hoffman ordered a 20% reduction in rations.225  There were reductions in bread (4 
ounces soft bread; 2 ounces hard bread; 2 ounces corn-meal), pork or bacon (2 ounces), beef (6 
ounces or 30% reduction), and potatoes (from 84 pounds per 100 men to 30 pounds per 100 
men).  Before the circular was fully implemented, Hoffman made a critical trip.  He traveled to 
Annapolis to see for himself the effects of Confederate treatment on paroled Union POWs.  This 
trip would affect both Hoffman and his Confederate charges. 
 At the behest of Stanton, on May 2nd Hoffman went to Annapolis to see the released 
POWs from Richmond.  His report, filed the following day, described the scene.  He wrote, “The 
enlisted men…were, with few exceptions in very sad plight, mentally and physically, having for 
months been exposed to all the changes of the weather with no other protection than a very 
insufficient supply of worthless tents, and with an allowance of food scarcely sufficient to 
prevent starvation, even if of wholesome quality, but as it was made of coarsely ground corn, 
including the husks…if it did not kill by starvation it was sure to do it by the disease it created.”  
Hoffman noted that some men were mere skeletons and others expressed limited mental energy 
to go with their dispirited physical appearance.  Of the 363 enlisted men returned, he projected 
that 50 to 100 would start to recover in ten days.  Of the remaining, he projected that 50 to 100 
would very slowly regain their health.  In his conclusion, he asked and answered the question, 
“Can an army keep the field and be active and efficient on the same fare that kills prisoners of 
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war at a frightful percentage?”  For Hoffman, the answer was, “I think not; no man can believe 
it, and while a practice so shocking to humanity is persisted in by the rebel authorities I would 
very respectfully urge that retaliatory measures be at once instituted by subjecting the officers we 
now hold as prisoners of war to a similar treatment.”226 
 While Stanton sent Hoffman’s report to the House Committee on the Conduct of the War 
and urged them to visit Annapolis, Hoffman returned to the business of the Union prison system.  
On May 19th, he proposed another reduction in the daily ration for the POWs.  In his proposed 
reduction, he proceeded by saying, “I have the honor to suggest that the ration as now issued to 
prisoners of war may be considerably reduced without depriving them of the food necessary to 
keep them in health.”  In comparison to the April 20th reduction, this new proposal reduced soft 
bread another two ounces; cornmeal two more ounces; tea two more ounces; potatoes an 
additional fifteen pounds per 100 men (from 30 pounds to 15 pounds per 100 men); elimination 
of candles; and sugar and coffee issued only every other day.  The proposal was sent to Stanton 
who referred it to Chief-of –Staff Halleck, Commissary-General of Subsistence J. P. Taylor, and 
Acting Surgeon-General J. K. Barnes.  Halleck wanted to eliminate tea, coffee, and sugar 
completely and reduce the ration to match that issued to Confederate troops by their authorities.  
Barnes pointed out the needs of the sick and wounded, which precluded Halleck’s 
recommendation.  Halleck approved tea, coffee, and sugar for the sick and wounded, but the new 
ration was passed with the additional elimination of tea, coffee, and sugar for the general POW 
population.  While Stanton gave the final approval, the reductions in rations originated with 
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Hoffman alone.227  The new ration for POWs went into effect on June 1st, 1864 or slightly more 
than a month before the prison camp at Elmira, New York opened its gates. 
 During much of 1863, Hoffman’s communications, especially about clothing, seemed 
consistent and uniform.  In regard to the timing of a change in Hoffman’s actions, Hunter’s 
thesis appeared accurate.  The end of November and the start of December 1863 did mark a 
change in Hoffman’s proclamations and his actions toward the captives.  The second half of 
Hunter’s thesis was that this change in actions by Hoffman had limited, if any, impact on the 
prison conditions and the mortality of the Confederate POWs.  At that moment, Confederate 
troops were being captured by the Army of The Potomac in the scrub forest of Virginia, known 
as “The Wilderness.” The fate of those new prisoners rested in whether the change in Hoffman’s 
actions were temporary or were to continue during what was the last year of the war. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GEORGE W. JERNIGAN:  HIS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND  
INVOLVEMENT IN THE CIVIL WAR FROM ENLISTMENT TO  
CAPTURE AND ENTRANCE TO ELMIRA PRISON CAMP 
  Prisoners of War are subject to confinement or imprisonment such as 
  may be deemed necessary on account of safety, but they are to be subjected 
  to no other intentional suffering or indignity.  The confinement and mode 
  of treating a prisoner may be varied during his captivity according to 
  the demands of safety. 
 
       Francis Lieber228 
 
 In the annals of military history, great commands have always been studied for their 
accomplishments.  These commanders were examined for character traits that made them great 
generals and leaders.  Hannibal in the Alps, Caesar at the Rubicon, and Napoleon in Austria 
became legendary figures who were studied and evaluated.  Their tactics, organizational skills, 
and personal courage were studied to identify why their armies were triumphant; yet, all of these 
great generals had armies made up of individual soldiers who performed heroic acts of bravery 
that led to those victories.  Since the spring of 1862, Gen. Robert E. Lee had led the Army of 
Northern Virginia to miraculous victories on the field of battle.  This army, like other great 
armies, was composed of ordinary soldiers bound together by loyalty and forged for greatness in 
battle.  One such soldier of the Army of Northern Virginia was Private (Pvt.) George W. 
Jernigan of Company E of the 20th North Carolina Volunteer Regiment. 
 This chapter shows the ancestry of George W. Jernigan, especially the immigration of 
Thomas Jernigan to the colony of Virginia in 1635.  It discusses the movement of the Jernigan 
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family to Duplin County, North Carolina and discusses his direct lineage including his 
grandfather, George Jernigan, hodom.  With his military records starting in 1861, the chapter 
explores George’s enlistment and placement in the 20th North Carolina Regiment Infantry.  
There is a brief overview of the military campaigns of the 20th NC Regiment prior to the onset of 
the Spring Offensive of 1864.  Starting with the forced march of May 4th, 1864, the chapter 
evaluates in detail the rigorous fighting of the first three weeks of May including the impact of 
sleep deprivation and “combat fatigue” on the members of the 20th NC including Jernigan.  This 
intense study recounts a detailed discussion of the battle of Harris Farm on May 19th-20th, 1864 
culminating in the capture of George W. Jernigan by Union forces.  The chapter concludes with 
a look at the travels of Jernigan through the Union prison system until his arrival at Elmira 
Prison Camp on July 6, 1864. 
 Jernigan’s journey to the battlefields of the American Civil War began over two centuries 
before with the immigration of Thomas Jernigan from England.  Thomas was born in England in 
1614 and entered the Virginia colony by way of Bermuda in 1635.229  The Jernigan ancestry was 
Danish with the spelling of Jernegan or Jernengham.  In 1030, the King of Denmark brought 
several military men to the island of England.  King Canute gave said Jernegan/Jernengham 
certain manors in Norfolk.230  The Jernegan family was mentioned in English documents 
throughout the Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Centuries.  Sir Hubert Jernegan, Knight of 
Horham in Suffolk, was involved in the insurrection of the Barons against King John (ca 1167-
1216), which resulted in the Magna Carta.  Upon accession of King Henry III, he submitted to 
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the new crown and obtained his pardon.231  The lineage of Jernegan, including knights and 
baronets, served the Crown of England with honor and distinction especially in the Sixteenth 
Century.  Sir Henry Jernegan or Jerningham was named Vice-Chamberlain and Master of her 
household by Queen Mary I.  In 1547, the Queen and her husband, King Philip of Spain, gave 
him the manor at Cossey.232   
As for Thomas Jernigan, he was one of 129 persons examined at Gravesend, England, on 
June 10, 1635, “by the Minister of Gravesend, concerning their conformities to the orders and 
discipline of the Church of England, as it now stands established, and took the oath of 
allegiance.”233  According to volume 6 on page 146 of Land Patents In Virginia, 1666-1669, 
Thomas Jernegan received a land grant of 250 acres in Nansemond County, Virginia, on May 16, 
1668.  This land grant adjoined the lands of Aylington and William Moore.234  By the 1730s, the 
Jernigans had moved to North Carolina and settled in Bertie County.  In 1776, George Jernigan 
had a will probated in that county.  He was the son of John Jernigan of Upper Nansemond 
County, Virginia and was married twice.  With each wife, he had a son whom he named George.  
The two sons were George the Planter by his first wife, Hannah and George Jernigan, hodom by 
his second wife, Ferebee Odom.  Both Ferebee and George Jernigan, hodom were named in his 
probated will.235  George Jernigan, hodom was born in 1758 and first married a woman named 
Ann, who resided in Bertie County.236  They had six children together and remained in Bertie 
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County until 1789.  In that year, they sold all of their land and property and moved to Duplin 
County, North Carolina.  George and Ann settled in Goshen Swamp, west of Goldsboro and on 
the road to Kenansville, North Carolina.237  When Ann died in 1796, George married Elizabeth 
Winters on March 1st of that year.  Wm. Dickson, the County Clerk, witnessed the marriage and 
John Whitehead was the bondsman.238  George and Elizabeth had three children together 
including Odom Jernigan born around 1810. 
 While living in Duplin County, Odom Jernigan married Helen Walker, who was twelve 
years his junior.  The couple was to have eight children together.  According to the Seventh 
Census of 1850, Odom’s family included his wife and three children of the home.  The children 
were George W. (age 9), Mary (age 4), and Watson (age 2).239  By the Census of 1860, Odom, 
who was now 50, and his wife, Helen, now 38, had six children in the household.  Besides 
George W. (age 18), Mary (age 14), and Watson (age 13), the Jernigan family had Clinton (age 
10), Sarah E. (age 6), and Susan (age 3).  For all of Duplin County in 1860, Watson was the only 
Watson Jernigan listed in this census.240  Further research documented two other children of 
Odom and Helen who were not available for the Census of 1860.241  Of Odom and Helen’s male 
children, only George W. was of age to enlist in the armed forces of North Carolina in 1861. 
 With the commencement of hostilities upon the firing on Fort Sumter, the young men of 
Duplin County eagerly offered their services to the State of North Carolina.  The students of 
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Franklin Military Institute and the young farmers of the county created a company of young 
soldiers.  Of the latter group, George W. Jernigan was mustered into the service of his state on 
April 16,1861.  Captain Thomas S. Kenan enrolled him into the company known as Light 
Infantry (Duplin Rifles) assigned to the 2nd Regiment of North Carolina volunteers.  He enlisted 
for six month and began training at the old fair grounds at Raleigh.  The training continued near 
Garysburg, North Carolina later that spring.  While training at Garysburg, the company was 
officially organized as the 2nd Regiment North Carolina Infantry (Volunteers) with the Duplin 
Rifles listed as (1st) Company (Co.) C.  The regiment was officially created on May 15, 1861, in 
response to acts ratified by the North Carolina General Assembly during its ongoing session. 
 On May 22nd, the newly designated 2nd Regiment left Garysburg for Richmond by rail.  
Upon arrival in Richmond, the troops were directed to Norfolk where an attack was expected 
momentarily.242  The regiment encamped at Camp Carolina during the summer months of 1861 
prior to taking up winter quarters at Camp Arrington near Sewell’s Point Battery.  As they had 
enlisted for six months, the enlistments of Company C (Duplin Rifles) expired during their time 
at Camp Arrington.  George W. Jernigan was mustered out of the 2nd Regiment on November 18, 
1861, when the regiment received a new designation as the 12th Regiment North Carolina 
Infantry Troops.  Jernigan was listed as absent from the regiment when he was mustered out, as 
he was classified sick and confined to the Regimental Hospital in Norfolk, Virginia. 
 The North Carolina General Assembly was responsible for the reassignment of 
regimental numbers.  In May of 1861, it had ratified not one, but two simultaneous plans for 
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enlistment of troops.  On May 8th, it ratified “An Act to Raise Ten Thousand State Troops.”  
These state troops were to consist of eight regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and 
one regiment of artillery.  These troops were to serve for the war unless discharged sooner.  They 
were designed to serve North Carolina and only North Carolina.  There was no provision within 
the act to transfer the troops to the Confederate States of America.  On May 10th, the General 
Assembly passed legislation entitled, “An Act To Provide For The Public Defense.”  These 
volunteers were to be enlisted for twelve months and offered to the Confederate States of 
America or any one of the slave-holding states.243  The difficulty was the simultaneous 
enlistment of troops into regiments with the same number, but different classification (volunteers 
versus state troops).  On June 27th, the ten regiments of state troops were transferred to the 
Confederate States of America.  The state troops were assigned the original numbers one through 
ten.  The fourteen volunteer regiments were required to add ten to their original number.  The 2nd 
Regiment of North Carolina Volunteers became the 12th Regiment of North Carolina (state 
troops).  Captain (Capt.) Claudius B. Denson’s company known as the Confederate Grays of the 
10th Regiment North Carolina Infantry (volunteers) was reassigned as Company E 20th Regiment 
North Carolina Infantry (state troops). 
 In April of 1861, students of the Franklin Military School in Duplin County formed the 
Confederate Grays.  Their principal, Capt. Denson, led them.  By May, these troops were 
transported to Fort Johnston near Smithville, North Carolina located at the mouth of the Cape 
Fear River below Wilmington.  During the first year of the war, the 20th regiment and Company 
E garrisoned at different points from Wilmington to Smithville.  On January 8, 1862, George W. 
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Jernigan, who had recovered from his illness of November, joined them.  He listed his 
occupation as farmer and indicated he stood 5 feet 6 inches tall.244 
 As the duties were neither dangerous nor burdensome, the troops became restless for 
battle action.  According to the historian of the 20th regiment, they longed “to snatch from the 
shock of battle, the clash of resounding arms, the sulphurous canopy and din of courageous 
conflict glimpses of the bright laurels.”245  By mid-June 1862, the 20th NC Regiment was ordered 
to the vicinity around Richmond.  On June 17th, Co. E reached their destination and went into 
camp on the Charles City Road.246  The 20th NC Regiment consisted of 1,012 men and officers 
and was assigned to Gen. Samuel Garland’s Brigade.  The brigade was composed of the 5th NC, 
38th VA, 23rd NC, 24th NC, and 2nd Fl regiments along with the newly arrived 20th NC Regiment. 
 After being initiated in battle on June 26th, the 20th NC, including Co. E and Jernigan, 
were fully engaged in the battle of Gaines Mill on June 27th.  During the latter portion of the 
battle, the brigade charged and captured a section of Union artillery supported by U. S. Army 
regulars commanded by Gen. George Sykes.  Garland noted, “The effect of our appearance at 
this opportune juncture [upon the enemy’s flank], cheering and charging, decided the fate of the 
day.  The enemy broke and retreated, made a second brief stand, which induced my immediate 
command to halt under good cover of the bank on the roadside and return their fire, when 
charging forward again, they broke and scattered in every direction.”247  In the charge at Gaines 
Mill, Co. E sustained eight men killed or mortally wounded; wounds permanently disabled four 
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other troops.  Eight to ten other soldiers were wounded but returned to duty.  Of the 60 men who 
charged into battle, the company lost twelve men or 20% of its number.248 
 Within a couple of weeks, the regiment was involved in the battle of Malvern Hill.  The 
regiment was unable to reach its objective and turned back with significant losses.  Five more 
men were killed or mortally wounded, while two others were wounded and disabled.  Another 
six troops were wounded but reported for duty.  For the Seven Days Campaign, Co. E had 
thirteen members killed or mortally wounded and six men permanently disabled.  A permanent 
loss of nineteen men out of an effective force of sixty soldiers—over 30% loses.249  The 20th NC 
Regiment had 93 men killed, 281 men wounded, and six missing of the original 1,012 men or 
37.5% casualties for the campaign.250  
 Co. E lost another nine men in the swamps around Richmond from camp fever before 
being ordered to Manassas Junction, Virginia.  Though not engaged in the battle of Second Bull 
Run, the 20th NC and Co. E continued northward toward the Virginia-Maryland state line.  On 
September 14th, Garland’s Brigade was involved in the battle of South Mountain at Fox’s Gap.  
It was at this critical junction that “scarce a thousand” North Carolinians were asked to hold the 
gap at all hazards against three thousand enemy forces.251  In the ensuing fight, Capt. L.T. Hicks 
of Co. E noted that the enemy came within fifteen feet before the regiment retreated down the 
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mountain, which was so steep that the enemy fired over their heads.252  Besides the loss of two 
more men from Co. E 20th NC, the brigade suffered the loss of its gallant leader, Gen. Garland. 
 By September 17th, the 20th NC Regiment had reformed and participated in the battle of 
Antietam.  Col. Duncan McRae, commander of the 5th NC Regiment, was now in command of 
the brigade as it was ordered to support Maj. Gen. Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson’s right flank.  
McRae commented, “Coming in sight of the enemy, the firing was commenced steadily and with 
good will, and from an excellent position, but unaccountably to me, an order was given to cease 
firing—that General Ripley’s brigade was in front.  This produced great confusion, and in the 
midst of it a force of enemy appearing on the right, [the brigade] commenced to break and a 
general panic ensued.  It was in vain that the field and most of the company officers exerted 
themselves to rally it.”253  Though broken in the morning, remnants of the brigade under the 
command of Col. Alfred Iverson, commander of the 20th NC, rallied and defended the 
Confederate positions at the Blood Lane against Union attacks in the early afternoon.  Following 
the conclusion of the bloodiest day in American military history, the Army Of Northern Virginia 
retired across the Potomac River.  During the Maryland Campaign, the brigade lost 40 men 
killed, 210 wounded, and 187 missing.254  
 The year of 1862 ended with the battle of Fredericksburg, fought on December 13th.  
After the Maryland Campaign, Iverson was given command of the brigade and promoted to Brig. 
Gen.  He took the brigade from the Shenandoah Valley to the Port Royal area of Virginia to 
prevent Union troop crossings over the Rappahannock River.  As part of Lt. Gen. Daniel H. 
Hill’s Division, the brigade was ordered to Fredericksburg on December 12th where it formed 
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part of the defensive line on the Confederate right flank.  During the actual battle, the 20th NC 
Regiment was not engaged and was held in reserve.  There were no casualties for Co. E, but the 
regiment lost three men to enemy artillery fire.255  
 By the spring of 1863, Iverson’s Brigade was comprised of the 5th NC, 12th NC, 20th NC, 
and 23rd NC regiments after the 13th NC Regiment had been transferred in October of 1862.  Col. 
Thomas F. Toon led the 20th NC in place of the promoted Brig. Gen. Iverson.  The regiment 
remained a portion of Stonewall Jackson’s Corps and as such participated in the flanking march 
around the Union forces at the battle of Chancellorsville.  The entire brigade was involved in the 
May 1st evening attack on the Union right flank.  The troops were also hotly engaged in the 
frontal assaults on Union positions on the evening of May 2nd and the morning of May 3rd.  
During the Chancellorsville Campaign, the regiment lost 15 men killed, 67 wounded, and 18 
missing or 100 more casualties from their original 1,012 men and officers.256 
 Following the victory at Chancellorsville and the death of Jackson, the 20th NC Regiment 
was reassigned to Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes’ Division of Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell’s Second 
Corps.  After being the first troops to enter Maryland and Pennsylvania, Iverson’s Brigade was 
engaged in the first day’s fighting at the battle of Gettysburg.  Poorly led by Iverson, the brigade 
suffered enfilading fires from Union troops protected by a small stonewall.  Four men of Co. E 
were killed and six more were seriously wounded and disabled.  Every one of the thirty members 
of the company then present were killed, wounded, or captured.  Only nine men were captured 
unhurt, including three officers.257  At least two members of the 20th NC Regiment survived the 
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fighting at Gettysburg.  One of those survivors was Iverson who did not go into battle with his 
troops.  He was relieved of his command following the campaign and transferred to the authority 
of his home state of Georgia.  The other survivor was Pvt. George W. Jernigan.  He had been 
assigned to the Provost Guard at Division Headquarters in early 1863 and he saw no action in 
either the Chancellorsville or Gettysburg Campaign.258 
 During the winter of 1863-1864, the North Carolina brigade rested and refitted.  The Tar 
Heels, under the command of Brig. Gen. Robert Daniel Johnston, were allotted two-month leave 
from their units prior to the spring campaign.  According to his military records, George W. 
Jernigan was furloughed from January 1st to February 28th, 1864.259  In February, Johnston 
received orders to detach from Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes’ Division and to proceed to Hanover 
Junction.260  The brigade encamped near Taylorsville, Virginia near Hanover Court House.  This 
station town was on the Richmond, Fredericksburg, & Potomac Railroad about twenty miles 
north of Richmond.  The brigade’s assignment was to guard the railroad bridges of the North and 
South Anna Rivers.  With no enemy troops in the area and actual barracks in which to sleep, the 
time was spent in “good country with hospitable people including charming young ladies.”261  
The troops were outfitted with neat uniforms and pleated-bosom shirts.  A few members of the 
23rd NC Regiment actually boarded out of camp in nearby houses.262  The North Carolinians held 
a political convention in Taylorsville for the election of a governor of their home state.  The 
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brigade endorsed the incumbent, Zebulon R. Vance, against his opponent, William H. Holden.  
To a man, it was known that this lull would not last and it did not.263 
 By May of 1864, the brigade was at full strength and well rested.  In the history of 
warfare, the traditional model of warfare had been the campaign of marching armies followed by 
a short, tense battle with the victor holding the field of battle.  After the engagement, the armies 
disengaged and retired to rest before campaigning once again.  In 1861, the battle of First Bull 
Run was a prototype for this style of campaign albeit affected by the time constraints of the “90-
day wonders.”  These men were the initial recruits who had volunteered for three months or 90 
days.  However, in 1864, the armies of the United States of America and the Confederate States 
of America were locked in mortal combat daily from May 4th to June 18th.  The tension and 
strain on the men enduring this new style of campaign was seen and clearly documented in 
letters from the frontlines to loved ones at home.  The physical and mental tension generated by 
this style of warfare was not studied until the Twentieth Century.  This style extracted immense 
energy from the troops and affected their ability to wage war. 
 By the time of World War II, the term “combat fatigue” was defined as the condition of 
fighting personnel resulting from the cumulative effect of fighting (and its horrors), sleep 
deprivation, and extreme psychological stress.  During the 1944 Normandy campaign, studies 
showed that a soldier’s period of maximum efficiency was about thirty days.  Approximately 2% 
of the soldiers were able to resist these effects for extended periods of time.264  Most troops did 
not resist the stressors for that long.  In Normandy, the treatment for “combat fatigue” was 
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withdrawal from the fighting and provisions of hot food, clean clothes, and rest.  Other names 
have been used since World War II for the long-term effects of this condition.  In the later 
Twentieth Century, the term for long-term effect has been post-traumatic stress syndrome 
(PSTD).  Symptoms of PSTD have been identified in the accounts of veterans from the Civil 
War.265  Unfortunately, therapy was not available for the forces fighting in 1864 and they 
suffered accordingly. 
 The Spring Campaign of 1864 opened on May 3rd.  On that evening, Lt. Benjamin L. 
Wynn, officer in charge of the signal station on Clark’s Mountain, reported unusual activity in 
the camps of the Army of The Potomac.266  Numbering nearly 120,000 troops, the Army of The 
Potomac was commanded by Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade, victor of the battle of 
Gettysburg.  Accompanying Meade and his army was Lt. Gen. Grant, overall commander of all 
Union forces.  Grant’s orders of movement were aimed at forcing Lee from behind his fortified 
earthworks and onto open ground where Grant’s advantage in men and material could be 
maximized.267  For Grant, his choice of crossing the Rapidan River below Lee’s forces meant 
that he had to go through Virginia’s infamous “Wilderness.” 
 The Wilderness was a region of dense woods and few clearings that in 1863 forced Maj. 
Gen. Joseph Hooker to realize that panic might occur in an instant.  Decades of iron mining had 
stripped the initial stand of timber from the area.  A second-growth forest of blackjack oak and 
pine took its place.  The trees rarely exceeded thirty feet in height and the undergrowth 
flourished among the shorter trees.268  The Wilderness neutralized Grant’s strength of numbers in 
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infantry, artillery, and cavalry.  Lee opposed Grant’s force with only 65,000 men in the Army of 
Northern Virginia.  These number included troops such as Johnston’s Brigade still encamped at 
Hanover Junction near Richmond. 
 Upon learning of Grant’s movement, Lee sent for Johnston and the North Carolinians.  
He was to bring his brigade to the Wilderness area as quickly as possible.  On May 4th, Johnston 
received orders to rejoin his division then confronting the enemy near Locus Grove on the 
Orange and Fredericksburg Road.  The brigade left Hanover Junction on the afternoon of that 
date.269  The brigade, all 1,350 strong, marched some sixty-six miles without bivouac or 
significant rest to reach the Plank Road near the Wilderness Tavern.  Marching thirty-three miles 
in one day, Jernigan and the Tar Heels arrived about noon on May 6th.  They were directed to the 
Confederate left flank to guard the roads leading to Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early’s rear, which they 
did about 1:00 P.M.270  The forced march was so severe that the historian of the 23rd NC 
Regiment noted army mules fell dead in their traces on the way.271 
 The arrival of Johnston’s Tar Heels strengthened the Confederate left flank and supported 
the troops of Brig. Gen. John B. Gordon.  During the daytime of May 6th, Gordon had argued 
with his superior, Lt. Gen. Ewell that the Confederates should attack the unsupported Union 
right flank.  As commander of the Second Corps, Ewell conferred with Early and delayed any 
attack until further investigation occurred.  The Union right flank was held, but not supported, by 
Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick’s Sixth Corps.  Fighting on May 5th had depleted the troops under 
Sedgwick and there were continued losses due to Confederate artillery barrages on the next day.  
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Opposite the now deployed but exhausted North Carolinians was Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour’s 
2nd Brigade of the 3rd Division (Rickett’s) of the Sixth Corps.  When Brig. Gen. Thomas H. 
Neil’s 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division (Getty’s)  was shifted south to fill gaps in the Sixth Corps 
line, the thinned out Union troops were stretched even further.272  To compensate for these 
moves, Sedgwick shifted three New York regiments of Brig. Gen. Alexander Shaler’s 4th 
Brigade of the 1st Division (Wright’s) to the Union right wing.  According to Shaler, this transfer 
was not enough.  By twilight of May 6th, he noted, “The most extraordinary fact was seen that 
any army of 100,000 men had its right flank in the air with a single line of battle without 
entrenchments.”273 
 After a personal inspection of his left flank late in the afternoon, Ewell agreed to 
Gordon’s attack.  He postponed the offensive until sunset when fading light would conceal the 
small attacking force, create panic in the Federal lines and minimize Confederate losses if forced 
to retreat.274About an hour before sunset, Early ordered Johnston to report with his brigade to 
Gordon.  Johnston rapidly moved the brigade, including Jernigan and the 20th regiment, about 
one half-mile to the right and formed behind Gordon’s men.275  On Gordon’s right flank was 
Brig. Gen. John Pegram’s Brigade of Virginians.  The plan was for the three brigades to advance 
simultaneously to affect the collapse of Sedgwick’s right flank and, hopefully, the collapse of the 
right flank of the entire Union army. 
 The initial burst of the Confederate attack disintegrated Shaler’s formation and swept 
away Seymour’s line of defense.  Sedgwick was nearly captured.  Both Shaler and Seymour 
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were taken prisoner along with 600 Union troops.  The generals were later reunited at 
Robertson’s Tavern behind Ewell’s lines.276  At the height of the Federal panic, a Union staff 
officer rushed to Grant and warned, “General Grant, this is a crisis that cannot be looked upon 
too seriously.  I know Lee’s methods well by past experience; he will throw his own army 
between us and the Rapidan, and cut us off completely from our communications.”  According to 
Horace Porter, Grant’s classic reply was, “Oh I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is 
going to do.  Some of you think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our 
rear and on both of our flanks at the same time.  Go back to your command, and try to think what 
we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do.”277  
 In fact, the coming of nightfall, the entanglements of the Wilderness, and stubborn 
resistance by Neil’s Brigade slowed the advance.  Neil’s formation bent to absorb the attacks 
from the front by Pegram’s Virginians and Gordon’s Georgians.  Johnston’s North Carolinians 
were largely ineffective.  Lack of direct communication  at the command level prevented 
coordination of the attack, especially in the thickets of the Wilderness.  Johnston noted, “I was 
the character of the ground.”278  Shortly after the attack was launched, the Tar Heels lost contact 
with Gordon’s advancing troops.  “It was impossible to see anything in front of the line fifty feet 
and I had to be guided by the noise and the firing which commenced in a few moments and soon 
became very warm,”  Johnston later recalled.279  Jernigan and the 20th NC Regiment pushed 
forward across the Germanna Ford  Road with little opposition. 
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 While the Tar Heels were able to occupy territory to the rear of the Federal lines, they did 
little real damage.  The brigade charged a house defended by sharpshooters.  The captured the 
sharpshooters along with two commissioned officers.  During this lull, heavy firing was heard to 
the rear of the command.  Johnston turned his brigade back toward the Germanna Ford Road.  
Prior to reaching the road, commands of officers directing movements of troops were heard.  
Johnston inquired, “What command is this?’  The reply was the 137th Pennsylvania Regiment of 
such a brigade and division.280  Recognizing that the Union troops were reforming, Johnston 
quickly led his brigade back across the Germanna Ford Road.  Once across the road, the Tar 
Heels rejoined Gordon’s Brigade that now occupied former Federal entrenchments.  The North 
Carolinians remained alert the rest of the evening prepared for any counterattack.281  Though 
Gordon’s twilight assault created debate in the post war era among participants on how close he 
came to rolling up the Union army, Johnston had his own opinion.  He reflected, “If proper 
information had been given me, I could have accomplished a great deal more and believe that the 
results of the action would have been far greater and more disastrous to the enemy.”282 
 Regardless of any future debate, the coming of nightfall on May 6th ended the battle of 
the Wilderness.  On May 7th, amid frequent skirmishing, Grant and Lee deliberated over their 
next move.  While Lee was uncertain as to Grant’s plans, he figured that Spotsylvania Court 
House was a part of those plans.283  While maintaining the bulk of the army in the Wilderness, he 
decided to send one corps of infantry towards Spotsylvania Court House while Grant’s plans 
were revealed.  Lee ordered the First Corps, now led by Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, to 
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begin a march south at 3:00 A.M. on May 8th.  Anderson assumed the command of the First 
Corps when Lt. Gen. James Longstreet was severely wounded by Confederate troops on the first 
day’s fighting in the Wilderness.   Around 7:00 P.M. Lee conferred with Anderson about his 
assignment.  Anderson noted in his report that Lee stated, “I have reason to believe that the 
enemy is withdrawing his forces from our front and will strike us next at that point.  I wish you 
to be there to meet him, and in order to do so, you must be in motion by three o’clock in the 
morning.”284  By 10:00 P.M., Anderson had First Corps in motion.  The stench of the battlefield 
and the burning of the woods of the Wilderness forced Anderson to continue southward through 
the night allowing him to beat the Union troops to Spotsylvania Court House. 
 The movement of First Corps had a direct impact on Second Corps and Jernigan’s 20th 
NC Regiment.  To maintain the Confederate line, elements of Ewell’s Second Corps moved into 
positions previously held by First Corps.  The shifting of troops created an accordion-like effect 
of closing and extending of the men throughout the night.  It gave no rest for the weary as sleep 
deprived men stumbled and fell into gullies.285  Sleep deprivation and physical exhaustion 
stalked the boys from Duplin County. 
 By the following morning, the Army of Northern Virginia confirmed that Grant and his 
troops had left the Wilderness.  Lee received reports from Maj. Gen. “JEB” Stuart indicating that 
the Union Army filled the Brock Road leading south.  This information validated that Grant was 
going to Spotsylvania Court House on his route toward Richmond or to use it to protect his left 
flank as he retreated toward Fredericksburg.  Lee’s response was to put the remainder of the 
army in motion toward Spotsylvania Court House.  While Third Corps remained in place, 
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Ewell’s Second Corps was ordered to move southward to support Anderson’s First Corps.  Third 
Corps also had a new commander.  The previous commander, Lt. Gen. Ambrose Powell (A.P.) 
Hill, was unable to perform his duties due to recurring illness.  Lee chose Early to temporarily 
command that corps.  Casualties (Longstreet) and illness (Hill) forced changes in the command 
structure.  Other command changes occurred that were not mandated.  On May 8th when Early 
took command of Third Corps, Lee placed Gordon in charge of Early’s old division.  To equal 
the size of the Second Corps’ divisions, Johnston’s North Carolinians were transferred from 
Rodes’ Division to Gordon’s Division.  In his history, the 23rd NC Regiment historian 
commented that this change was much to the brigade’s regret.286           
 The 20th NC Regiment reached the area of Spotsylvania Court House around sunset of 
May 8th after a difficult march through the dust and heat from the burning woods.287  They took 
up their positions on the Confederate right flank just past Anderson’s First Corps.  Lee’s chief 
engineer, Martin Smith, had constructed a line of defense extending some five to seven miles 
through the woods and farms of the area.  Anchored by Anderson’s First Corps on the left bank 
of the Po River, the defensive line moved past Laurel Hill and Old Cold Harbor Road to the area 
of the Harrison House.  The terrain’s natural contour swung north and created an area of higher 
ground.  This area was defended to prevent the Union army from using it to command the 
surrounding territory.  This region was in the shape of a horseshoe created by the natural contour 
of the land.  This “horseshoe” salient was the focus of the upcoming battle.  The Second Corps 
including Jernigan’s 20th regiment was placed at this very angle.  Until Early’s Third Corps 
reached the battlefield, the Confederate right flank was unprotected. 
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 As with other battles in the Civil War such as Bull Run (Henry House) and Antietam 
(Dunkard Church), Spotsylvania Court House’s “horseshoe” salient had a residential landmark.  
A man named McCoull owned the land around the salient.  It was his house with its two 
chimneys, located at the center of the salient, which was seen about the entrenchments that 
surrounded it.288  To the rear of the salient, the Harrison House was located.  This house was 
approximately one half mile from the McCoull homestead.  These two houses, located in the 
salient, were the measuring landmarks for the advances and retreats for the impending battle. 
 Regardless of its location, military dictum mandated that high ground must be defended.  
As the Napoleonic era of open battles with linear formations passed from the military scene, a 
system of entrenchments developed.  Consequently, neither army slept during the nights after 
reaching Spotsylvania Court House.  Though exhausted by four days of marching and fighting, 
the rebel infantrymen worked through the night preparing defensive entrenchments with cups 
and bayonets.  They cut down pine trees to build breastworks with small hand axes only three 
inches wide.289  They stacked these trees in front of their lines with loopholes for firing.  They 
cleared fields of fire and erected intertwined branches of obstruction called abatis.  Andrew 
Humphreys, Army of The Potomac’s chief of staff, noted, “With such intrenchments as these, 
having artillery throughout, with flank fire along their lines whenever practicable…the strength 
of an army sustaining attack was more that quadrupled, provided they had force enough to man 
the entrenchments as well.”290  The exhausted rebel defenders rested where they stood on the 
dawn of May 9th. 
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 Early’s Third Corps had reached Shady Grove Church Road on the evening of May 8th.  
By the next day, the plan was from them to assume their positions on the Confederate right flank.  
Until they achieved their position, Johnston’s North Carolinians were ordered to reconnoiter the 
area toward the Fredericksburg Road and the Beverly house.  They moved from their positions 
behind Second Corps toward the Ni River along the Fredericksburg Road.  Brig. Gen. William 
C. Wickham’s horse artillery, joined Johnston and 300-400 men of the brigade as they moved 
toward the Beverly house.  Their objective was to hold up the advance of Brig. Gen. Orlando B. 
Wilcox’s Division of Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside’s Ninth Corps until Early’s troops were in 
position.291  
 These Union troops included the 60th Ohio Regiment, which had been recruited just three 
weeks previous and had never faced “the elephant” of combat.  Johnston’s Tar Heels attacked 
the Ohioans and scattered them as they advanced toward the Beverly house.  They enfiladed the 
1st Michigan Sharpshooters with fire causing significant damage.  The Union infantrymen 
recovered from the shock of Johnston’s charge.  Led by the regiments including the 50th 
Pennsylvania, 20th Michigan, and 79th New York, they swept toward the now outnumbered Tar 
Heels.  As recounted in the history of the 23rd NC Regiment, the historian recalled, “but seeing 
himself nearly enveloped by the enemy in overwhelming force, Johnston withdrew his brigade in 
time to escape capture.”  The 23rd NC Regiment lost some 20-30 men in this reconnaissance.292 
The skirmish ended with the Union forces in control of the southern bank of the Ni River and 
Johnston back closer to Spotsylvania Court House.  In the meantime, Early and his men arrived 
and deployed across the Fredericksburg Road anchoring the Confederate right flank. 
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 May 10th, 1864 was a date that shines in the history of the 20th NC Regiment.  During 
much of this day, the area of the “horseshoe” salient (now dubbed the Mule Shoe) was quiet.  
The North Carolina brigade was concealed behind a pine thicket where it rested in support of 
Second Corps troops including the brigades of Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel and Brig. Gen. George 
Doles.293  In the Union lines, Col. Emory Upton, commander of the 2nd Brigade of 1st Division 
(Wright’s) of Sedgwick’s Sixth Corps, formulated a plan of attack designed to penetrate the 
formidable Confederate entrenchments.  He argued that the way to penetrate such breastworks 
was to reach them quickly.  There was to be no firing and reloading during the charge.  The foray 
demanded quick action to enter the entrenchments.  Follow up by supporting troops was needed 
to open the breach once the line was penetrated.294  Upon approval from Grant, Upton and 
twelve hand-picked regiments from Sixth Corps were prepared for a 5:00 P.M. attack on the west 
side of the Mule Shoe.  The target of their attack was Doles’ Georgians. 
 Due to delays from the chain of command, it was 6:35 P.M. before the preparatory 
artillery bombardment ended and the Union forces attacked led by Upton.  Without stopping to 
fire a shot, the forward wave of troops braved two volleys from the Confederate lines before 
clawing their way into Doles’ Georgians.  The lightning quick foray was a smashing success.  
When the Union troops broke through the defenses, the Georgians were scattered and began 
surrendering wholesale.  Nearly fifty years later, the fighting and surrendering was remembered 
by one of Doles’ Georgians.  Pvt. H. T. Davenport, Company A of the 12th Georgia Regiment, 
wrote, “Oh, how plainly I can even now—Feby 19/1904—see it all, hear it all—feel it all.  The 
musketry, cannon, the Blue dead, the Gray dead, the groans, the oaths, the prayers, the tears.  
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And my capture-my being hurried to the rear, and that mean coward in Blue on horse-back, who 
thrust his sabre into me while I was an unarmed prisoner.”295  While Upton taught the military 
world a lesson is tactics in breaching a strongly fortified entrenchment, he learned a valuable 
lesson in return.  To expand a breach opened in a defensive line, the attacking forces required 
additional reinforcements.  Without further reinforcements, Upton’s attackers became defenders. 
 Spearheaded by Ewell personally, the resistance by Second Corps came to life.  He rode 
up to Johnston and shouted, “Charge ‘em, General.  Damn ‘em, charge ‘em.”296  Lee, who had 
been near the Harrison home when Upton broke through Doles’ defenses, arrived mounted on 
Traveller at the moment Johnston’s Tar Heels double-quicked to the scene.  As opposed to the 
Wilderness incident where Lee verbally urged the Texans into battle, he rose in his saddle and 
pointed toward the breach in the line.  The North Carolinians promised to retake the line if he 
left the field.297  As Capt. A. T. Cole of the 23rd regiment wrote, “Just as the brigade faced by the 
left flank and advanced towards the enemy, I saw facing the head of the column General Lee on 
horseback, hat in hand, cheering on the men, within not more that 100 yards of the enemy.”298  
Johnston’s men then charged the line of battle, recovered the works and restored the line of 
battle.299  The charge regained not only the breastworks, but also several pieces of artillery, 
which were still in position.  The surviving artillerymen turned the artillery pieces on the 
retreating Union troops causing much damage.  During the initial onslaught, the quick-thinking 
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cannoneers of the Richmond Howitzer’s had removed the rammers when they fled their position, 
rendering the artillery pieces useless to the Union attackers.300  
 There remained one final act of gallantry on this day of Confederate success.  During the 
brigade’s charge, Maj. John F. Brooks of the 20th regiment, and Capt. Joseph F. Johnston, and 
Aide-de-camp of Johnston, raced each other for a Federal flag planted on the now abandoned 
embankment.  According to Johnston, “The whole brigade and the Genl. Commanding must 
have seen the race.  The contest was so close that both reached the breastworks almost at the 
same instant.  Just as Capt. Johnston reached out his hand to seize the coveted prize his foot 
stumbled, he tumbled into the ditch and Brooks had the flag.”301  Brooks took the prize to the 
rear and presented it to Lee.  He requested that it be sent back to the governor of North Carolina 
as one of the trophies of the brigade.  The following letter was later sent to the 20th NC 
Regiment: 
Headquarters 
Army Northern Virginia 
May 16, 1864 
 Sir: Yesterday evening the enemy penetrated a part of our line and planted his colors 
upon the temporary breastworks erected by our troops.  He was immediately repulsed, and 
among the brave men who met him the Twentieth North Carolina, under Colonel T. F. Toon, of 
the brigade, commanded by General R. D. Johnston, captured the Vol. flag.  It was brought to me 
by Major Jno. S. Brooks, of that regiment, who received his promotion for gallantry in the battle 
of Chancellorsville, with the request that it be given to Governor Vance.  I take great pleasure in 
complying with the wish of the gallant captors, and respectfully ask that it be granted, and that 
these colors be presented to the State of North Carolina as another evidence of valor and 
devotion that have made her name eminent in the armies of the Confederacy. 
Very Respectfully, Your obedient servant,  
   R. E. Lee, General 
 
Hon. Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.302 
 
                                                 
300
 Rhea, The Battles For Spotsylvania Court House And The Road To Yellow Tavern, May 7-12, 1864, 173.  
301
 Robert D. Johnston to John W. Daniel, August 6, 1895, 3.  
302
 Toon, “Twentieth Regiment”, Walter Clark, Ed., Histories of Several Regiments, Vol. II, 120-121. 
113 
 Without reinforcements, Upton was forced to retire from the salient due to the 
counterattacks by Johnston’s North Carolinians and other brigades.  By 7:30 P.M., Upton had 
retired to the Federal lines in good order though retreating across open ground left many injured 
and wounded soldiers abandoned.303   Upton calculated his losses at approximately 1,000 men 
who were killed, wounded, or missing.  The 49th Pennsylvania Regiment was effectively halved 
by the assault.304  Ewell’s official report on the assault was written ten months after the event.  
He reported a total loss of 650 casualties including 350 prisoners.305  However, these numbers, 
especially regarding the number of men lost as prisoners, seemed low to the individual soldiers.  
Doles’ Brigade left their encampment prior to the battle of the Wilderness with 1,567 men in 
three regiments.  On the evening of May 10th, the brigade numbered 550.306  Daniel’s Brigade 
lost over 400 soldiers in addition to Doles’ estimated 600 casualties.  Gen. Marsena R. Patrick, 
Provost Marshall of the Army of The Potomac, recorded 913 enlisted men and 37 officers were 
captured by Upton’s force.307  At the end of the day, Ewell’s losses were greater than Upton’s 
based on all accounting.  The near success of Upton’s assault was not lost on the command chain 
of the Union army. 
 When May 11th broke over the Virginia battlefield, the rains of May came.  There were 
the cold, miserable rains that made the ground of the Mule Shoe salient a muddy mess.  The 
Confederate defenders spent a long, sleepless night on May 11th-12th.  Again, the cruel hand of 
sleep deprivation gripped the Dublin County troops.  Johnston’s Brigade was bivouacked near 
the Harrison house along with Pegram’s Virginians, led by Col. John S. Hoffman.  The third 
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brigade of Gordon’s Division—Col. Clement A. Evans’ Georgians (Gordon’s former 
command)—occupied the front of the McCoull house.  These placements allowed Gordon to 
support either Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson’s Division or Rodes’ Division, depending upon the 
circumstances.308  During the morning hours of May 12th, sounds of a possible Federal attack 
reached the Confederate lines.  Gordon was ordered to reinforce Johnson’s troops, who were 
entrenched at the toe of the Mule Shoe.  While Evans’ Georgians moved behind Daniel’s North 
Carolinians, Hoffman’s Virginians advanced to the second line of trenches behind two of 
Johnson’s brigades.  These maneuvers left Johnston’s Brigade as the sole remaining immediate 
reserve for the Mule Shoe. 
 As dawn approached, the weather remained inhospitable for the Confederate defenders.  
Mist and fog shrouded the entire battlefield including the Mule Shoe.  At 4:35 A.M., Union 
troops under the leadership of Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock attacked Johnson’s position 
with a force greater by thousands than the one Pickett had mustered in his famed charge at 
Gettysburg ten months earlier.309  Some 20,000 troops smashed into the Mule Shoe salient and 
“swept over the Stonewall Brigade like an avalanche.”310  Opposed by only 2,000 rebel 
defenders, the struggle for the breastworks lasted only the briefest of time.  Once inside the Mule 
Shoe, the attackers’ momentum carried them toward the McCoull house.  
 At the Harrison house, Gordon, who had risen early, was with Johnston when they heard 
of the Federal assault.  Gordon immediately ordered the North Carolinians toward the breach.  
Johnston moved his brigade of perhaps 600 men across an open field into a virgin forest with 
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thickened undergrowth.311  Upon entering the woods, Johnston noted the strong force opposing 
his brigade.  The Tar Heels confronted a force of division strength with their meager force.  So 
close were the opposing forces that the Tar Heels could hear the commands of the Union 
officers.312 
 With an open field extending a quarter of a mile to the rear, the North Carolinians stood 
and fought.  On a least two occasions, Union officers stepped forward and demanded that the 
brigade surrender to a larger force.  The first time ended when Col. Thomas M. Garrett of the 5th 
NC cried out to “shoot the d____d rascal” and he was instantly shot down.313  While receiving 
enfilading fire by the right and left flanks, the brigade was forced backward by overwhelming 
numbers.314  After “one of the bloodiest combats of the war and with heavy loss, the brigade 
retreated fighting desperately as it went.”315  As the brigade reformed, Johnston grabbed the flag 
of his old regiment (23rd NC Regiment) and leaped to the front of the brigade.  Ordering a 
charge, Johnston and the Tar Heels rose and dashed toward the enemy.  Johnston recalled, “To 
my astonishment [they] gave way and we followed them through the woods recapturing the lines 
from which Edward Johnson had been expelled a few hours before.”316  Upon reaching the 
breastworks and planting the flag of the 23rd regiment in the ground, Johnston received a severe 
scalp wound that forced him to retire from the battlefield.  Command of the brigade passed to 
Garrett who was mortally wounded in the head a short time later.  Though wounded as well, 
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Toon of the 20th NC assumed command.  Toon noted that Maj. Brooks, who had won the race for 
the Federal flag on the 10th, leaped wildly in the air, grasped his side, and fell dead while urging 
the 20th NC to the hottest conflict they ever fought.317  Though deprived of Johnston’s 
leadership, the North Carolinians remained in place until withdrawn to a new line of 
fortifications at 9:00 P.M.318  The charge stabilized the Mule Shoe’s eastern sector for the Army 
of Northern Virginia.  The western sector was the site of ferocious fighting that lasted well into 
the night.  The glorious charge had been costly.  Besides the loss of Col. Garrett, the 5th NC 
Regiment had only 42 men answer the roll call that night.319 
 Previously during this war, the Union commander would have retreated towards 
Fredericksburg and safety after the results of the fighting of May 10th and 12th.  Grant was unlike 
any of the previous Union commanders in the Eastern Theater.  The objective of the Overland 
Campaign was the destruction of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.  The ultimate goal was to 
fight Lee on open ground.  Maneuvers were begun to achieve that goal in the days following 
Hancock’s assault.  While the terrible weather of May continued, Grant began the long arduous 
process of moving his army toward Lee’s right flank.  Between May 12th and 18th, Grant ordered 
Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren’s Fifth Corps and Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright’s Sixth Corps 
(Sedgwick’s Corps) from the Union left flank to its right flank.  These two corps was positioned 
to accompany Burnside’s Ninth Corps in a southward movement toward the North Anna River. 
 When Anderson’s First Corps was shifted to the Confederate right flank to balance 
Warren and Wright’s maneuvers, Ewell’s Second Corps became Lee’s left flank.  Opposing 
Ewell was Hancock’s Second Corps.  In an attempt to lure Lee into open territory, Grant 
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instructed Hancock to move Second Corps east to Guinea Station.320  After dark on May 18th, 
Second Corps troops were in motion toward Anderson’s Mill east of Spotsylvania Court House.  
By the morning of the 19th, Grant wanted Warren, Wright, and Burnside moving toward 
Massaponax Church Road with Hancock in the rear.  By the evening of the 19th, Hancock was to 
set off in a march that would get Lee onto open ground.321  For the Union army, their 
maneuvering had left a gap on their right flank undefended.  This gap included a stretch of 
Fredericksburg Road between the Ni River  and Gordon  Road.  The Fredericksburg Road was 
the lifeline of provisions and ammunition between Belle Plain and the Army of The Potomac.  In 
one sense, this oversight gave Lee an opportunity to cut Grant off from his base of supply.  
Though Lee was aware of the shifting positions of Grant’s army, he was not aware of the exact 
location and strength of Grant’s right flank.  He ordered Ewell to advance from his positions and 
to locate the right flank of the Federal line.322   
Lee’s orders to Ewell emphasized the need to “demonstrate against the enemy in his 
front” and “to find Grant’s right and develop his purpose.”323  Ewell’s concern was avoiding a 
frontal attack against entrenched troops.  He erroneously believed that Hancock and Second 
Corps of the Army of The Potomac “were strongly intrenched in front.”324  He persuaded Lee to 
allow him to take the entire Second Corps on a reconnaissance in force around Hancock’s 
suspected positions.  He understood his orders from Lee to engage the enemy as to ascertain if  
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Grant was moving to the Confederate right.  As noted, Hancock and Second Corps had already 
vacated their entrenched positions in front of Second Corps. 
According to Ewell’s plan, Second Corps was on the move by 3:00P.M. on the afternoon 
of May 19th.  These troops were not the same men who stepped off toward the Wilderness on 
May 2nd.  Col. Bryan Grimes wrote to his wife on this date, “Have been fighting more or less 
every day…Nearly all fagged out and need rest.”325  In addition to fatigue, the corps had lost 
over one-half of its fighting strength during the campaign.  Previously numbering nearly 13,500 
effective infantry and 2,000 artillery personnel, Ewell counted about 6,000 men capable of 
duty.326  Johnston’s Brigade, now led by Toon, had the additional forced march of May 4th-6th to 
increase their level of sleep deprivation and fatigue. 
 Still believing that Hancock remained entrenched to his front, Ewell sent Second Corps 
on a long and needless detour by way of the Brook Road before moving toward the 
Fredericksburg Road.327  Prior to leaving, Ewell had added Lt. Col. Carter M. Braxton’s six-gun 
battery to his force.  Due to the conditions of the rain-soaked muddy roads and the nature of the 
Ni River, Braxton and his field pieces were unable to continue the march after three to four 
miles.  He turned back to the original entrenchments while the infantry pressed forward.  The 
reconnaissance in force continued down the Gordon Road before turning toward the Harris Farm 
located just in front of the Fredericksburg Road.   
 When Union officers uncovered the gap in their defenses, they moved to defend it.  
Warren sent Col. J. Howard Kitching’s Brigade to fill the void in the lines.  Initially, Kitching’s 
men were the 6th New York Heavy Artillery (H.A.) and the 15th New York Heavy Artillery.  On 
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the 18th, the 2nd Battalion, 4th New York Heavy Artillery, reinforced these troops.  The men of a 
Heavy Artillery regiment were not trained infantrymen.  There were regiments organized to man 
the heavy-caliber guns in the forts surrounding Washington, DC328  Little fighting had occurred 
in and around Washington during the war and these regiments were used for visiting VIPs and 
official inspections.  Veteran combat troops dubbed these troops, “bandbox regiments.”  What 
the Heavies, as they were called, lacked in training and experience, they made up for in numbers.  
Their regimental strength numbered between eighteen and twenty-two hundred.329  The brigade 
of North Carolinians including the 20th NC Regiment barely numbered 600 at this time. 
 Kitching’s 4th NY H.A. was in position around the Harris Farm by mid-afternoon of the 
19th.  Upon increased reports of Confederate probes in their sector, Meade ordered Brig. Gen. 
Robert O. Tyler of 4th Division of Hancock’s Second Corps to move his brigade of five large 
H.A. regiments to support Kitching.  The 1st Massachusetts H.A. reached the Harris Farm around 
2:30 P.M.  By 4:00P.M. when the first contact with Confederate troops occurred, the Federal 
command had closed the undefended gap and placed five H.A. regiments on the front line and 
one H.A. regiment in reserve. 
 Leading the reconnaissance in force was Brig. Gen. Stephen Dodson Ramseur and his 
brigade of North Carolinians from Rodes’ Division.  It was his skirmishers who initiated the 
battle of Harris Farm against the Heavies, already prepared for battle.  Ramseur’s skirmishers 
began firing at the pickets of the 4th NY H.A.  Arriving on the field of battle, Ramseur noted the 
increasing strength of the opposing Union troops.  Though the rest of the corps was not in 
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position, Ramseur decided that delay in action “would cause disaster.”330  He requested and 
received permission to attack the Heavies around the Harris Farm.  Ramseur’s Tar Heels charged 
the 4th NY H.A. and drove them backward with great loss.  Flanking artillery fire stalled the 
Confederates.  Upon recognizing that his flanks were partially enveloped by superior numbers, 
Ramseur ordered a withdrawal of some 200 yards.  Rodes Division’s other two brigades 
consisting of Grimes’ North Carolinians and Brig. Gen. Cullen A. Battle’s Alabamians joined 
them.331 
 Gordon’s Division including Toon’s Brigade and the 20th NC Regiment reached the 
battlefield and deployed on Rodes’ right flank.  As Gordon emerged between the Alsop and 
Peyton houses, he ordered Col. Zebulon York’s Brigade of Louisianans and the remnants of Maj. 
Gen. Edward “Allegheny” Johnson’s Division forward.  Like Ramseur’s men, these troops met 
with initial success before being forced to retreat.  Unlike Ramseur’s men, their retreat almost 
turned into a rout as Johnson’s men scrambled for the rear.  Hoffman’s Virginians, aided by 
Ramseur’s men, stabilized the front of the rebel lines.  Ewell was on the battlefield and directed 
Hoffman’s men in defending against Federal attacks.  His sorrel mare was hit and killed and 
Ewell fell heavily to the ground.  Nearby troops rolled the dead horse off the one-legged 
gener4al and encouraged him to evacuate to the rear.332 
 The battle raged for another three hours in an increasing downpour.  By 6:00 P.M. Union 
reinforcements made their way to the aid of the Heavies.  Maj. Gen. David B. Birney’s 3rd 
Division “moved up very promptly and went into action about 6:15 P.M. on [the] right of Gen. 
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Tyler.”333  The total effective force under Tyler and Kitching’s commands numbered close to 
10,000 men not counting Birney’s reinforcements.  Aided by Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Rosser’s 
horse artillery, the Confederate Second Corps stabilized their defensive front and fought until 
darkness in the driving downpour.  On both sides the casualties were significant, especially 
among the inexperienced Heavies seeing action for the first time.  By 9:00 P.M., the firing 
between the lines had ceased.  Within the hour, Ewell’s Second Corps was ordered to withdraw 
to their original trench positions.  Their retreat was hampered by darkness, by incessant rain, and 
by combat fatigue.  When the firing stopped, many of the Confederate troops fell asleep at their 
positions, worn out by nearly three weeks of constant marching and fighting.  Most of Second 
Corps were able to return to their lines.  However, a number of men were simply too exhausted 
to move without and rest and were ultimately captured.334 
 The conclusion of the battle of Harris Farm marked the close of the battle of Spotsylvania 
Court House.  Lee wrote to J.A. Seddon, Secretary of War, “The enemy continues to drift toward 
our right.  To develop his purpose General Ewell was directed to cross the Ny and find his right.  
He discovered his main body between the Spotsylvania and Fredericksburg Road and the 
Telegraph Road, and returned within our lines.”335  The battle of Harris Farm marked the end of 
much more than either the battle of Spotsylvania Court House or the attempt by Lee to ascertain 
the movements of Grant’s forces.  In his report on the Spring Offensive of 1864 written ten 
months later, Ewell estimated his losses at Harris Farm at about 900 men killed, wounded, or 
missing.336  Union losses were listed at 1,535 troops killed, wounded, or missing.  The net effect 
of nearly 2,500 casualties was to delay Grant’s movements for twenty-four hours.  For this delay, 
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Ewell lost nearly 10% of his corps in an erroneous assumption regarding the position of 
Hancock’s Second Corps.  His fall from his mount during the conflict cost him much more.  
Coupled with diarrhea developed while marching toward the North Anna River, Ewell 
voluntarily relinquished command of the Second Corps to Early.337  During his absence, Lee 
replaced Ewell with Early on a permanent basis.  Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell never led Second 
Corps again. 
 The battle of Harris Farm was also the end of fighting for other soldiers as well.  During 
the night retreat of May 19th-May 20th, scores of soldiers were captured as Second Corps groped 
its way back to their trenches.  Toon’s Brigade with Jernigan’s 20th NC Regiment acted as the 
rear guard.  Thus, Jernigan and his fellow Tar Heels were at the end of a retreat hampered by 
darkness, poor terrain, and a cold rain.  By May 20th, Tyler and Birney turned over 421 
Confederate POWs to the Union Provost Marshal.  One of those 421 prisoners was George W. 
Jernigan.   
 At the start of the Spring Offensive of 1864, Grant had 120,000 blue-clad men in the 
Army of The Potomac.  To supply such a force, a depot was needed that was accessible to the 
front lines and had the capacity to hold large quantities of material.  Wagon trains of ammunition 
and provisions were sent from this depot daily.  Coming from the battlefields were ambulances     
filled with wounded soldiers of both armies.  In addition to the wounded rebel soldiers, the 
Federal authorities needed a location for captured POWs.  Belle Plain, Virginia, which was 
located seven miles to the east of Fredericksburg on the mouth of the Potomac Creek, became 
that depot in the spring of 1864.  Reinforcements and supplies for the Federal war machine 
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passed from Belle Plain to Grant along the Fredericksburg Road.  It was this road that Ewell and 
the Second Corps were attempting to reach on May 19th.  In the opposite direction, caravans of 
wounded soldiers and columns of POWs paraded.  Upon his capture at Harris Farm, Jernigan 
began his trek into the Union Prison System.  His first stop was Belle Plain and the Punch Bowl. 
 Nestled in a small valley surrounded by a low ridge, the collection site for Confederate 
POWs resembled a punch bowl.  The prisoners were easily watched by Union guards who set up 
camps including batteries of artillery along the ridgeline.  There was a small stream that passed 
through the cleft in the surrounding hills.338  As the Exchange Cartel had failed and Grant had 
terminated all prisoner exchanges, all rebel troops captured from May 5th through May 20th were 
detained in this location at Belle Plain.  While they awaited transportation to Northern prison 
camps, they received adequate rations.339  On May 23rd, Grant left Spotsylvania Court House for 
the North Anna River.  The depot was moved from Belle Plain to Port Royal, which was located 
on the Rappahannock River.  All Confederate POWs, including Jernigan, were sent on to 
Northern prison camps when the depot was changed.340  Steamers sent Jernigan and his fellow 
captives to their next destination, Point Lookout, Maryland. 
 Point Lookout Military Prison opened in August of 1863 and was located on the tip of the 
peninsula formed at the junction of the Potomac River and the Chesapeake Bay.  Prior to the 
war, it had been a seashore resort for eastern shore vacationers.  During its operation in the war, 
it was the major camp for Confederate POWs from the Eastern Theater.  The compound of forty 
acres was sealed off from the rest of the peninsula by a fifteen-foot-high board fence with a 
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gallery along the top for guards.341  Inside these forty acres, a vast number of POWs were held—
up to 20,000 men on several occasions.  The prisoners lived in tents on a flat stretch of sand bare 
of any vegetation.342  During the conflict, over 50,000 Confederate captives were interned at 
Point Lookout.  Most of these men were transferred to other prison camps in the North.  
However, 3,584 prisoners perished at Point Lookout during its twenty-two month existence.343 
 When Jernigan arrived in May of 1864, the camp numbered 5,741 prisoners and he was 
one of 6,876 captives to join the camp during the month.344  Upon arrival, he and his fellow 
prisoners were searched for hidden currency and had the contents of their pockets turned out 
onto the ground.345  Jernigan was assigned a tent and awaited his fate.  Exposure to the elements, 
poor water supply, and overcrowding by even more POWs was his future at Point Lookout.  As 
the number of captives increased in Maryland, pressure was created to transfer some of these 
men to other facilities including a new camp in New York.  Among the 12,671 POWs at Point 
Lookout in June of 1864, Jernigan was designated for transfer to another facility in early July. 
 On June 30th, preparations were made for the transfer of 2,000 POWs from Point Lookout 
to a new facility.  They were to be divided into groups of 400 men guarded by a detachment of 
one hundred guards.  Prior to transfer, all of the men were given two days of cooked rations.  On 
July 2nd, the first group of prisoners assembled at the main gate of the Point Lookout camp.  
Jernigan was one of those 400.  The POWs were marched down to the dock to board steamers.  
Their trip took them down the Chesapeake Bay, past Hampton Roads and into the Atlantic 
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Ocean, then up the Delaware Peninsula and Jersey Shore for New York Harbor.346  Though the 
journey was short, the experience was miserable.  Besides limited space on the steamers, there 
were no sleeping accommodations.  A number of captives were already ill prior to the voyage.  
The combination of ocean waves and fatty pork rations did not help them improve.347  Many 
more POWs became sick due to the ocean voyage itself.  With the lack of sleeping 
accommodations, the prisoners were forced to sleep standing up.  Upon reaching the New York 
Harbor, the POWs were marched across the Hudson River to Jersey City.  One captured rebel, 
noting the enormous wealth of the city, marveled at the resilience of the Confederacy to take on 
such a foe.348 
 At Jersey City, Jernigan and his fellow POWs boarded Erie Railway boxcars for the trip 
to Elmira that took 17-20 hours.  Delays for fuel and water were expected.  The time of the trip 
was increased by necessary prisoner head counts.  While the guards ordered strict silence from 
their captives, the Southern POWs persuaded civilians to slip them tobacco and crackers.349  At 
6:00 A.M. on Wednesday, July 6, 1864, the first Confederate POWs were greeted by hundreds of 
Elmirans who had gathered in the early morning to glimpse these first arrivals.350  In columns of 
four, Jernigan and the other POWs marched south on Main Street and then west onto Water 
Street to the entrance of the camp.  Charles Fairman in the Elmira Advertiser described this 
march.  He wrote, “Although lean and lank, yet evidently possessing the vigor and litheness to 
go through thick and thin.  Of course they were black, sunburnt and dirty; but they took their lot 
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cheerily and laughed and joked among themselves…They marched off lively towards Barracks 
No. 3 from the depot, seemingly gratified by their recent change of base.”351 
 For approximately two miles, Jernigan marched past the stately elms, the exquisite 
village green, and the elegant buildings of the business district of Elmira to his new residence.  
The heavy, thick gates of Elmira Prison Camp awaited their arrival.352  A. J. Madra of Tarboro, 
North Carolina and a member of the 30th NC Regiment was first through the gates.  Madra, who 
survived Elmira, recalled, “I was at the head of the column, walking by the side of a U. S. 
sergeant, and he remarked to me:  “You are the first “Reb” in the prison’.”353  George W. 
Jernigan was number 275 through the gates of “Helmira.”  Unlike Madra, he was never to see 
North Carolina again.354 
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CHAPTER 5 
HOFFMAN’S DECISIONS AT ELMIRA MILITARY PRISON AND 
THEIR EFFECT ON THE HEALTH OF CONFEDERATE POWs 
  A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, 
  nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any 
  suffering, or disgrace, by civil imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, 
  death, or any other barbarity. 
 
       Francis Lieber355 
 
 “If there ever was a hell on earth, Elmira prison was that hell…”356  These words, penned 
in 1926 by a former POW held at Elmira, reflected the deep seated animosity that the military 
prison camp generate.  For some Confederate soldiers, Elmira represented the worst conditions 
the Union Prison system created.  For nearly 3,000 other prisoners, Elmira represented a final 
resting place earning its title “Death Camp of the North.”  The opening of Elmira in July of 1864 
came at a time at which the intensity of the Civil War was increasing.  “The hatred engendered in 
the minds of the contestants of the conflict’357 drove the North and the South farther apart and 
hardened their hearts and minds.  This “war psychosis” created an environment in which 
behavior unimaginable earlier in the war became common and accepted.  The tragedy for Elmira 
was it came to represent some of the worst of the Union’s behavior toward their Confederate 
captives. 
 While institutions or governments may embody a certain philosophy or “corporate 
culture,” it is the daily decisions by individuals that put their philosophy into practice.  The 
thesis of this chapter is that the decisions made by Hoffman directly affected the Confederate 
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prisoners at Elmira.  In the twelve-month existence, Elmira had the highest death rate of any 
camp in the Union prison system.  Many factors, some controllable such as the number of POWs 
sent to Elmira and some uncontrollable such as the severe weather, created this high percentage 
of death.  Yet, Hoffman’s decisions also affected the fate of Confederate prisoners at Elmira.  
His decisions regarding the population of the camp, the drainage of Foster’s Pond, and the 
building of barracks all caused the Elmira captives hardship and suffering.  Unlike Hunter’s 
contention, the change in actions by Hoffman in the last year of the war did have an impact on 
the condition of Confederate POWs. 
 During the 1862 buildup of Confederate POWs, Capt. H. M. Lazelle was ordered by 
Hoffman “to visit the permanent camps at Albany, Utica, Rochester, and Elmira, N.Y. and also 
the U. S. barracks at Buffalo to ascertain their capacity for quartering troops and to make a 
written report thereon accompanied by a general plan of each camp.”358  Lazelle’s report of June 
25th, 1862, dealt with the camp located at Elmira, N.Y., which he visited around the 19th of June.  
Lazelle noted that the camp at Elmira consisted of four separate camps respectively named Camp 
Rathbun, Arnot Barracks, Post Barracks, and Camp Robinson Barracks.  For all four camps, 
Lazelle estimated a total capacity of 10,500 POWs if the present sleeping arrangements were 
adjusted.  He included diagrams of each camp as per Hoffman’s instructions and finished his 
report by noting that Elmira was connected by railroad to Baltimore, Maryland via Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania.  The total distance from Elmira to Baltimore was 202 miles less than by way of 
Albany and New York City.359 
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 Lazelle’s New York itinerary took him to the major cities of Albany, Rochester, and 
Buffalo.  The inclusion of Elmira seemed unusual, but the military facilities at Elmira reflected 
its location and topography.  From the earliest settlements of Indians and white settlers, Elmira’s 
Chemung Valley was conducive to economic and military activity.  The valley acted as a natural 
corridor from west to east.  By 1833, the town of Elmira and its businessmen were connected by 
the Chemung Canal to Senaca Lake, one of New York’s Finger Lakes.  The age of the railroad 
reached Elmira in 1849.  The completion of the New York and Erie Railroad in October brought 
the following pronouncement from a local newspaper, “We are now placed within about fourteen 
hours of the city of New York.  It is a great era in the history of our country to be in connection 
with the great market of our union in so short a period.”360  More railroad building continued in 
western New York State including rails running northward parallel to the Chemung Canal.  
Upon completion of the north-south tracks of the Northern Central Railroad into Pennsylvania, 
the Chemung Valley was accessible from all four directions by the vehicles of the newest 
technology.  By 1860, Elmira was a town of 8,682 citizens and the surrounding Chemung 
County enhanced the industrial town with an abundant agricultural economy.361 
 With the firing on Fort Sumter, Lincoln issued a request for 75,000 volunteers to 
suppress the rebellion.  When New York Governor Edwin D. Morgan announced on April 17th, 
1861 that Albany, New York City, and Elmira were the military depots for New York State, the 
prominence of Elmira was solidified.  Most newly recruited soldiers were assigned to one of the 
four military camps set up during May and June of 1861 around Elmira.  One of these camps was 
formed from land leased from William Foster, an Elmira citizen.  His property, which was 
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located approximately one mile west of downtown, had once been a portion of the racecourse for 
the local fairgrounds.  The plot of land encompassed a rough 300-yard by 500-yard rectangle.  It 
was generally flat, but the contour sloped toward the south and the Chemung River.  The army 
leased the right to use the land, including an elongated pond located at the back of the property 
near the river.  In honor of its landowner, the pond was named Foster’s Pond.362   
 Foster’s property became known as Camp Rathbun and accommodated military 
personnel from the onset of hostilities until Lazelle inspected it.  In his report, Lazelle noted that 
the camp was fenced on the east, west, and north by a four and a half foot fence of horizontal 
slats nailed to upright posts, which were five feet in height.  The southern boundary was the 
Chemung River and Foster’s Pond.  The camp was divided by a camp road, which separated the 
barracks.  There were twenty barracks with ten on each side of the road.  Each barracks 
measured 88’ by 18’ by 8’ and was furnished with wooden bunks.  The bunks were placed end to 
end on the long side of the barracks and numbered twelve sets of two double bunks.  There was 
room for approximately 100 men.  Lazelle estimated that a different arrangement of the bunks 
could increase the capacity of each barracks by 50 men.  The estimated total capacity of Camp 
Rathbun in 1862 was 2,000 troops as the bunks were set or 3,000 troops if they were 
rearranged.363 
 The remainder of Camp Rathbun was described in Lazelle’s report.  There were several 
buildings including two houses for guards (located at the front of the camp on either side of the 
main entrance), a sutler’s store building, and the staff quarters consisting of five equally 
dimensioned rooms.  Closer to Foster’s Pond were the mess halls.  Each hall contained tables 
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and benches for 1,000 men.  The kitchen, located between the two mess halls, was complete with 
cooking facilities.  It had a steam engine, large ranges, furnaces, and boilers sufficient to cook 
for 2,000 men at one time.  In Lazelle’s diagram of the camp, he indicated the fresh water wells 
for the camp were positioned in a shed to the rear of the kitchen.  Each well was provided with a 
pump.  Lazelle did have one note of concern in his report.  He described the sinks as insufficient, 
incomplete, and filthy.364  In addition to the inadequate sinks for just 2,000 troops, the location of 
the fresh water wells was worrisome.  These wells provided the troops with all of their water for 
cooking and drinking.  Initially Foster’s Pond was used for bathing and washing by the troops.  
Given the proximity of the wells to Foster’s Pond, any contamination of Foster’s Pond had the 
potential to contaminate the water supply for the entire camp. 
 After the onset of the Exchange Cartel of 1862, the urgency for additional space abated 
for Hoffman.  As for Elmira’s four camps, Post Barracks and Camp Robinson Barracks were 
disbanded and never used again.  When the Federal Government assumed control of military 
instillations in 1863, Elmira was named headquarters for the western part of New York State in 
the Department of the East.  Upon implementation of conscription, the War Department 
designated the Elmira site as Draft Rendezvous.365  Arnot Barracks and Camp Rathbun were 
designated Barracks Number 1 and Barracks Number 3 respectively.  With the addition of ten 
new barracks, Barracks Number 3 increased its capacity for troops.  Each of the new barracks 
was 25’ by 80’ by 12’ high and could accommodate 150 men.  There was now a total of thirty 
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barracks constructed on Foster’s property, giving a maximum capacity for 4,000 troops (with 
crowding) in the barracks.366 
 By May of 1864, the effective collapse of the Exchange Cartel and Grant’s Overland 
Campaign had markedly increased the number of Confederate POWs.  Hoffman searched for 
sites to transport prisoners to relieve the existing overcrowded conditions at Point Lookout 
Military Prison.  At Elmira, six companies of the 179th New York Volunteers had recently 
departed.  Their departure left the thirty barracks at Barracks Number 3 empty.367  Assistant 
Adjutant-General Edward D. Townsend notified Hoffman of this fact on May 14th, 1864.  
Townsend wrote, “I am today informed that there are quite a number of barracks at Elmira, N. Y. 
which are not occupied, and are fit to hold rebel prisoners.  Quite a large number of those lately 
captured could be accommodated at this place.  I give you this information for you to make such 
sue of it as you think proper.”368  Hoffman knew exactly what to do with that kind of 
information.  He informed Stanton on May 19th of the overcrowded conditions at Point Lookout 
where 10,000 POWs were located.  He respectfully suggested that one set of barracks at Elmira 
be appropriated for the overflow of Point Lookout.  The plan was to ship the prisoners directly 
from Belle Plain on steamers to New York City and then to Elmira by railroad cars.  Finally, in a 
terribly fateful assessment, Hoffman stated, “I am informed there are barracks there available 
which have, by crowding, received 12,000 volunteers.  By fencing them in at a cost of about 
$2,000 they may be relied on to receive 8,000 or possibly 10,000 prisoners.”369  Hoffman’s 
assessment was apparently based on Lazelle’s 1862 report, but the decision on the number of 
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prisoners to be encamped was Hoffman’s.  This assessment haunted the captives at Elmira for its 
entire existence. 
 On the day he notified Stanton of his plan to occupy Elmira’s barracks, Hoffman alerted 
on old acquaintance of his new command.  Lt. Col. Seth Eastman, commander of Draft 
Rendezvous, was ordered “to set apart the barracks on the Chemung River at Elmira as a depot 
for prisoners of war.”370  Eastman, who previously managed prisoners at McLean Barracks as 
Military Governor of Cincinnati, 371 had been a classmate of Hoffman’s at West Point.  Hoffman 
further instructed Eastman to enclose the barracks with a suitable fence similar to ones at other 
depots.  His communication gave exact details of the fence required including the height of the 
fence and requirements for the sentries.  He finished by stating that he not only expected 8,000 to 
10,000 prisoners, but that the barracks might be needed within ten days.372 
 Four days later Eastman responded to Hoffman’s letter.  His report mirrored Lazelle’s 
1862 inspection with regard to the status of Barracks Number 3.  He noted the absence of a 
hospital on site, but assured Hoffman that the mess halls could seat 1,200 to 1,500 troops at a 
time.  His understanding was that the kitchens would handle 5,000 troops daily.  His 
communication indicated the work on the fence had been started and would probably be finished 
in ten days.  While Eastman was concerned about a shortage of guard personnel, he was 
confident the barracks would hold 4,000 POWs with tents accommodating approximately 1,000 
more prisoners.373  In Eastman’s estimation, the capacity of Barracks Number 3 was 5,000 
prisoners or one-half of Hoffman’s proposed number. 
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 While work proceeded on the fence, officials in Washington were considering alternative 
sites.  On May 30th, Eastman received word that Elmira was no longer considered a site for 
POWs.374  Regardless, he finished the fence project shortly after June 5th.  The twelve-foot high 
fence extended 5,610 feet around the roughly rectangular plot.  A main gate faced the Foster’s 
residence on Water Street.  A wooden walkway was set on the outside of the fence—eight-feet 
high and four-feet wide.  Sentry boxes were set at intervals with diamond-shaped windows to 
visualize the entire area in foul weather.  There were forty-seven sentry boxes accessed by 
stairways on the outside of the structure.  The walkways had railings in place to help during the 
night watch.375  On June 22nd, new communications ordered Eastman to prepare Elmira for 
prisoners a per Hoffman’s May 19th instructions.  Hoffman reiterated his instructions to Eastman.  
“In establishing the fence it is advisable, if practicable,” he wrote, “to inclose ground enough to 
accommodate in barracks and tents 10,000 prisoners.376  Eight days later, Hoffman notified the 
commanding officer at Point Lookout to prepare for the transfer of 2,000 prisoners to Draft 
Rendezvous barracks in groups of 400 men accompanied by 100 guards.377 
 Before the first contingent of prisoners including George W. Jernigan reached Elmira, 
Eastman had completed the fence project.  Yet, the campground had no hospital on site and 
barracks capacity for only 4,000 men.  Tents were to be used for the additional POWs.  Besides 
no hospital, Elmira had been assigned no medical personnel.  There were no military medical 
personnel on hand to meet the first POWs.  At Camp Douglas in Chicago, at least six Chicago 
physicians were hired to treat the prisoners.378  In regard to rations, Hoffman’s May 19th 
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reduction was made official on June 1st.  The circular required reductions in bread, cornmeal, and 
potatoes.  Sugar and coffee or tea was excluded to healthy POWs.  The sick or wounded 
prisoners were to receive reduced quantities on an every other day basis.379  Into this situation, 
8,000 to 10,000 prisoners were to be placed. 
 Within the first week of arrival of prisoners, the camp census was 1,151 POWs, including 
George W. Jernigan and two distant cousins, Lewis and Cader Jernigan, from Wayne County, 
North Carolina.  They had served in Company H of the 20th NC Regiment and were also 
captured during the Overland Campaign.  By July 12th, Elmira had received its first official 
evaluation.  Lt. Col. Charles T. Alexander, Surgeon and Acting Medical Inspector, reviewed the 
camp on July 11th.  His report, which was filed directly to Hoffman on July 14th, found the camp 
in good condition.  His assessment indicated that the barracks would hold 5,000 men and tents 
could contain 3,000 to 5,000 additional prisoners.  Alexander’s assessment matched Hoffman’s 
expectations.  There were shortcomings according to Alexander.  The prisoners had no proper 
hospital organization.  They were cared for by a local surgeon, William Wey, who visited the 
camp once daily in his role as surgeon for the Union troops.  Among Alexander’s 
recommendations were a 300-bed hospital, a laundry, and “the immediate necessity of a 
competent surgeon to take charge.”380   
 The condition of the sinks after only one week of occupancy was a significant portion of 
Alexander’s report.  The Medical Inspector detailed the close proximity of the sinks to a stagnant 
slough.  His concern was the sinks might become offensive and a source of disease.  The slough 
described was Foster’s Pond.  Alexander’s remedy was “either to bring water from the city of 
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Elmira and construct new sinks with suitable drainage, or to cause the river near which the camp 
is situated to communicate with the slough, thereby providing a running stream through the 
camp”381  By the ninth day of the camp’s existence, Hoffman was informed of the potential 
hazard Foster’s Pond posed to the POWs and a remedy—proper drainage—had been suggested. 
  Shortly thereafter, Eastman and Elmira received an important visitor.  On July 19th, 
Hoffman arrived in town and registered at a local hotel.  He dined with his classmate that 
evening before touring the camp the following day.  Accompanied by Eastman, Hoffman 
inspected the camp, which still lacked a hospital and a complete medical staff, and Foster’s 
Pond.  Upon finishing his inspection, Hoffman returned to Washington on the evening train.  
While he left no new orders regarding the camp or Foster’s Pond, he did communicate with the 
press.  The following day the Elmira Advertiser reported, “Col. Hoffman spent the day yesterday 
in examining into the condition of those at Barracks No. 3.  He professed himself highly pleased 
with the accommodations and arrangements which have been devised for their comfort.”382  By 
the end of July, the official camp census stood at 4,424 prisoners with eleven who had died and 
two prisoners listed as escaped.383 
 August at Elmira brought significant changes for the prisoners encamped there.  It also 
brought a marked increase in the number of POWs.  The camp census doubled during the first 
half of the month.  When the fifteenth detachment of POWs arrived on August 18th, the camp 
counted 9,262 prisoners.384  As this number far exceeded the maximum capacity of the barracks, 
tents were set up on the grounds, which formerly was the old racecourse.  Tents quickly became 
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in short supply.  By August 7th, Eastman notified Hoffman that he was out of tents and 
requisitioned more.  Because of this tent shortage, a portion of the military guard was transferred 
to Barracks Number 1.  Eastman inquired as to the regulations regarding clothing for the 
prisoners.385  Hoffman reassured Eastman that he had the Quartermaster-General forwarding 
more tents without delay.  He reminded Eastman that only clothing of gray coloring could be 
issued to prisoners and that prisoners were not allowed to purchase tools and leather for repairing 
shoes.386  In the coming winter, many prisoners developed frostbite due to a lack of quality 
shoes. 
 Tools and leather were soon not the only things the prisoners were denied.  Earlier in 
1864, Hoffman had enforced regulations prohibiting the sending of boxes of supplies from 
friends and families to the POWs.  At the behest of Butler, these regulations had been relaxed.  
Prisoners were allowed to receive boxes containing “nothing harmful or contraband” and were 
allowed to purchase certain supplies including clothing from the sutlers.  Hoffman noted he did 
not concur with Butler’s recommendations and indicated he had been the one who suggested the 
limitations placed on this privilege.387  On August 10th, Hoffman again suspended this privilege.  
The circular read, “It is ordered that hereafter no supplies of any kind will be furnished to 
prisoners of war by their relatives or friends except in the cases of illness…”388  The list of 
articles that could be sold by the sutlers was included in the circular.  While tobacco was still on 
the list, it did not contain foodstuffs, especially fresh vegetables and fruits.  In essence, Hoffman 
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had eliminated the major source of supplementation of the existing rations left to the POWs.  
Their diet was now largely bread and water with a small amount of meat. 
 In response to a question from the camp commander at Camp Chase, Hoffman gave an 
illustration of the extent of this suspension.  Col. W. P. Richardson requested clarification of the 
August 10th circular with regard to disposal of supplies already received.  He reported, “The 
consequence is the accumulation of a large amount of supplies, the greater portion of which are 
of a perishable nature…Will you instruct men what disposition to make of these articles?”  In a 
response to Richardson on August 26th, Hoffman instructed that the supplies were to be disposed 
as the prisoner saw fit.  The supplies were either to be sold and the money credited to the 
prisoner or to be returned to the donor, if the prisoner paid the expense of sending it back.389 
Regardless, the supplies already in the possession of camp officials were not to be made 
available to the individual prisoner. 
 The prisoners soon felt the new regulations.  Without the availability of fresh vegetables 
and fruits and the diminished rations of June 1st, the prisoners at Elmira experienced a large 
increase in the incidence of scurvy.  By August 26th, Lt. Lounsbury, Acting Assistant Adjutant-
General, received a report listing 793 cases of scurvy among the 9,300 POWs in camp.  The 
report stated that scurvy did not arise from any sanitary neglect and recommended an extra issue 
of one ration per week of potatoes, cabbage, or onions to the prisoners in general and daily issue 
of the ration to prisoners with scurvy.  This report was indorsed by Eastman and referred to 
Hoffman.  Eastman noted the hospital fund could not cover the enormous cost and asked to use 
the prison fund to cover the expense.  He recommended further that sutlers be permitted to sell 
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green vegetables to the prisoners during the time that scurvy was present.  Within two weeks, 
Hoffman approved Eastman’s request.390 
 Elmira’s new Head Surgeon, Maj. Eugene F. Sanger, wrote this medical report to 
Lounsbury.  Sanger was in Baltimore after participating in the Red River Campaign when on 
July 29th, he received orders to assume the position of Chief Surgeon at Barracks Number 3.  He 
reported for duty on August 6th, or four weeks and three days after the camp opened.  Within a 
week, Sanger had serious concerns about the camp, especially Foster’s Pond.  In his report to 
Lounsbury, Sanger described in detail the condition of the pond, which he thought of as a pool of 
standing water.  He indicated that one large sink used by the POWs stood directly over the pond, 
which received fecal matter hourly.  Sanger calculated that “seven thousand men will pass 2,600 
gallons of urine daily, which was highly loaded with nitrogenous material.”  He reviewed the 
possibility of neutralizing the stench of the pool with chemicals, but rejected this idea due to the 
quantity and expense of the chemical needed.  His final solution was one already proposed by 
Alexander.  Sanger wrote, “The remedy then is to pass a current of water through this putrid 
matter…A large drain should be dug through the low run in the camp proper, and emptying 
drains should be dug from the main drain to the pond…Unless the laws of hygiene are carefully 
studied and observed in crowded camps disease is the inevitable consequence.”391 
 In reporting the condition of Foster’s Pond, Sanger was joined by Eastman who wrote 
Hoffman directly.  On August 17th, Eastman pointed out the offensive odor emanating from the 
pond.  He predicted as well that sickness would occur if the situation were not fixed very shortly.  
Like Alexander and Sanger, Eastman echoed, “The only remedy for this is to dig a ditch from the 
                                                 
390
 Ibid., 682, 683, 785. 
391
 Ibid., 604, 605. 
140 
pond to the river so that the water will run freely through it.”  Unlike the previous two observers, 
Eastman proposed a plan of action and had already commissioned a survey into the project.  He 
estimated the length of the ditch to be a mile.  In his opinion, the only objection to the project 
was it might do some damage to the land through which the ditch ran.  It appeared he had 
already conferred with the property owners as he reported, “They have, however, no objection to 
having the ditch dug.”  Eastman closed his report by requesting Hoffman to give instructions for 
this project quickly.  He concluded, “For if the work is to be done, it should be done 
immediately.”392 
 Hoffman telegraphed Eastman the next day requesting a copy of the survey.  Eastman 
complied with this request and added more details regarding the ditch project.  He noted the 
length to be roughly 5,960 feet with an average depth of six feet except in a certain area where it 
would be seven feet.  As Eastman’s plan called for an open ditch, two of the four involved 
landowners refused to allow the work to proceed.  They feared that the next rainfall would ruin 
their land between the ditch and the river.  Owing to a region-wide drought in the summer of 
1864, Eastman rejected the possibility of bringing water to the camp from the city water-works.  
The drought caused the town of Elmira to have difficulty supplying its own inhabitants with 
water.  Eastman estimated the cost of the project at $5,000.  Eastman did observe that should 
heavy rains come shortly then the work would not be required.393  While 553 prisoners lay ill in 
the hospital tents and another 558 awaited admission, this hope for rain and solution to the 
problem of Foster’s Pond never materialized.  The death count at Elmira rose from eleven in July 
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to 115 for August.394  Unlike the two-week response to the concerns about scurvy, Eastman 
never heard from Hoffman regarding the Foster’s Pond drainage ditch project. 
 The end of August also brought the end for a quick release from Elmira and elsewhere 
for the Confederate POWs.  Wilber Wightman Grambling, who was a member of the 5th Florida 
Volunteer Regiment, was captured on May 6th at the battle of the Wilderness.  Transferred from 
Washington, he entered Elmira on July 25th.  In his diary dated Saturday, Aug. 20, 1864, he 
wrote, “The exchange question is still being agitated very much.  Report says (said to be reliable) 
commencing 10th Sept. all over plus to be paroled & all to have 60 days furlough on our 
return.”395  Prisoners heard rumors of all types daily.  However, the New York Times gave some 
credibility to this one.  In an editorial on August 23rd, the editors noted the condition of “our 
poor, suffering, half-famished soldiers now prisoners in the south.”  They concluded, “In view of 
this condition of things, then, we can conceive of nothing more proper for the War Department 
to do in the premises than find a way at once to make a general sweeping exchange of 
prisoners.”396  The next day, the New York Times again called attention, in graphic detail, to the 
conditions at Andersonville.  Their call to the Lincoln administration and military leaders was 
simple.  The editors stated, “The duty of the military authorities is surely clear.  Exchange the 
white prisoners man for man at least; if no better can be done for the negro troops now, their 
time will come anon, unless the South is to have a monopoly of the capture of prisoners.”397  
While the editors of the New York Times called for the exchange of prisoners, and prisoners such 
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as Grambling hoped for it, one Union military leader was opposed to any exchange of POWs—
Grant. 
 Grant’s position on the exchange of prisoners was not created in August of 1864 as some 
historians have implied.  In his study, Battle Cry of Freedom:  The Civil War Era, James M. 
McPherson wrote, “A good many historians—especially those of southern birth—have pointed 
to Grant’s remarks (of August 1864) as the real reason for the North’s refusal to exchange.  
Concern for the rights of black soldiers, in this view, was just for show.  The northern strategy of 
a war of attrition, therefore, was responsible for the horrors of Andersonville and the suffering of 
prisoners on both sides.  This position is untenable.  Grant expressed his opinion more than a 
year after the exchange cartel had broken down over the Negro prisoner question.”  McPherson 
noted such Southern historians as William Hesseltine and Shelby Foote as well as a non-
Southerner, James Ford Rhodes as proponents of this view.”398  McPherson was right in that 
Grant did not order the halt of exchanges for the purpose of attrition, but Grant had already 
halted the exchanges in April of 1864.  In his order of April 17th, Grant wrote Butler that the 
validity of the paroles of the prisoners captured at Vicksburg and Port Hudson and the status of 
African-American prisoners were the only points that required instructions.  Failure to agree to 
both or either of these points by the Confederate authorities was to be regarded as a refusal on 
their part to agree to further exchanges of prisoners.399  Grant was on record well before his 
comments of August 1864 concerning the exchange of prisoners.  In August, he used the concept 
of attrition to strengthen his previously stated position.  It was not until October of 1864 that the 
treatment of African-American POWs was the stumbling block between Grant and Lee for the 
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resumption of the exchange of prisoners.  McPherson did not acknowledge Grant’s previous 
statements when he wrote his comments. 
 In a letter to Butler on August 18th, Grant confirmed his injunction on exchanges of 
prisoners.  He wrote, “I am opposed to exchanges being made until the whole matter is put on a 
footing giving equal advantages to us with those given to the enemy.  In the meantime I direct 
that no flags of truce be sent to the enemy nor any arrangements entered into with him without 
my first being advised of what is being done and yielding my consent to it.”400  Grant followed 
up these statements with another letter to Butler dated the same day.  Voicing the concerns from 
his April discussion with Butler, Grant commented, “Every man we hold, when released on 
parole or otherwise, becomes an active soldier against up at once either directly or indirectly.  If 
we commence a system of exchange which liberates all prisoners taken, we will have to fight on 
until the whole South is exterminated.  If we hold those caught they amount to no more than 
dead men.”  Grant explained his overall view of prisoner exchanges in a letter to Secretary of 
State William H. Seward on August 19th.  He insisted, “We ought not to make a single exchange 
nor release  a prisoner on any pretext whatever until the war closes.  We have got to fight until 
the military power of the South is exhausted, and if we release or exchange prisoners captured it 
simply becomes a war of extermination.”401  There was to be no general exchange for the 
prisoners at Elmira or any Union prison camp. 
 Despite the drought in Chemung County during the summer, the local newspapers 
reported excellent crops of fruits including apples, pears, and peaches as well as a variety of 
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fresh vegetables including potatoes.402  In his response to Eastman on September 8th, Hoffman 
did allow sutlers to sell fresh fruits and vegetables to those prisoners who could afford them.403  
By September 11th, there were 1,870 reported cases of scurvy.404  As for the rations received by 
the prisoners after the circular of August 10th by Hoffman, a letter secreted out of Elmira by a 
prisoner, John Brunson, shed light on their fare.  Brunson wrote to his sister, “I will give you 
some idea of my solution.  I would never have written to you for money, but I am almost starved 
to death.  I only get two meals a day, breakfast and supper.  For breakfast I get one-third of a 
pound of bread and a small piece of meat, for supper the same quantity of bread and not any 
meat, but a small plate of warm water called soup.”405  The debate over the quantity and quality 
of rations for any POW was an ongoing and never ending one.  For those POWs who felt their 
rations did not satisfy their needs, there were alternative sources of food. 
 One evening a prisoner was brought before the camp’s officer for suspicious behavior.  
When questioned as to his behavior, the prisoner answered he had been hunting.  The officer 
queried the prisoner as to what type of game he was hunting.  The prisoner quickly replied, 
“rats.”406  With the deterioration of Foster’s Pond, the camp’s rodent population had increased 
dramatically.  The rodents emerged toward evening from deep holes buried into the side of the 
pond.  When a rat was sighted, according to one prisoner, “Such a hurrah and such a chase and 
such a volley of stones!  You would have thought it was our Battalion of Sharpshooters in 
charge.”407  The prisoners prepared the rats either by frying or grilling.  In the market place of 
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the camp, a rat was worth four or five cents, five chews of tobacco, or a loaf of bread.408  Rats 
were not the only other source of dietary supplementation.  Pets, especially dogs, of the 
townspeople were known to wander near the camp and never return.  The punishment for being 
caught eating dog was the wearing of a barrel shirt.  The offending prisoner was forced to wear a 
barrel and walk around camp for a specified number of hours.  The barrel had attached to it a 
sign, which read, “I eat a dog.”409  Other offenses by prisoners were punished in a similar 
fashion. 
 In his report on the camp for September 25th, Capt. Munger, Camp Inspecting Officer, 
advised the camp commander, “During the past week there have been 112 deaths, reaching one 
day 29.  There seems little doubt numbers have died both in quarters and hospital for want of 
proper food.”410  The receiver of Munger’s report was the new camp commander, Col. Benjamin 
Tracy, who assumed command of Elmira on September 20th.  He replaced Eastman who was 
relieved of command due to health reasons.  Tracy forwarded Munger’s report to Hoffman with 
his own attachment.  He noted extensive scurvy and the offensive smell from the sinks, which 
permeated into the tents of the prisoners.  Tracy became the fourth officer to alert Hoffman to the 
effects of Foster’s Pond.  He wrote, “There is a pond of stagnant water in the center, which 
renders camp unhealthy.”  His remedy echoed the other officers—drain water from the river 
through the camp.411  In a month in which no new prisoners arrived and fresh fruits and 
vegetables were accessible to all prisoners, sick and well, the death toll at Elmira did not 
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improve.  It increased from 115 to 385, which was the most for any camp in the Union prison 
system.412  Elmira contributed 44% of all Confederate POW deaths that month. 
 Tracy’s concern for the effect of Foster’s Pond as the source of the camp’s diseased state 
was well founded.  Following the problems with scurvy, a significant number of the camp’s 
inhabitants developed “chronic diarrhea.”  Seventy-five years after being a prisoner at Elmira, 
James Hoffman recalled that the “well water looked pure and good but was deadly poison to our 
men.”413  The location of the wells to Foster’s Pond made them susceptible to ground 
contamination from the bacterial infestation of the pond.  The Confederate POWs developed 
symptoms of contaminated well water—headaches, dizziness, fever, coughing, nausea and 
vomiting, and chills.  Weakened by scurvy, the prisoners succumbed to dehydration and 
electrolyte imbalance.414  As American medicine and its practitioners had not yet accepted Louis 
Pasteur’s germ theory, the most logical was to stop the well water contamination was to drain 
Foster’s Pond. 
 Munger’s next report to Tracy did nothing to alleviate Tracy’s concerns.  In his report 
dated October 16th, Munger noted there were 588 patients in the hospital and 1,021 POWs 
receiving medical treatment in their dwellings.  Even after the transfer of 1,200 invalid prisoners 
in October, there were forty-four deaths recorded in the camp in the last four days.  Munger 
speculated, “The cause of this amount of sickness and death is a matter of deep interest.  That the 
existence of a large body of filthy, stagnant water within the camp has much to do with it can 
admit of no doubt.”  In his communication with Hoffman four days later, Tracy enclosed 
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Munger’s report.  He admitted that the mortality rate at Elmira was so great as to require a most 
rigid investigation as to its cause.  As for the future, he prognosticated, “If the rate of mortality 
for the last two months should continue for a year you can easily calculate the number of 
prisoners there would be left here for exchange.”415 
 Eastman had been ill the last month of his military career and Tracy was younger, more 
energetic and aggressive.  He persisted in calling Hoffman’s attention to the dangers of Foster’s 
Pond.  In another October communication to Hoffman, Tracy wrote, “The continued prevalence 
of disease and death in this camp impels me to call the attention of the authorities to what is 
apparently the cause, to wit, the existence of a stagnant pond of water within the inclosure.  
Nothing else that I can see produces the large mortality among the prisoners.”416  The letter gave 
Tracy’s opinion as to how to drain Foster’s Pond.  Rather than an open trench, as proposed by 
Eastman, Tracy recommended the use of pipe buried in a closed system.  The distance of pipe 
required remained approximately 6,000 feet.  He proposed to lay six-inch diameter wooden pipe 
at a cost of seventy-five cents per foot.  His projected estimated cost was higher that Eastman’s 
projection.  Tracy estimated a cost of $6,000 per mile.  He reminded Hoffman that his attention 
had been called to this “almost intolerable nuisance” in Eastman’s letter of August 17th.  To aid 
in Hoffman’s recollection, Tracy enclosed the August 21st telegram from Eastman outlining his 
plan.  As opposed to Eastman’s open ditch plan, Tracy found the landowners did not object to 
the closed system.  He finished by stating, “It seems to me that a due regard for the lives of the 
prisoners confined here require that some method of introducing a running stream of water 
through the camp should be adopted.”  Hoffman passed along Tracy’s letter with Eastman’s 
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attachment to Halleck.  He agreed that a pipe of two-inch plank should be laid and estimated the 
cost of not over $1,000.417 
 By October 23rd, Hoffman had answered Tracy’s letter and request.  He approved Tracy’s 
suggestion regarding the construction of a closed drainage system.  As per Tracy’s plan, the 
labor for the construction was to be performed by prisoners.  The prison fund was to pay for all 
expenses.  Hoffman did not stop at just an approval.  As with his instructions to Eastman 
regarding Elmira’s fence, he detailed to Tracy exactly how the pipe was to be constructed.  The 
degree of detail extended to the description of the fitting of each length of pipe to insure a closed 
joint.  He further estimated that the “whole work should not cost over $120,” as opposed to his 
original estimate to Halleck of $1,000.  Echoing Eastman’s previous wishful thinking, Hoffman 
concluded, “The fall rains may be expected to come on very soon, which for the winter will do 
away with the necessity of the work.”418  Despite transferring 1,264 invalid prisoners for 
exchange, Elmira’s death toll for October was 276.  The number was again the highest for any 
camp in the Union prison system.  The next highest death toll was at Camp Chase, which had 
113 deaths or less than half of Elmira’s total.419 
 Three days later, Tracy notified Hoffman that he was ready to proceed with a work force 
of 125-150 prisoners.  The work was to commence immediately unless Tracy heard back from 
Hoffman.  He predicted, “The whole work can be completed in from twelve to fifteen days from 
commencement.”420  Tracy’s prediction was far from accurate.  Part of the problem was the soil 
between the pond and the river.  He originally stated it was very light soil and easily dug.  
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Unfortunately, the prison workforce found quicksand in certain areas and extremely coarse 
gravel in others.  Tracy commented that the soil appeared to have been the riverbed previously.  
Several unanticipated delays were necessitated by the severe weather in Chemung County in 
November and December.  The river caused occasional flooding, which required extensive 
pumping.  Instead of the projected twelve to fifteen days, the ditch project required sixty-seven 
days of work.  When completed, the cost of the project was $2,000 as opposed to Hoffman’s 
estimation of $120.  On January 1st, 1865, Tracy boasted to Hoffman that the conduit worked 
“like a charm.”  Meanwhile, since the opening of Elmira Prison Camp, 1,263 Confederate POWs 
had perished.421 
 The ditch project was not the only concern for Tracy during this time.  At the beginning 
of October, the thirty established barracks at Elmira housed 3,873 prisoners.  As the camp’s 
census was 9,063 POWs, there were 5,190 men encamped in 1,038 “A” tents located on the old 
racecourse.422  The overcrowded conditions had begun with the earliest arrivals.  Following his 
request for more tents in August, Eastman foresaw the need for permanent winter quarters.  As 
early as August 28th, he had requested information from Hoffman regarding arrangements for the 
winter quarters.  He recommended that the construction commence immediately, owing to the 
difficulty of the supply of lumber.  Hoffman, in his response on September 8th, told Eastman to 
order Sibley tents for October.  Without additional explanation, Hoffman simply stated, 
“Barracks for guards, or additional ones for the prisoners will not be put up for present.”  By the 
end of September, it was Tracy’s turn to recommend additional barracks.  He echoed Munger’s 
September 25th report that the men in tents suffered from the weather.  Hoffman gave his 
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approval for the erection of shed barracks for the POWs on October 3rd.  As fit Hoffman’s 
demonstrated management style, he gave Tracy not only a description of how the barracks were 
to be constructed, but also a diagram on how the building was to be arranged.  His plan called for 
bunks to be built in three tiers as opposed to the double tiers of the other barracks.  By mid-
October, he had also approved the erection of barracks for the depot guard.  Hoffman directed 
that “the barracks will be built after the style of those directed for the prisoners, and in every way 
the closest economy will be studied.”423         
 Three major building projects including the ditch project, the additional barracks for the 
prisoners, and the barracks for the depot guard, commenced during the month of October.  All 
three projects required lumber, building materials, skilled laborers from the community, and 
prisoner workforce.  Despite shortages of timber, progress was made by mid-November.  Six 
new barracks had been completed for the prisoners and another four were almost finished.424  By 
December, there were serious shortages of lumber supplies.  In the report to Tracy for the week 
of December 11th, three more barracks had been erected, but the last one of the buildings was 
incomplete because there was no lumber on hand.425  Construction was halted again because of a 
scarcity of lumber the week before Christmas.  On Christmas Day, the weather at Elmira was 
more pleasant as the temperatures rose.  The rise in temperatures was enjoyed by the 900 POWs 
still living in tents.  By New Year’s Day, 1865, all of the 8,401 prisoners were sheltered in 
barracks.426  
 It was good that all the prisoners were housed in barracks by January 1st after the camp 
opened July 6th.  The question remained of why it took so long to get approval to build the 
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barracks.  From his personal visit on July 20th, Hoffman was aware of the lack of space for 
accommodating 10,000 prisoners in the existing barracks.  In light of Grant’s rejection of a 
general exchange, the War Department knew that winter quarters were needed.  During August, 
Eastman had reminded Hoffman of the need for more housing.  The topic was discussed when 
more tents were requisitioned and again when Eastman inquired about the arrangements for 
winter quarters.  Still, Hoffman delayed giving his approval until severe weather had already 
begun in October.  During this three-month delay, Elmira had a death toll of 808 prisoners.  The 
next highest death toll of a Union prison camp was Camp Douglas, which was located in 
Chicago.  The death toll for that camp in the same three months was 649 POWs out of a total 
enrollment of 7,999 prisoners or comparable to Elmira’s census.427 
 While all prisoners were housed in barracks by New Year’s Day, there was significant 
overcrowding in each building.  The twenty original barracks had capacity of one hundred men, 
which the newer barracks—the ten built before 1864 and the thirty-five just completed—were 
designed to accommodate 120-150 prisoners.  Almost 200 men were posted in each building.428 
The winter in Elmira, which had started as of October 10th, was severe even for New York State.  
During the winter, the temperature twice dropped to eighteen degrees below zero and blizzards 
left several feet of snow.429  The bunks were built to accommodate two men, but in severe 
weather as many as four occupied the same bunk.  Marcus Toney remembered the winter of 
1864-1865.  He noted that “two of the prisoners slept with their heads toward the east, and two 
with heads toward the west, and of course had to be on their sides; and when ready to change 
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positions, one would call out, ‘All turn to the right’; and the next call would be, ‘All turn to the 
left.’  The turns had to be made as stated or there would be collisions.  Of course the men did not 
disrobe in extreme cold weather, and on awakening in the morning their feet would be in each 
other’s face.”430 
 Overcrowding in the barracks caused concern for others than just the prisoners.  Maj. 
Anthony E. Stocker, the camp’s new Chief Surgeon who replaced Sanger, worried that the 
overcrowding of the barracks was an invitation for medical catastrophe.  In a private letter to 
Tracy on the last day of December 1864, he voiced his concerns and fears.  He wrote, “The 
buildings already erected and in use for the accommodation of prisoners are too crowded, 
needing more light and ventilation if practicable.  The present effects of too crowded buildings 
are to produce in their occupants a low form of Pneumonia or Inflammation of the Lungs, a form 
of disease greatly on the increase, and to propagate contagious and infectious diseases, especially 
of Small-Pox, now also on the increase.”431  At the time of Stocker’s letter, pneumonia had 
already claimed the life of Lewis M. Jernigan, who died on December 28, 1864.432  Smallpox 
was already at Elmira and had been transmitted to sixty-three prisoners, which did not include 
two prisoners who died of the illness earlier.433 
 The arrival of the smallpox virus was traced to a Fort Morgan captive who entered the 
camp at the end of October.  While that prisoner recovered from the disease, it was not before he 
infected other prisoners.  By December, the outbreak of the illness was threatening to become an 
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epidemic.  The camp report for December 18th noted several cases of smallpox with one death 
from the illness.  The dead prisoner was buried within the compound.434  By January 1st, there 
were ninety-five new cases with nine deaths attributed to the disease.  The inspecting officer 
stated that all clothing belonging to the victims had been destroyed.435  As the number of cases 
increased, Tracy was advised by the Washington authorities to prepare temporary facilities to 
isolate the infected patients.  They suggested a site within the camp if possible, but he was 
authorized to place these facilities outside the compound if the prisoners were well guarded.436 
 When the number of smallpox cases increased to 126 including ten deaths, Tracy and 
Stocker created a temporary hospital of “A” tents in the area just across Foster’s Pond.  As 
Stocker prepared to initiate vaccinations for the camp, Tracy informed Washington, “We hope 
we have got control of this disease (smallpox) and will be able to keep it within bounds.”437  
Again, Tracy’s prediction was inaccurate.  By the end of January, there were so many smallpox 
victims in the temporary tents that plans were made to construct a more permanent smallpox 
hospital.  Stocker vaccinated 5,600 men in January as a result of the reported 397 cases of 
smallpox.438  The death toll for Elmira for January 1865, including the smallpox deaths, was 285.  
This number was the third highest for the Union prisons system behind Camp Douglas (308) and 
Camp Chase (293).  There were officially 1,015 prisoners listed as sick.  This number was by far 
the most of any camp that month.  Camp Douglas had 511 officially listed POWs as sick with a 
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census of 11,711 prisoners, while Camp Chase listed 535 men on the sick list with a census of 
9,423, both camps with larger prisoner populations than Elmira.439 
 Despite attempts at vaccination, many new cases of smallpox were reported.  The 
procedure for treatment was vivid for Marcus Toney.  Remembering his stay in the smallpox tent 
hospital (January 25th-29th), Toney recalled, “I walked across the lake [Foster’s Pond] and 
commenced my search at the head of a row of tents…I found a tent with two patients…and I 
crawled in…once a day a waiter brought some tea and bread…The second night one of our 
bedfellows died…We had about eight blankets, but could not keep warm.”440  Personnel, 
including doctors, nurses, waiters, and wardmasters who were resistant to the disease, tended to 
the sick and dying.  There was no medical therapy available for the patients.  The disease had to 
run its course and the patient hoped to survive.  Because of the irritating blisters of smallpox, 
many patients had to be kept from scratching their sores, which in some cases created the 
appearance of one continuous scab.441  The smallpox epidemic lasted for the first three months of 
1865.  Some 400 men perished directly from smallpox during that time.  By April, the camp 
began to experience milder temperature and the warmer weather brought a merciful end to the 
outbreak of smallpox.442 
 Since August of 1864, there had been pressure on the Lincoln administration to affect a 
general exchange of prisoners.  During the fall months, there had been informal exchanges of 
sick and invalid prisoners in small numbers.  In October, Elmira transferred 1,264 prisoners and 
Point Lookout sent 2,879 POWs for exchange.  Returning Union prisoners with their stories of 
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cruelty, especially at the hands of the commandant of Andersonville, increased the pressure on 
Grant to create a general exchange.443  While previous attempts at a general exchange had 
broken down over the issue of African-American troops, the attitude of the Southern leaders was 
changing.  By mid-January 1865, Grant notified Stanton that he had authorized Col. Mulford to 
renew negotiations for the exchange of all prisoners now held by either party.  These 
negotiations quickly led to an agreement, which included the exchange of prisoners held in 
prison camps and not under charges.444 
 For the captives of Elmira, this agreement meant release from overcrowded conditions 
and the severe weather of winter.  It also meant a journey, which taxed even healthy men.  In the 
October exchange, five prisoners had died on the train trip to Baltimore and one prisoner had 
succumbed after his arrival there.  Many other prisoners, who made the trip, were hospitalized 
until they recovered enough to proceed.445  When Hoffman notified Tracy on February 4th of the 
impending exchange, he reminded Hoffman of the difficulties faced in October.  He 
recommended that the prisoners be sent to New York City on the Erie Railroad and then onto 
Baltimore.  Hoffman rejected Tracy’s suggestion and ordered the men onto the Northern Central 
Railroad.  Tracy prepared for the departure of 3,000 prisoners from Elmira.446  While Tracy’s 
preparations continued, the first detachment of exchanged POWs arrived in Baltimore, three of 
the prisoners had died en route because of chronic diarrhea and nineteen were hospitalized being 
unable to proceed further in the journey.  One of those prisoners hospitalized had smallpox.447  
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 In accordance with Hoffman’s arrangements, the first detachment of 500 prisoners 
marched out of Barracks Number 3 at 4:30 P.M. on February 13th, 1865.  Their final destination 
was City Point, Virginia and the exchange site before their final journey home.  Their itinerary 
had them march to the railroad depot before boarding a Northern Central Railroad train bound 
for Baltimore.  Once in Maryland, the prisoners were to be transported by steamer to Point 
Lookout before embarking for City Point.  The Elmira Advertiser was once again present to 
record the prisoner’s activities.  The newspaper reported: 
  “The sick and disabled were removed in a long line of baggage wagons 
  and stowed away in the cars comfortably as could be arranged for them. 
  A few so ill to be unable to sit up were tenderly cared for in the Hospital  
  ambulance, in which they were carried to the train…They looked hopeful 
  even through the diseases under which many were laboring or recovering  
  from.  The glad prospect of home once more, even in its devastation and 
  desolation, seemed to light up the countenances of all, and the sick and  
  weary took a fresh cling to life, that they might have strength to greet loved 
ones once more.”448 
 
As those prisoners made ready for their journey home, another prisoner made his final journey as 
well.  The resumption of the exchange of prisoners came too late for George W. Jernigan.  He 
died on February 12th, 1865 with “variola” listed as the cause of death.  Variola was a smallpox 
related disease that infected those persons who had already been afflicted with smallpox or who 
had been vaccinated against the disease.449  Examination of the records kept at Elmira Prison 
Camp revealed no deaths from smallpox.  While many men were listed as dying from 
pneumonia, chronic diarrhea, and variola, no prisoner was given smallpox as their cause of 
death.450  George W. Jernigan was transported to the dead-house, which was located on the west 
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side of the camp on the flat near the river.451  This 16’ by 30’ by 12’ building was where the 
deceased were kept and prepared for burial. 
 Confederate prisoners administered to the deceased captives.  Methodically, the deceased 
was placed in a pine box, which had been built on site by the POWs.  The deceased’s clothing 
and even jewelry were left alone and buried with the prisoner.  The name, rank, company, 
regiment, grave number, and date of death were recorded on paper and on the lid of the coffin.  
The paper was then placed in a bottle.  The bottle was placed into the coffin before the lid was 
nailed shut.452  The coffins were then loaded onto a customized hearse driven by John Donohoe, 
who received $60 per month for his services.453  Six coffins were placed into the hearse—four on 
the inside and two on top—for the drive to the Woodlawn Cemetery, which was a mile-and-a-
half north of the prison camp. 
 When Elmira opened in July of 1864, Eastman recognized the need for burial space for 
the deceased POWs.  He requested Hoffman to authorize leasing space in the local cemetery, 
Woodlawn Cemetery.  Hoffman approved Eastman’s request to lease a half-acre plot for $300 as 
a burial ground for the prisoners.  Eastman was also given permission to employ a laborer at $40 
per month to dig graves.454  As the Confederate dead increased, there was need for more space at 
Woodlawn Cemetery.  The Mayor of Elmira leased additional space to the government on 
January 1st, 1865.  The cost of this additional space was $600.455 
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 When the coffins reached Woodlawn Cemetery, it fell to the laborer to bury the dead.  It 
was in this individual that the deceased Confederate prisoners and their families were blessed.  
The sexton of Woodlawn Cemetery was John W. Jones, who was a runaway slave from the Elzy 
Plantation in Virginia.  With his brother, George, and several others, Jones escaped from 
Virginia in 1844 and settled in Elmira.  After teaching himself to read and write, he was sexton 
of a local church for many years.  In the position of sexton of Woodlawn Cemetery, he directed 
the burial of the Confederate coffins into trenches dug into the ground from north to south.  The 
coffins were then placed at equal distances from east to west.  In all, there were thirty-six 
trenches extending across the plot.  At the head of each grave, there was placed a wooden slab 
containing all the information neatly painted from the lid of the coffin.456  Jones meticulously 
kept records and noted the location of each Confederate deceased.  Lewis M. Jernigan was 
buried in grave number 1297, while George W. Jernigan rested in grave number 2072.  Unlike 
other prison camps such as Camp Douglas, family and friends of the fallen POWs were able to 
locate their loved ones thanks to Jones and his meticulous records. 
 During the months of February and March, the exchanges of prisoners continued.  In 
February, Tracy transferred for exchange 1,491 prisoners, but the death toll was 426 men or 
approximately fifteen deaths per day including the death of George W. Jernigan.  Despite 
sending another 1,518 POWs in March for exchange, the highest monthly death toll was 
recorded.  In March of 1865, 491 men perished during its thirty-one days or just fewer than 
sixteen deaths per day.  Yet, Elmira did not have the highest death toll for the prison system.  
Camp Chase in Ohio held that honor with 499 deaths.  As of April 1st, the camp census was 
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5,054, but the overall death toll had reached 2,465 captives at Elmira out of a total of 11,990 
prisoners held in its walls at some point.457 
 April of 1865 brought spring to Elmira and relief from the smallpox epidemic.  It also 
brought news from the South.  In his diary, Grambling chronicled the final news Lee’s army.  On 
April 3rd, Grambling noted, “Reports say that Richmond evacuated.”  This was followed by his 
entry for April 10th, “Reports say, it is published on bullitenboard that Lee has surrendered his 
army also that we are to be paroled immediately.”  The diary noted Grambling’s resignation on 
April 13th with his acceptance of the reality of Lee’s surrender to Grant.458  Lee’s surrender did 
not end the prisoner’s stay at Elmira.  It was announced that the War Department was compiling 
names of prisoners willing to take the Oath of Allegiance.  Those men who accepted the offer 
and took the oath were to be released.  Those who refused were to remain captives.459  
Grambling initially resisted the offer.  He wrote on April 24th, “Took the names of all citizen 
oath takers, all who willing to take the oath and those who won’t take the oath.  I am still a R B 
REB.”  Two days later, he had a change of heart.  The diary entry read, “Most all have applied to 
take the oath and I was weak enough to do so also.  Sorry for it since try and live in the hopes 
that it will prove for the best.”460  Grambling and the other oath takers had good reason to take 
heart over pride.  Elmira’s death toll for April was 276 prisoners, again the highest of any Union 
prison camp.461 
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 During May and June, Elmira’s prison population diminished in prisoners as 1,144 ex-
Confederates left alive and another 131 POWs were buried in Woodlawn Cemetery.462  It 
diminished in Union officers as well.  Tracy submitted his resignation to the War Department 
and was replaced on June 17th.  June saw the release of another 2,509 captives with only 54 
deaths recorded.  Of those released, Cader Jernigan was released on June 16th.463  Prior to 
leaving, he raised his right hand and repeated, “I, Cader Jernigan, do solemnly swear, in the 
presence of Almighty God, that I will henceforth faithfully support, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States, and the Union of the States thereunder; and that I will, in the 
like manner, abide by and faithfully support all laws and proclamations which have been made 
during the existing rebellion with reference to the emancipation of slaves:  So help me God.”464 
In July, the end came quickly for Elmira’s military prison.  On July 11th, the final detachment of 
256 ex-Confederate POWs made their way out of the gates of Barracks Number 3 and turned 
onto Water Street headed for downtown Elmira and the train depot.  The last of Elmira’s 
captives, some 142 men too ill to travel, were transferred to Elmira’s Union Hospital where 
seventeen more Confederate deaths occurred between July 12th and September 1st.465 
 Elmira Military Prison Camp was in existence only twelve months, but it has earned a 
long lasting reputation.  During its months of operation, it had the highest death rate percentage 
of any Union prison system camp.  Of the total of 12,122 Confederate POWs housed in Elmira, 
there were 2,950 deaths including 2,933 known Confederate soldiers, 24 civilians, and seven 
                                                 
462
 Ibid., 1002. 
463
 M598, Roll 67, United States War Department.  Selected Records of the War Department to Confederate 
 Prisoners of War 1861-1865.  Elmira register of POWs confined and deceased. 
464
 Gray, The Business of Captivity, 149. 
465
 Horigan, Elmira:  Death Camp of the North, 179-180. 
161 
unknown Confederates.466  There were many factors contributing to the 24.3% death rate.  There 
was no doubt that location and weather played a part in the deaths at Elmira.  Other intangibles 
such as the condition of the Confederate soldiers upon admission to the camp must also be given 
consideration.  However, at several critical junctions, Hoffman’s decisions affected the direction 
of the camp’s destiny and created an environment that added to the death toll.  From the start, it 
was his decision to place 8,000 to 10,000 prisoners in a camp prepared to receive half that 
number.  His failure to respond to multiple communications regarding Foster’s Pond meant a 
delay in the improvement of the camp.  This delay was costly in terms of money and in terms of 
men.  The number of prisoners who died with the diagnosis of Chronic Diarrhea was substantial.  
Finally, his refusal to acknowledge Eastman’s request concerning winter quarters did not fit his 
management style, which could be considered one of micromanaging.  There were many factors 
beyond Hoffman’s control.  These factors led to a portion of Elmira’s death toll and its 
subsequent reputation.  However, Hoffman’s decisions affected the conditions at Elmira, and 
ultimately, the welfare of the prisoners.  A portion of Elmira’s reputation must be laid at his feet.  
He did play a role in the “Death Camp of the North.” 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
Throughout history, the fate of prisoners-of-war has been of limited interest to the 
general populace of the nation-states.  There is current media coverage of the treatment of Iraqi 
POWs, but the coverage has not been paramount in the overall reporting of the war.  In general, 
POWs are a low priority not only for the public but also for the governments who hold them.  In 
regards to food, clothing, and shelter, the status of prisoner comfort is negligible.  Their deaths 
do not seem as glorified as those of soldiers who die in combat on the battlefield.  The surge of 
recent literature on Civil War prisoners is, as McPherson stated, “attention they so long 
needed.”467 
For the Civil War captives, the duration of the war and the immense numbers of men held 
captive were factors in the story of these men.  As Hesseltine’s classic study demonstrated, the 
longer a conflict continued the greater the animosity needed to sustain the nation’s war effort.  
There was no doubt that neither side was prepared for the vast number of prisoners that each 
ultimately held.  It was to William Hoffman’s credit that he initially improved the chaos of the 
Northern prison system in the time before the Exchange Cartel.  However, the long-term effort of 
caring for nearly 65,000 men required a much greater commitment.  The location of camp sites, 
the availability of support services including transportation and food, the behavior of individuals 
including guards, officers, or camp commanders, as well as the condition of the arriving 
prisoners were all factors involved in the care of the prisoners.  A decrease in the daily ration for 
a Confederate prisoner affected that soldier’s chance of survival, especially if that soldier entered 
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the camp already malnourished with a case of scurvy.  Thus, any increase in the death toll of 
Confederate POWs was related to many factors involving the prison system, the different camps, 
condition of soldiers when they became POWs, and individuals in offices of authority over the 
prisoners. 
It was the development of a change in actions as a feature of the treatment of POWs that 
illuminated Hoffman.  Whether a writer, such as Hesseltine, labeled this change “war psychosis” 
or simply a hardening of the behavior as written by McPherson, it was the change of action that 
mattered.  When questions concerning responsibility for poor living conditions and increases in 
death rates of prisoners arose, the accused was usually the leader of the government.  For the 
Confederacy, with the death of Gen. John H. Winder and the hanging of Henry Wirz of 
Andersonville, Jefferson Davis became the main suspect.  Following the war, several politicians 
placed Davis at the heart of a conspiracy to deliberately kill Union POWs.  For the Union, the 
prime figure was not Abraham Lincoln, but his Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, whose wartime 
rhetoric and post-war reconstruction stance made him a target of Confederate accusations. 
For the writer, Bruce Catton, Stanton was the culprit behind the great suffering by 
Confederate POWs.  In Grant Takes Command, Catton argued that Grant and Stanton refused to 
make prisoner exchanges despite the greater need for Union troops on the front line.468  He wrote 
that the no-exchange policy was Stanton’s and his arguments convinced Grant.  Catton claimed 
the basis of Stanton’s arguments was that to make exchanges was to abandon the African-
American troops and their officers.  His second argument was that the South needed its 
manpower and it stood to gain more than the Union in any parole and exchange policy.469  
                                                 
468
 Bruce Catton, Grant Takes Command (Boston:  Little, Brown, And Company, 1968), 370. 
469
 Ibid., 372. 
164 
Grant’s early war experiences and his subsequent dealing with the parole fiasco at Vicksburg 
made this argument seem unlikely.  Grant’s attitude toward the prisoners appeared to be set prior 
to assuming the position of Lieutenant General.  His plans for the Spring Offensive of 1864 
revolved around the application of constant pressure on the Southern resources, including troops.  
Even before his pronouncements in August of 1864, Grant had eliminated the exchange and 
parole process in response to the Confederate government’s handling of the paroles involving 
Vicksburg and Gettysburg as well as the response to the issue of African-American troops.  
Catton was not the only historian who points to Stanton as the culprit. 
Michael Horigan, author of Elmira:  Death Camp of the North, stated, “Secretary 
Stanton, a man of profound calculations, saw to it that a handful of his ranking officers 
implemented a policy of retaliation—a policy that turned Elmira into a death camp.”470  He listed 
seventeen reasons why Elmira’s death toll was so great.  Chief among Horigan’s complaints was 
Stanton’s call for retaliation in April of 1864.  While the leader of any institution may have 
developed a specific “corporate culture”, it was still individuals, who created the expression of 
that culture.  Of Horigan’s seventeen concerns, the actions directly related to Hoffman involved 
at least ten of the concerns, including the placement of 10,000 POWs at Elmira, the lack of 
medical staff and facilities, the delays in the building of the barracks, and the late start on the 
drainage of Foster’s Pond.  The Official Records pointed to Hoffman as the author of these 
decisions, rather than to an individual carrying out the orders of a superior. 
The personality of William Hoffman had many qualities as seen by various historians.  
Lonnie R. Speer characterized Hoffman as “a methodical, budget-conscious administrator [who] 
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insisted that money be spent only on absolute necessities.”471  “Obedient, intelligent, and [a] 
tireless official” described Hoffman as seen by the author, George Levy.472  J. Michael Martinez 
contended Hoffman “oversaw the conditions and treatment of Confederate prisoners with an 
almost fanatical parsimony that bordered on obsession.”473  Even his biographer, Leslie Gene 
Hunter, noted, “Concerned with the most minute formalities of military conduct and proper 
protocol, [Hoffman] expected precision and perfection in the reports, returns, records, and rolls 
of his subalterns.”474  By consensus, Hoffman came across as a methodical perfectionist, frugal 
to a parsimonious degree, given to limited deviation from his duties.  During the spring of 1864 
and after, Hoffman’s actions belied this description.  The actions and decisions by Hoffman were 
not like the ones taken earlier in the war by this individual.  Whether it was “war psychosis” as 
alleged by Hesseltine and Hunter or simply a hardening of attitude as stated by McPherson, 
Hoffman’s actions toward Confederate POWs were not the same starting in early 1864. 
Hunter, in his dissertation, pointed to the critical period of April 1864 to February 1865 
as the time frame for Hoffman’s “war psychosis.”  During this time, Hoffman created the April 
20th circular, which reduced the rations to the POWs, visited Annapolis and viewed the returning 
Union prisoners, and recommended on May 19th to Stanton a further reduction of the rations for 
the prisoners.  In August of 1864, Hoffman eliminated the supplemental ration boxes from 
families as well as prisoner trading with sutlers.  The opening of Elmira occurred during this 
time frame.  Elmira seemed to bear the brunt of Hoffman’s change in actions and decisions. 
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The criticism of Hoffman as being partially responsible for Elmira’s death rate focused 
on his actions during the start of the camp.  The two major areas of criticism were the 
commitment of 8,000 to 10,000 prisoners into the space allocated and the failure to recognize the 
potential impact of Foster’s Pond.  While other concerns existed such as the lack of medical staff 
and hospital facilities, Hoffman’s handling of the opening of Elmira would be less troublesome if 
he had not personally visited the camp on July 20th.  As an experienced frontier officer, Hoffman 
should have seen the potential problems given the overcrowding of the camp.  The very day of 
his visit Hoffman ordered more prisoners sent to Elmira from Washington, DC despite the fact 
that the camp contained nearly 4,000 POWs.  This number of POWs filled the capacity of the 
existing barracks.  There were no accommodations for additional captives at this time.  Yet, 
Hoffman continued to add more prisoners.   
Another point of criticism was the drainage of Foster’s Pond.  Hunter wrote, “When the 
commander recommended the construction of a sewage system over one mile in length to the 
Chemung River, which would drain the large stagnant pond of water within the prison, Hoffman 
approved.”475  Hunter did not give any background to the request or any time frame.  Hoffman 
did approve Tracy’s request, but his approval was in October.  In a letter in August, Eastman 
reminded Hoffman of the offensive stench of Foster’s Pond.  While Hoffman responded to 
Eastman’s plea for fresh vegetables and fruits for the prisoners with scurvy within two weeks, he 
made no comment on Foster’s Pond.  He delayed his decision until October and even then, 
proposed to see if the fall rains would alleviate the necessity of the job.  These actions were from 
an individual who routinely wrote camp commanders on the depth that poles should be placed 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
475
 Ibid., 207. 
167 
for fencing.  For a man who appeared to micromanage, it seems unlikely that Hoffman simply 
overlooked the need for the drainage of Foster’s Pond.  If Eastman’s proposed plan was 
impractical, Hoffman was not above offering his opinion.  In the case of other camps, he 
routinely offered his recommendation regarding the type of cooking kettles to be used as well as 
other specific instructions regarding the building of barracks.  When Tracy presented his plan to 
Hoffman, Hoffman response was to give detailed instructions on how to form the pipefittings for 
a tight seal.  Based on his performance, Hoffman’s dealing with Foster’s Pond does not seem to 
be one of overlooking a memo.  Horigan concluded, “The delay of addressing the condition of 
Foster’s Pond can be directly traced to the commissary general of prisoners.”476 
Lastly, the delay in providing winter quarters for the prisoners at Elmira appeared to be 
Hoffman’s decision.  As opposed to other camps where Hoffman reported that Stanton declined 
to build more barracks, there was no such statement here from Hoffman.  The delay led to 
prisoners still in tents in December in Elmira.  When the new barracks were built, there was 
severe overcrowding for the prisoners.  As seen by Stocker’s letter to Tracy, communicable 
diseases such as pneumonia and smallpox flourished in such a setting.  Hoffman did not cause 
the smallpox epidemic.  Many other campsites had outbreaks of smallpox that caused troops as 
well as prisoners to die.  Yet, an environment where men were crammed into small spaces 
allowed any communicable disease to spread with more intensity whether it was a viral flu 
syndrome or smallpox.  The Surgeon General’s Office evaluated the sickness and mortality of 
Confederate prisoners following the war.  The conclusions of their study were published in the 
Medical History of the War of the Rebellion.  With regard to Elmira, the medical examiners 
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concluded, “Large mortality was undoubtedly referable to over-crowding, insufficient hospital 
accommodations, and insufficient protection from the cold of the northern climate.”477  At 
Elmira, decisions regarding the number of prisoners, building of winter quarters, and the 
drainage of Foster’s Pond was the privy of one individual—William Hoffman.  He must bear 
part of the responsibility of Elmira’s death toll and reputation as “Hellmira.” 
The second half of Hunter’s thesis was that Hoffman’s “war psychosis” did not greatly 
affect the prisoners.  He admitted that Hoffman did show the effects of “war psychosis,” but it 
had no appreciable impact on prison conditions.478  To further his argument, Hunter used a 
monthly mortality rate as the indicator for the impact of Hoffman’s “war psychosis.”  Using the 
number of monthly deaths divided by the total number of prisoners, Hunter presented 
information as a percentage.  He noted from March 1864 to June 1864, the monthly mortality 
rate declined from 1.99% in March (675 deaths/33,802 prisoners) to 0.98% in June (413/33,598) 
and to 1.26% in July (625/49,544).  The mortality rate did not reflect the retaliation form 
Hoffman’s “war psychosis” concluded Hunter.479  The problem with this statement was that the 
figures came before Elmira opened, before restrictions on boxes of foodstuffs, and before 
winter’s effect and overcrowding in the barracks were felt.  Using Hunter’s table, the statistics 
reflected the full effect of Hoffman’s “war psychosis.”  For months December 1864 to March 
1865, the mortality rate jumped from 1.26% (July) to a range of 2.15% in December 
(1094/50,834) to 2.78% in both February (1819/65,322) and March (1451/52,189).480  The effect 
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of Hoffman’s “war psychosis” on the monthly mortality rate was an increase from 1,26% to 
2.78% or an increase of 220%. 
The accepted figures on total deaths of Civil War prisoners, Union and Confederate, 
came from a 1904 history by James Ford Rhodes.  Rhodes quoted Gen. F. C. Ainsworth, Chief of 
the Record and Pension Office, in his history.  Rhodes wrote, “It appears that 211,411 Union 
soldiers were captured during the civil war, of which number 16,668 were paroled on the field 
and 30, 218 died while in captivity; and that 462,634 Confederate soldiers were captured during 
the war, of which number 24,769 were paroled on the field and 25,976 died while in captivity.  
Thus, the mortality was a little over 12 per cent in the North and 15.5 at the South.”481  While 
Hunter calculated a slightly different figure, most texts, including McPherson’s Battle Cry Of 
Freedom:  The Civil War Era and Ordeal By Fire:  The Civil War and Reconstruction, used 
these figures on the death rate of Civil War POWs.  From July 1862 through November 1865, 
the figures from the monthly reports to Hoffman showed only 20,338 deaths in all Union prison 
camps.  Hunter attributed this large discrepancy to deaths of prisoners who were wounded or 
sick when captured and died in Union hospitals.  He concluded that less than 10% of 
Confederate captives died in Union prison camps.482  Hunter’s calculation made Elmira’s death 
rate of 24.3% even more impressive.  As for other Union prison camps, they did not have the 
same death rate as Elmira.  Camp Alton and Camp Rock Island had a death rate of 14%, while 
Camp Chase reported a 13% death rate.  Camp Morton in Indiana was at 10%, while Fort 
Delaware demonstrated a 9% death rate.  Two camps had very low percentage of deaths, but for 
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different reasons.  Point Lookout in Maryland had a death rate of only 0.06%, but this rate was in 
part due to the significant number of prisoners, nearly 40,000 men, who passed through this 
camp.  Further, most of the POWs held at Point Lookout were transferred to other camps 
reasonably quickly.  The other camp with a low death rate was the first camp, Johnson’s Island.  
The death rate at Johnson’s Island was 0.03%, but this camp housed only officers during the 
entire war and had a limited census.483  The camp most similar to Elmira was Camp Douglas in 
Chicago, Illinois.  It had been both a mustering camp and a prison camp like Elmira.  Both 
camps had about the same census of prisoners.  Overall, Camp Douglas had a death rate of 
15%.484  For the time frame June 1st, 1863 to May 31st, 1864, Camp Douglas had an average 
monthly census of 5,304 prisoners with a total death toll of 536 POWs.  For the following year, 
June 1st, 1864, to May 31st, 1865, the average monthly census increased to 7,821 POWs.  It was 
during this time that Hoffman’s actions changed toward the Confederate captives.  Camp 
Douglas experienced a death toll during that year of 1,801 prisoners or more that three times the 
number for the previous year.  During its twelve-month existence, Elmira had an average 
monthly census of 7,212 prisoners, yet, as shown, its death toll was over a thousand men greater 
that Camp Douglas at 2,893 POWs, including George W. Jernigan.485 
There does not appear to be any data on the deaths in Union prison camps broken down 
by year.  Such figures were difficult to generate because of the nature of the prison system.  
Elmira was open only twelve months and that makes the 1864-1865 mortality percentage easy to 
calculate.  However, prisoners who entered Elmira were transfers from other prisons.  The death 
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rate percentage was figured by the total number of deaths divided by the total number of 
prisoners who entered the camp.  These figures did not reflect deaths if they occurred elsewhere 
such as another camp or at home after being exchanged.  Breaking these figures down year-by-
year was very difficult.  There was one statistic that came close.  This statistic was the yearly 
death rate per thousand prisoners for the Union prison camps.  The figures for the major camps 
were as follows:  Alton, 55.0; Camp Douglas, 44.1; Rock Island, 98.0; Camp Morton, 46.7; 
Johnson’s Island, 9.8; Fort Delaware, 45.4; Point Lookout, 46.4; and Elmira, 241.0.486  The gross 
death figures from 1864-1865 were still impressive in their own right.  Of the 20,338 deaths 
recorded from July of 1862 to November of 1865, only 646 deaths occurred after May 31st, 1865.  
Removing this number from the overall death total left 19,692 deaths during the wartime 
operations of the camps.  From June 1st (the start of the May 19th reduction in rations) to May 
31st, 1865 (when most camps were in the process of releasing prisoners), there were 12,075 
Confederate deaths.  Out of the total of 19,692 deaths, 61.3% occurred in the last year of the war.  
Using Rhodes’ number of 25,796 total Confederate deaths during captivity, the percentage of 
deaths in the last year of the war was still an impressive 48.0% or nearly one-half of all 
Confederate POW deaths. 
Hoffman’s performance gave another indicator to use for judgment.  This indicator was 
the prison funds that accumulated during the war.  On October 19th, 1865, Hoffman submitted 
his report on the prison funds generated by the individual camps.  He remitted to the government 
a total of $1,845,125.99 from twenty-five camps.  The breakdown by year for these funds 
revealed a noteworthy trend.  In 1862, the prison funds showed a year-end balance of $17,000 
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with a total of $40,000 accumulated funds, while there was $23,000 in expenses.  The following 
year the funds accumulated $293,000 with expenses of only $136,000.  These expenses left a 
fund balance of $157,000.  The percentage of prison funds remaining at year’s end increased 
from 42.5% to 53.6%.  By 1864 with the dramatic increase in the prisoner population, the prison 
funds accumulated $1,560,000.  Expenses were only $522,000 or an excess of $1,038,000.  The 
percentage of funds that remained was 66.7%.  As Hunter wrote, “A consolidated report showed 
that for the years 1862-1865 over $3,000,000 accumulated in the numerous prison funds, and 
over $1,245,000 of this sum was spent.”487  As for Elmira’s fund, the camp showed a balance of 
$58,151.54 at the end of the war.  This amount placed Elmira in eighth place over-all of the 
twenty-five camps.  All camps with higher total numbers reflected camps that were open 
longer.488  Horigan concluded, “Little did they [prisoners] know that at the time of their captivity 
that less than 44 percent of appropriated funds would be spent for food and other essential 
needs.”489 
There is little doubt that the Confederate POW death toll in 1864-1865 was a 
multifactorial problem.  The physical condition of the prisoners who presented in a debilitated 
state was a factor that cannot be overlooked.  Hoffman was unable to prevent the severe winter 
of 1864,-1865, neither was he able to prevent the spread of communicable diseases such as 
pneumonia and smallpox.  He was most certainly unable to control such variables as availability 
of lumber and building supplies, the composition of the soil surrounding the camps, and the 
impact of contamination of ground water.  With all of these factors accepted, there is an 
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inescapable fact—more Confederates died and a lower percentage of money was spent during 
the time of Hoffman’s change in action toward the Confederate captives.  There is one final note.  
Comparing Andersonville and Elmira, their respective commanders had different outcomes.  
Henry Wirz received a death sentence, while Brevet Maj. Gen. William Hoffman received a 
pension. 
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